State v. Samuel
Decision Date | 28 February 2018 |
Docket Number | Appellate Case No. 2015-002401,Opinion No. 27768 |
Citation | State v. Samuel, 813 S.E.2d 487, 422 S.C. 596 (S.C. 2018) |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Lamont Antonio SAMUEL, Petitioner. |
Appellate Defender Robert M. Pachak, of Columbia, for Petitioner.
Attorney GeneralAlan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney GeneralJ. Robert Bolchoz, Assistant Deputy Attorney GeneralDonald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Attorney GeneralW. Edgar Salter, III, all of Columbia, and Solicitor David Michael Pascoe, Jr., of Orangeburg, for Respondent.
In this casewe clarify the proper scope of a circuit judge's inquiry under Faretta1 when a criminal defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives his right to counsel and requests to proceed pro se .Prior to his trial for murder, Lamont Antonio Samuel moved to represent himself under Faretta .The circuit judge denied his motion, finding Samuel was lying about whether he had or would have access to legal coaching in preparation for trial.The court of appeals affirmed.State v. Samuel , 414 S.C. 206, 777 S.E.2d 398(Ct. App.2015).We now reverse.
Samuel was indicted for the murder of his cousin, Taneris Hamilton.On the day his case was called to trial, Samuel indicated he was dissatisfied with defense counsel and made a Faretta motion to waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se .The circuit judge then properly initiated an ex parte hearing to discuss Samuel's Faretta motion with him.
Samuel informed the court that he was twenty-one years old and had graduated from high school with a 4.0 GPA in all honors classes with hopes of enlisting in the Navy as a diesel mechanic.Additionally, Samuel affirmed he understood he was charged with murder and was aware of the elements of the crime.He realized he could be sentenced to at least thirty years in prison, with a maximum possible sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.Samuel also indicated he had never been treated for drug or alcohol abuse, nor had he received assistance for mental or emotional health issues.Moreover, he had not taken any medication, drugs, or alcohol in the previous seventy-two hours.The judge noted she found Samuel to be "incredibly articulate" and "exceptionally bright;" nevertheless, she repeatedly told Samuel she had misgivings about his self-representation.Samuel thanked the judge for her advice, but reiterated his request to proceed pro se .
The circuit judge then inquired as to whether Samuel had any legal training.He responded that he had been studying trial procedures in the Criminal Law Handbook, which he had received in the mail while in prison.Samuel testified that his mother had sent him the book upon the advice of attorney Carl Grant.The circuit judge further questioned whether Samuel was familiar with the rules of evidence, motions in limine , and motions for directed verdict.Samuel affirmed that he was, based upon his study of the Criminal Law Handbook and coaching he had received from Grant.He also acknowledged he would be required to follow the rules of evidence if he were to represent himself, and that he had the right not to testify under the Fifth Amendment.Finally, the circuit judge asked Samuel if he was aware of any possible defenses he might have to the charge against him and, following some prompting questions by the judge, he acknowledged his intent to maintain his innocence based upon his co-defendant's alleged confession.
Rather than concluding the Faretta colloquy, the circuit judge continued to caution Samuel against representing himself, stating in her opinion Samuel would be far better defended by a trained lawyer, it would be unwise of him to waive his right to counsel, and she did not believe he was sufficiently familiar with the law, procedure, or rules of evidence to adequately represent himself.Despite the judge's warnings and in light of the potential penalties he faced, Samuel voluntarily reaffirmed his desire to dispense with the assistance of counsel and proceed pro se .
The circuit judge then stated, However, instead of ruling on Samuel's motion at that point, the circuit judge summoned Grant to question him on his relationship with Samuel.Nonetheless, prior to Grant's arrival, the judge stated on the record that her inclination was to allow Samuel to represent himself.
Upon his arrival, Grant testified as follows:
I have no recollection of ever sharing with Ms. Betty Hickson, [Samuel's]mother, anything pertaining to any rules of evidence or rules in criminal procedure or anything like that....The only discussion has been about the legal fees to represent this young man....Also, I've not been retained....I've not offered any assistance to anyone, Judge.I've not even given this young man any kind of copy of the rules of evidence or rules of criminal procedure or offered my assistance in any way....[A]s far as my offering any assistance to him, Judge, number one, if he's representing himself I would not be available to provide any assistance to him in any capacity.
After hearing Grant's testimony, the circuit judge denied Samuel's request to proceed pro se citing Rule 3.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct2andGardner v. State , 351 S.C. 407, 412–13, 570 S.E.2d 184, 186–87(2002)( ).Specifically, the circuit judge interpreted Samuel's and Grant's conflicting testimony to mean Samuel was lying to her and attempting to manipulate the proceedings.
Thereafter, Samuel proceeded to trial with his counsel and was found guilty and sentenced to fifty years imprisonment.He appealed his conviction, asserting the circuit judge erred in denying his right to self-representation, and the court of appeals affirmed.Samuel , 414 S.C. at 213, 777 S.E.2d at 402.This Court granted Samuel a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' opinion.
Whether a defendant has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel is a mixed question of law and fact which appellate courts review de novo.United States v. Lopez-Osuna , 242 F.3d 1191, 1198(9th Cir.2000).Specifically, we review a circuit judge's findings of historical fact for clear error; however, we review the denial of the right of self-representation based upon those findings of fact de novo.United States v. Bush , 404 F.3d 263, 270(4th Cir.2005).In doing so, this Court must consider the defendant's testimony, history, and the circumstances of his decision, as presented to the circuit judge at the time the defendant made his request.United States v. Singleton , 107 F.3d 1091, 1097(4th Cir.1997).
Through counsel, Samuel now argues the court of appeals erred in affirming the circuit judge's denial of his Farettamotion to proceed pro se .In particular, Samuel contends the circuit judge impermissibly exceeded the scope of the Faretta inquiry by considering Grant's testimony to conclude that Samuel was attempting to manipulate the proceedings, thereby precluding him from proceeding pro se .We agree.
In Faretta , the United States Supreme Court held that criminal defendants have a fundamental right to self-representation under the Sixth Amendment.422 U.S. at 819–21, 95 S.Ct. 2525.In order to effectively invoke this right of self-representation, the defendant must clearly and unequivocally assert his desire to proceed pro se and such request must be made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.United States v. Frazier-El , 204 F.3d 553, 558(4th Cir.2000).Where a defendant invokes his right of self-representation before trial, the only inquiry the circuit judge may undertake is that required by Faretta .State v. Barnes , 407 S.C. 27, 35, 753 S.E.2d 545, 550(2014).Thus, the only basis upon which a circuit judge may deny a defendant's pre-trial motion to proceed pro se is if the court determines the defendant has not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.State v. Reed , 332 S.C. 35, 41, 503 S.E.2d 747, 750(1998).A circuit judge's denial of a defendant's knowing and voluntary request to proceed pro se is a structural error requiring automatic reversal and a new trial.State v. Rivera , 402 S.C. 225, 247, 741 S.E.2d 694, 705(2013).
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Rule 3.3 Candor Toward the Tribunal
...whether the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his or her right to be represented by counsel. See State v. Samuel, 422 S.C. 596, 813 S.E.2d 487 (2018). But see City of Columbia v. Marie-Therese Assa'ad-Faltas, 420 S.C. 28, 33, 800 S.E.2d 782, 784 (2017) ("right to pr......