State v. Sampson

• Decision Date: 08 July 2011
• Docket Number: No. 2008–311–C.A.,2008–311–C.A.
• Citation: 24 A.3d 1131
• Parties: STATEv.Mark SAMPSON.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

24 A.3d 1131

STATE

v.Mark SAMPSON.

No. 2008–311–C.A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 8, 2011.

Lauren S. Zurier, Department of Attorney General, for Plaintiff.Janice Weisfeld, Office of the Public Defender, for Defendant.Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.

OPINION

Justice ROBINSON for the Court.

The defendant, Mark Sampson, appeals from a judgment of conviction for second degree child abuse after a bench trial in the Superior Court for Kent County. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial justice committed reversible error because, in his view: (1) G.L.1956 § 11–9–5.3 (the statute pursuant to which the defendant was convicted) is unconstitutionally vague; (2) the evidence was insufficient for an adjudication of guilt and for denial of the defendant's motion for new trial; (3) the defendant did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to counsel; and (4) it was an abuse of discretion to adjudicate the defendant guilty and to deny the defendant's motion for new trial.

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court.

IFacts and Travel ¹

On September 27, 2007, defendant, Mark Sampson, was charged by criminal information with second degree child abuse. The criminal information set forth the charge in pertinent part as follows:

“That Mark Sampson, * * * on days and dates between July 30, 2007 and August 3, 2007, * * * did abuse [Jacob], a child, by inflicting upon said child a serious physical injury, not resulting in permanent disfigurement or disability, in violation of [G.L.1956] § 11–9–5.3(b)(2)(d)(e)* * *.” ^{2, 3} It is undisputed that Jacob is defendant's son, who was three years old when the child abuse allegedly occurred.

AThe Defendant's Waiver of Counsel and Waiver of a Trial by Jury

Mr. Sampson's trial commenced on April 7, 2008 in the Superior Court. Just prior to the voir dire process with respect to prospective jurors, defense counsel addressed the court regarding certain concerns that defendant wished to raise. Counsel, speaking on Mr. Sampson's behalf, stated that Mr. Sampson was “alleging ineffective assistance of counsel because [the attorney] [was] not going to call [defendant's other] son, [Michael], as a witness.” ⁴ Mr. Sampson, speaking on his own behalf, added that he “didn't want a jury trial, but [his attorney] wants to have a jury trial * * *.”

Addressing the disagreement over whether or not to call Michael as a witness, the trial justice indicated to Mr. Sampson (1) that he “presume[d] that there [was] a valid tactical reason” for the attorney's decision and (2) that ineffective assistance of counsel is usually alleged in the context of a postconviction proceeding. Mr. Sampson responded that “it [was] good enough to have on record.” In response to that statement, the trial justice indicated that they were, in fact, making a record; he then proceeded to deal with the jury trial issue.

With respect to the jury trial issue, the following exchange between defendant's attorney and the trial justice occurred:

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: * * * The issue of a [b]ench versus a jury trial, Mr. Sampson and I discussed that way back when I was first appointed * * *. We had been going back and forth[.] I have spoken to several attorneys, including the attorney who litigated the Thorpe case, and based upon all the information that I have * * * I do believe that it is in Mr. Sampson's best interest based on the work that I have done in preparing for this case, not to waive the jury trial. That's my strategic decision, and whether or not to call a specific witness or put—what questions to ask of a specific witness, these are decisions that are made by counsel, not by the client. The client decides whether or not he wants to testify. I've advised Mr. Sampson in this regard.

“ * * *

“THE COURT: * * * [Y]our reading of Strickland is that this decision is defense counsel's to make?

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It is, your honor.” (Emphasis added.) ⁵

Following the just-quoted exchange, the trial justice proceeded to advise defendant of the rules governing attorney conduct in this jurisdiction, and he again advised defendant that he would be able to address, in a postconviction relief proceeding, what he considered to be his attorney's ineffective assistance. The following ensued:

“THE COURT: * * * [W]e do have rules that are set by our Supreme Court that [govern] attorney conduct in these proceedings, and specifically in the Supreme Court Rules Article 5 Rule Number 2 which involves the role of a counselor, and Rule 2.1 involves just what [your attorney] is obligated to do as both your attorney and as an officer of this [c]ourt in representing a client. I'm quoting, ‘A lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid ...’ I emphasize, ‘... candid advice. In rendering advice a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors that may be relevant to a client's situation.’ Now, the commentary with regard to that rule says in part, ‘Legal advice often involves unpleasant facts and alternatives that a client may be disinclined to confront. However, a lawyer shall not be deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect that that advice will be unpalatable to the client.’

“MR. SAMPSON: That's advice though, sir, that is not the ultimate decision. That's advice.

“THE COURT: Ultimately, in addition to his duty to you[,] [your attorney] is required to proceed in a way that is calculated to get you the fairest and the best trial and try to [e]nsure the best chance of your acquittal of these charges. I quite agree with the decision to put your matter in front of a jury.

“MR. SAMPSON: Okay, I understand that you agree, but that doesn't—does that mean that it is actually right, sir? Not questioning your authority.

“THE COURT: I know, Mr. Sampson. The only way to judge that would be if this matter were to proceed to a jury and if you were to be convicted, at that point an Appellate Court or probably in a proceeding for post-conviction relief there would be an opportunity to present that question, that the decision to retain or to move forward with a jury trial in lieu of a Bench trial was, in fact, the wrong decision and it made for a good case of ineffective assistance of counsel. The argument may be more persuasive if it was reversed, that [your attorney] was insisting that we have a Bench trial and they avoid a jury trial. That may be a better argument in some cases depending on the specific facts, but I appreciate your placing this on the record, I'll treat it as a motion. I'm going to deny your motion. Is there anything else we need to address before the jury arrives?

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, your Honor. Thank you.

“THE COURT: Very well, Mr. Sampson. Thank you for your comments. I can assure you our court reporter has taken down your comments, and as soon as the jury arrives we'll commence the process of jury selection, we'll be in recess until then.” (Emphasis added.)

After the above-referenced recess, the jury voir dire commenced. At the conclusion of the voir dire process, defendant asked to address the court; and, with the prospective jurors not being present, defendant indicated that he was concerned about the composition of the jury. The defendant also stated that he was not satisfied with counsel. The trial justice then began to pose the necessary questions to defendant so that he could assure himself that his waiver of counsel and decision to represent himself was voluntary and knowing and intelligent. Before completing his inquiry of defendant, however, the trial justice continued the trial to April 9, 2008; he said that he was continuing the trial so that Mr. Sampson and his attorney could review the relevant case law with respect to waiver of counsel and so that Mr. Sampson could decide whether or not he wished to waive his right to an attorney.

On April 9, 2008, as defendant's trial resumed, defendant's attorney indicated to the court that defendant's desire to waive his attorney persisted. The trial justice then continued his inquiry of Mr. Sampson with respect to whether or not he wished to represent himself. The following brief exchange ensued:

“THE COURT: I remember at the end of the discussion before we had completed it you told me you didn't have the ability to represent yourself; do you remember that?

“MR. SAMPSON: Yes, sir.

“THE COURT: Do you still feel that way today?

“MR. SAMPSON: No. I feel that I don't want the support of [this attorney]. If it is the only alternative that I have, I will proceed.

“THE COURT: We're going to proceed today with you in charge of your own defense or with [this attorney]. So, do you feel that you can represent yourself today?

“MR. SAMPSON: Yes.” (Emphasis added.)

The following exchange, which occurred shortly thereafter and which we quote in pertinent part, is also of relevance:

“THE COURT: Now, in light of the penalty that you might suffer, if you are found guilty, and in light of all the difficulties of you representing yourself, do you still desire to represent yourself, Mr. Sampson, and give up your right to be represented by a lawyer?

“MR. SAMPSON: (Brief pause) Yes, sir.

“THE COURT: You don't sound very sure of that, sir.

“MR. SAMPSON: Your honor, I have to have confidence within my counsel and I don't. So I feel as though I have to step up myself. I don't have, as I stated, I don't have the money myself for counsel. If I did, I would definitely do that.

“THE COURT: Your problem is primarily you don't like the advice you're getting from [your attorney]?

“MR. SAMPSON: We're going in two different directions, sir, and I feel something is, you know, not being addressed.

“THE COURT: And you understand that you certainly are going to be able to make a case for that in a post trial proceeding with regard to [your attorney's] effective representation of you; do you...