State v. Sanabria

• Decision Date: 10 April 1984
• Citation: 192 Conn. 671,474 A.2d 760
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Efrain SANABRIA et al. STATE of Connecticut v. Jose Alberto CASUL.

Page 760

474 A.2d 760

192 Conn. 671

STATE of Connecticut v. Efrain SANABRIA et al.

STATE of Connecticut v. Jose Alberto CASUL.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Nov. 8, 1983.

Decided April 10, 1984.

[192 Conn. 672] Jon L. Schoenhorn, Sp. Public Defender, for defendants Sanabria and holder.

Michael J. Whelton, Sp. Public Defender, for defendant Rivera.

Gerard Smith, Asst. Public Defender, Hartford, for defendant Richardson.

Douglas S. Ebenstein, W. Hartford, for defendant Worthington.

Gerald M. Klein, Sp. Public Defender, for defendant Ramos.

Carl Eisenman, Assistant Public Defender, Simsbury, for defendant Williams.

William A. Roberto, Hartford, for defendant Madison.

Carl Schuman, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, was John M. Bailey, State's Atty., for the State in first matter.

Richard Emanuel, Sp. Public Defender, with whom, on the brief, was Suzanne Zitser, Asst. Public Defender, for defendant Casul.

Carl Schuman, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were Arnold Markle, State's Atty., and Arthur C. Hadden, Asst. State's Atty., for the State in second matter.

Before SPEZIALE, C.J., and PETERS, HEALEY, PARSKEY and MENT, JJ.

SPEZIALE, Chief Justice.

These cases were heard together because they present common questions. Each requires a determination of the effective date of amendment seventeen to the Connecticut constitution, which provides that all persons held to answer for a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment be accorded a probable cause hearing "in accordance with procedures prescribed by law." We now hold that although amendment seventeen became a part of the constitution on November 24, 1982, it did not take effect until May 26, 1983, the effective date of legislation (Public Act 83-210) prescribing the necessary procedures. All defendants, therefore, charged with such crimes who had not been indicted by grand jury as of May 26, 1983, are entitled to a hearing in probable cause. Those who were indicted before May 26, 1983, have no right to any further pretrial determination of probable cause.

When our constitution originally was adopted in 1818 it required that prosecutions for certain offenses be commenced by grand jury indictment: "And no person shall be holden to answer for any crime, the punishment of which may be death or imprisonment for life, unless on a presentment or an indictment of a grand jury; except in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service, in time of war, or public danger." Conn. Const., art. I § 9 (1818). From 1818 until 1982 that provision remained substantially unchanged. ¹ All persons charged with a crime punishable on conviction by death or life imprisonment had a constitutional right to a grand jury determination that there was probable cause to believe the charge before being required to stand trial. See State v. Stepney, 181 Conn. 268, 435 A.2d 701 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077, 101 S.Ct. 856, 66 L.Ed.2d 799 (1981); State v. Menillo, 159 Conn. 264, 268 A.2d 667 (1970); State v. Stallings, 154 Conn. 272, 224 A.2d 718 (1966); Kennedy v. Walker, 135 Conn. 262, 63 A.2d 589 (1948), aff'd, 337 U.S. 901, 69 S.Ct. 1046, 93 L.Ed. 1715, reh. denied, 337 U.S. 934, 69 S.Ct. 1493, 93 L.Ed. 1740 (1949); State v. Kemp, 126 Conn. 60, 9 A.2d 63 (1939).

Throughout this period there also existed a statutory right to a grand jury indictment as a precondition to trial for such offenses. The most recent enactment appeared in General Statutes § 54-45 ² and provided in relevant part that "[n]o person shall be put to plea or held to trial for any crime the punishment of which may be death or imprisonment for life unless an indictment has been found against him for such crime by a grand jury legally impaneled and sworn...." General Statutes § 54-45(b). Subsection (a) of that statute set out, inter alia, procedures by which grand juries should be summoned, impaneled, and sworn, and how they should conduct themselves.

In 1981 the General Assembly adopted substitute House Joint Resolution No. 36. ³ Public and Special Acts, 1981, vol. 1, part 1. That resolution proposed that article first, § 8 of the constitution, which then incorporated the grand jury right among its other provisions, ⁴ be amended. The proposal called for the elimination of the grand jury and substituted a requirement for a probable cause hearing in all cases where a sentence of death or life imprisonment might be imposed. House Joint Resolution No. 36 (1981). On November 2, 1982, the proposed amendment was duly presented to the electorate for its approval at the general election. On November 24, 1982, the secretary of the state certified that a majority of the voters had approved the amendment, which was designated amendment seventeen to the constitution ⁵ (hereinafter the amendment). The amendment provides in relevant part, that: "Section 8 of article first of the constitution is amended to read as follows: ... No person shall be held to answer for any crime, punishable by death or life imprisonment, unless upon probable cause shown at a hearing in accordance with procedures prescribed by law, except in the armed forces, or in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger." (Emphasis added.) Conn. Const., amend. XVII.

As of November 24, 1982, the date the amendment was certified by the secretary of the state, neither the General Statutes nor the rules of the Superior Court prescribed procedures for such probable cause hearings. Also, the legislature had not yet repealed or amended the statutory grand jury provision, § 54-45 of the General Statutes. It was not until May 26, 1983, that Public Acts 1983, No. 83-210 became effective. ⁶ That act repealed the grand jury provisions embodied in § 54-45 and prescribed procedures by which probable cause hearings would be conducted. The legislature, however, did not make the act's provisions concerning probable cause hearings retroactive to the date the amendment was certified, November 24, 1982. Instead, the act provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o person charged by the state on or after the effective date [May 26, 1983] of this act shall be put to plea or held to trial for any crime punishable by death or life imprisonment unless the court at a preliminary hearing determines there is probable cause to believe that the accused person has committed it." Public Acts 1983, No. 83-210 § 1(a). The act then states that any person charged with such a crime before the effective date of the act must be indicted by a grand jury before being put to trial. Id., § 3(b).

These cases present questions concerning the period of time between certification of the amendment, November 24, 1982, and the effective date of the act, May 26, 1983. Unquestionably, any defendant indicted by a grand jury before the amendment was certified (November 24, 1982) is not entitled to any further pretrial determination of probable cause. And, any defendant charged by information for any crime punishable by death or life imprisonment on or after the effective date of Public Act 83-210 (May 26, 1983) is entitled to a hearing in probable cause. In order to determine the constitutional rights of those so charged before May 26, 1983, but not indicted before November 24, 1982, we are now asked to decide: (1) whether the constitutional right to a probable cause hearing became effective immediately upon certification, and (2) whether the legislature acted within its constitutional authority in enacting Public Act 83-210 which authorizes probable cause hearings only for those charged by the state on or after May 26, 1983.

The first matter before us involves eight separate cases: State v. Sanabria, State v. Holder, State v. Rivera, State v. Richardson, State v. Worthington, State v. Ramos, State v. Williams, and State v. Madison. All eight defendants were charged by information before May 26, 1983, with crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment; all of them were indicted by grand juries after November 24, 1982, on the charges alleged in the informations. The indictments against Sanabria, Holder, Rivera, and Richardson were handed down before May 26, 1983. The indictments against Worthington, Ramos, Williams, and Madison, however, were handed down after May 26, 1983. Each defendant filed a motion for an order granting a probable cause hearing. In each instance the trial court denied the motion without prejudice. On September 16, 1983, the trial court, Brennan, J., combined these cases and reserved to this court questions concerning the defendants' asserted right to a hearing in probable cause.

The second matter involves a single defendant, Jose Casul, who, on February 22, 1983, was charged by information with murder. On March 21, 1983, Casul filed a motion to dismiss the grand jury, which had been summoned by the trial court. The trial court denied the motion and on March 23, 1983, the grand jury returned a true bill of indictment on the charge. Casul then filed an appeal (docket No. 12114) from the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss the grand jury. On August 15, 1983, Casul filed a motion for a probable cause hearing. The trial court denied the motion without prejudice and, with the consent of the parties, reserved to this court questions concerning the defendant's asserted right to a hearing in probable cause. The reservation, with stipulated facts, was filed on September 26, 1983. Because the reserved questions address the same issues that Casul raised on appeal, we dismiss the appeal as moot. ⁷

I JURISDICTION

Before we address the reserved questions we must first decide whether it is within our jurisdiction to hear these questions at this stage of the proceedings. Section 52-263 of the General Statutes provides, in relevant part, that a party who "is aggrieved by the decision of the court or judge upon any question or questions of law arising in the trial ... may appeal to the court having...