State v. Sams

• Decision Date: 24 September 2014
• Docket Number: No. 27447.,27447.
• Citation: 410 S.C. 303,764 S.E.2d 511
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Desmond J. SAMS, Petitioner. Appellate Case No. 2011–195886.

410 S.C. 303

764 S.E.2d 511

The STATE, Respondent

v.Desmond J. SAMS, Petitioner.

Appellate Case No. 2011–195886.

No. 27447.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard Oct. 2, 2013.

Decided Sept. 24, 2014.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 7, 2014.

Tristan M. Shaffer, of Myrtle Beach, and Appellate Defender Susan Barber Hackett, of Columbia, for Petitioner.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, both of Columbia, for Respondent.

Opinion

Justice BEATTY.

Desmond J. Sams was convicted of voluntary manslaughter after he strangled the victim, Jake Frazier, during an altercation. Sams appealed, arguing the circuit court erred in denying his request to instruct t2he jury on involuntary manslaughter. The Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Sams, Op. No. 2011–UP–205, 2011 WL 11734316 (S.C. Ct.App. filed May 4, 2011). This Court granted Sams's petition for a writ of certiorari. We affirm.

I. FACTS

In the early morning hours of April 12, 2008, Sams and Lisa Strickland, along with Frazier and Stephanie Ballard, were all drinking at Strickland's residence in Walterboro when a dispute suddenly occurred between Sams and Frazier.¹ During the ensuing struggle, Sams managed to get on top of Frazier, who was lying face down on the floor. Sams locked his arm around Frazier's neck while lying on top of him. According to Ballard and Strickland, Frazier repeatedly stated that he could not breathe and he asked Sams to let him go. Frazier also told Sams that he had children. Sams, however, refused to release Frazier, so Ballard and Strickland tried unsuccessfully to get Sams to release his chokehold. Sams allegedly struck Ballard several times when she tried to separate the two men. Around 4:36 a.m., Strickland made the last of several calls to 911 to report the fight and to request police assistance.

Steve Dunn, a supervisor at the Colleton County Sheriff's Department, was dispatched at 4:38 a.m., and he arrived at the scene around 4:46 a.m., some ten minutes after the last call for help was made. He was met on the porch by Strickland, who told the officer, “They're in here,” and led him to a bedroom on the right side of the trailer. The officer observed two men lying face down on the floor, one on top of the other. According to the officer, he drew his taser and ordered the man on top, Sams, to “Get off of him.” However, Sams did not release his grip on Frazier, who was not moving. The officer ordered Sams to get up a second time, and Sams responded, “No, he'll want to fight.” The officer then ordered Sams a third time to get up.

At that point, Sams released Frazier and stood up. When Sams got up, the officer observed Sams's “arms [had been] wrapped around the neck area of the victim” in an “arm lock.” Frazier was unresponsive and remained face down on the floor. The officer handcuffed Sams and asked Strickland and Ballard to pull Frazier away from the wall and to roll him over on his back.

The officer noticed Frazier “was not breathing” and that he “had a blue cast to his skin.” The officer noted Frazier had shown no signs of life and had never made any movements.

Dr. Susan Presnell, a forensic pathologist, performed an autopsy and found Frazier had a number of bruises and scratches in his neck area. She also observed that he had bruises in the underlying muscles of his neck, as well as a number of petechiae

, or hemorrhages, in the lining of his eye and around the lining of his eyelid, all of which were indicative of strangulation. Dr. Presnell determined Frazier's cause of death to be asphyxiation, or lack of oxygen, due to strangulation.

Sams was indicted for murder for the choking death of Frazier. At trial, the circuit court instructed the jury on murder, the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter, and self-defense. The circuit court declined Sams's request to charge involuntary manslaughter. The jury found Sams guilty of voluntary manslaughter.

Sams appealed, arguing the circuit court erred in denying his request to charge the jury on involuntary manslaughter. The Court of Appeals affirmed. This Court granted Sams's petition for a writ of certiorari.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In criminal cases, appellate courts sit to review only errors of law. State v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 625 S.E.2d 216 (2006) ; State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 545 S.E.2d 827 (2001).

Thus, an appellate court is bound by a trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Wilson, 345 S.C. at 6, 545 S.E.2d at 829.

“The law to be charged to the jury is determined by the evidence presented at trial.” State v. Hill, 315 S.C. 260, 262, 433 S.E.2d 848, 849 (1993). The trial court is required to charge a jury on a lesser-included offense if there is evidence from which it could be inferred that the defendant committed the lesser, rather than the greater, offense. State v. Drafts, 288 S.C. 30, 340 S.E.2d 784 (1986) ; see also Dempsey v. State, 363 S.C. 365, 610 S.E.2d 812 (2005) ; State v. Gourdine, 322 S.C. 396, 472 S.E.2d 241 (1996).

“An appellate court will not reverse the trial [court]'s decision absent an abuse of discretion.” State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 570, 647 S.E.2d 144, 166 (2007). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling is based on an error of law or, when grounded in factual conclusions, is without evidentiary support.” Id. at 570, 647 S.E.2d at 166–67. “The refusal to grant a requested jury charge that states a sound principle of law applicable to the case at hand is an error of law.” Id. at 570, 647 S.E.2d at 167.

In determining whether the evidence requires a charge on a lesser-included offense, the Supreme Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the defendant. State v. Cole, 338 S.C. 97, 525 S.E.2d 511 (2000). The charge request is properly rejected when there is no evidence tending to show the defendant was guilty of the lesser offense. State v. Tucker, 324 S.C. 155, 478 S.E.2d 260 (1996) ; State v. Cooney, 320 S.C. 107, 463 S.E.2d 597 (1995) ; State v. Gadsden, 314 S.C. 229, 442 S.E.2d 594 (1994).

III. LAW/ANALYSIS

On appeal, Sams contends the Court of Appeals erred in determining there was no evidence to support a charge of involuntary manslaughter when he testified that he was attacked by Frazier and he “unintentionally strangled his friend while trying to restrain his friend.” We disagree.

Sams was indicted for the offense of murder for killing Frazier by means of choking. SeeS.C.Code Ann. § 16–3–10 (2003) (defining “murder” as “the killing of any person with malice aforethought, either express or implied.”). Voluntary and involuntary manslaughter are both lesser-included offenses of murder. State v. Williams, 399 S.C. 281, 731 S.E.2d 338 (Ct.App.2012).

“Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being in sudden heat of passion upon sufficient legal provocation.”Cole, 338 S.C. at 101, 525 S.E.2d at 513. “Both heat of passion and sufficient legal provocation must be present at the time of the killing.” Id. The sudden heat of passion need not dethrone reason entirely or shut out knowledge and volition, but it must be such as would naturally disturb the sway of reason and render the mind of an ordinary person incapable of cool reflection and produce what may be called an uncontrollable impulse to do violence. Id. at 101–02, 525 S.E.2d at 513 (citing State v. Byrd, 323 S.C. 319, 474 S.E.2d 430 (1996) ).

Involuntary manslaughter is defined as the unintentional killing of another without malice while engaged in either (1) the commission of some unlawful act not amounting to a felony and not naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm, or (2) the doing of a lawful act with a reckless disregard for the safety of others. State v. Tucker, 324 S.C. 155, 478 S.E.2d 260 (1996) ; see also S.C.Code Ann. § 16–3–60 (2003) (stating a person charged with involuntary manslaughter may be convicted only upon a showing of criminal negligence, “defined as the reckless disregard of the safety of others”).

Sams's theory at trial was essentially self-defense. Sams testified that he did not mean to kill Frazier and maintained he was just trying to restrain him to protect himself during their fight. However, Sams admitted that he held his arm around Frazier's neck and did not release his hold on him until the police officer arrived and ordered him to get off of Frazier. It is undisputed that more than ten minutes elapsed during this time.

In his appeal, Sams asserted the circuit court erred because the evidence arguably supported a factual finding that he unintentionally killed Frazier while acting in self-defense. The jury rejected Sams's argument of self-defense. The Court of Appeals rejected this contention as well and affirmed.

State v. Sams, Op. No. 2011–UP–205, 2011 WL 11734316 (S.C. Ct.App. filed May 4, 2011). The court observed Sams's appellate brief was scant and did not articulate which definition of involuntary manslaughter he believed was applicable, so it analyzed the case under both definitions. Id., slip op. at *1.

On certiorari, Sams contends the Court of Appeals erred in finding there was no evidence to support the charge of involuntary manslaughter because he testified that he was attacked by his friend and unintentionally strangled his friend while trying to restrain him. Sams argues he was entitled to the charge under either definition of the offense.

As noted above, involuntary manslaughter is defined as the killing of another without malice and unintentionally, while one is engaged in either (1) the commission of some unlawful act not amounting to a felony and not naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm; or (2) the doing of a lawful act with a reckless disregard of the safety of others. Tucker, 324 S.C. at 170, 478 S.E.2d at 268.

At trial, defense counsel asked for a charge on involuntary manslaughter because the killing was unintentional and Sams might have been criminally negligent because, even if he wasn't really in danger, he believed...