State v. Sanchez

Decision Date28 May 2015
Docket Number34,516.
Citation2015 NMSC 018,350 P.3d 1169
PartiesSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Petitioner, v. Aide Zamora SANCHEZ, Defendant–Respondent.
CourtNew Mexico Supreme Court

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, James W. Grayson, Assistant Attorney General, Corinna Laszlo–Henry, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.

Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender, Allison H. Jaramillo, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM for Respondent.

Jones, Snead, Wertheim & Clifford, P.A., Jerry Todd Wertheim, Barbara E. Bergman, Theresa M. Duncan, Albuquerque, NM for Amicus Curiae New Mexico Criminal Defense Lawyers Association.

OPINION

CHÁVEZ, Justice.

{1} DefendantRespondent Aide Sanchez (Sanchez) was at the Santa Teresa, New Mexico port of entry, an international border crossing, attempting to enter the United States from Mexico, when Border Patrol agents seized marijuana from her van. In State v. Cardenas–Alvarez, 2001–NMSC–017, ¶ 1, 130 N.M. 386, 25 P.3d 225, we held that “the New Mexico Constitution and laws apply to evidence seized by federal agents at a border patrol checkpoint [located] sixty miles within the State of New Mexico [ (an interior fixed checkpoint) ] when that evidence is proffered in state court.” We also held that Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution “demands that after a Border Patrol agent has asked about a motorist's citizenship and immigration status, and has reviewed the motorist's documents, any further detention requires reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” Cardenas–Alvarez, 2001–NMSC–017, ¶¶ 12, 20, 130 N.M. 386, 25 P.3d 225.

{2} Sanchez successfully moved to suppress the evidence seized from her van, arguing that (1) Cardenas–Alvarez applies at the international border, and (2) seizure of the marijuana violated the New Mexico Constitution because the Border Patrol agents did not have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to continue to detain her once they had established her citizenship and immigration status. We hold that Article II, Section 10 does not afford greater protections at an international border checkpoint because unlike motorists who are stopped at interior border checkpoints, all motorists stopped at international fixed checkpoints are known to be international travelers who are not entitled to the heightened privacy expectations enjoyed by domestic travelers. We therefore reverse the district court's order suppressing the evidence in this case.

BACKGROUND

{3} On January 2, 2012, United States Customs and Border Protection Officer Erica Pedroza (Pedroza) was working as the primary officer at the Santa Teresa Port of Entry, an international border checkpoint. Primary officers are the first customs agents to speak with a motorist seeking to cross an international border. They check motorists' citizenship documentation and inspect their vehicles for contraband. Primary officers usually have, at most, 30 seconds to decide between releasing a motorist or referring the motorist to a secondary area for further inspection of the vehicle. Further inspections arise for various reasons, including documentation deficiencies such as the lack of a passport, the presence of agricultural products, and evidence that vehicles have been tampered with.

{4} Pedroza testified that while she was working, she encountered Sanchez driving a van. According to Pedroza, Sanchez claimed that she had spent the weekend in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico and was driving back to Denver, Colorado. Pedroza also stated that Sanchez produced valid documentation of her legal status as a permanent resident. However, Pedroza was unable to inspect the van to her satisfaction because of the presence of a large dog within the van. Consequently, Pedroza referred Sanchez to a secondary area to have the vehicle inspected, even though Pedroza did not suspect any criminal activity.

{5} Customs and Border Protection Officer Monica Pantoja (Pantoja) testified that she performed a seven-point inspection of Sanchez's van, which is an inspection of the whole vehicle. As part of this inspection, a drug-sniffing canine located marijuana within Sanchez's van.

{6} Sanchez was indicted for distribution of marijuana in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30–31–22(A)(1)(a) (2011) and conspiracy to commit distribution of marijuana in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30–28–2 (1979). Sanchez filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that under CardenasAlvarez, Pedroza lacked the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity required by the New Mexico Constitution to prolong her detention. In Cardenas–Alvarez we held that Article II, Section 10 applies to evidence seized at an interior fixed checkpoint “sixty miles within the State of New Mexico when that evidence is proffered in state court.” 2001–NMSC–017, ¶ 1, 130 N.M. 386, 25 P.3d 225. Under CardenasAlvarez, in the context of an interior fixed checkpoint, Article II, Section 10 “demands that after a Border Patrol agent has asked about a motorist's citizenship and immigration status, and has reviewed the motorist's documents, any further detention requires reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” 2001–NMSC–017, ¶ 20, 130 N.M. 386, 25 P.3d 225. The district court granted Sanchez's motion to suppress, finding that Pedroza's referral of Sanchez for a secondary inspection of the van was not supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The district court excluded “all evidence obtained and seized from [Sanchez] and her vehicle, following the referral of [Sanchez] for a secondary inspection.”

{7} The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court, holding that Cardenas–Alvarez applies, irrespective of the location of the checkpoint. State v. Sanchez, No. 32,994, mem. op. ¶¶ 1–3, 8, 2013 WL 6662824 (N.M.Ct.App. Nov. 6, 2013) (non-precedential). The Court of Appeals then concluded that “the facts relied upon by the State neither establish that issues of residence or citizenship were unresolved when [Sanchez] was sent to the secondary inspection area nor that there was any basis for a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing at that time.” Id. ¶ 6.

{8} We granted the State's petition for writ of certiorari, State v. Sanchez, 2014–NMCERT–002, to address two issues:

1) Whether the protections of Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution extend to the international border, and, if so, whether referral of [Sanchez] to a secondary area for continuation of routine questioning requires individualized suspicion[, and]
2) Whether the application of the interstitial approach in Cardenas–Alvarez should be revisited.

We decline to interpret Article II, Section 10 as requiring individualized reasonable suspicion of criminal activity for prolonging detentions at an international border checkpoint. We also decline to revisit the approach taken in CardenasAlvarez, because Cardenas–Alvarez is not implicated in this case.

DISCUSSION

{9} All of the issues presented in this case are reviewed de novo. “Whether the exclusionary rule under Article II, Section 10... applies to the use of evidence in a New Mexico state court proceeding when that evidence resulted from a search conducted by federal border-patrol agents is a threshold constitutional issue that is subject to de novo review.” State v. Snyder, 1998–NMCA–166, ¶ 6, 126 N.M. 168, 967 P.2d 843. If a constitutional provision applies, claims arising under it are also reviewed de novo. State v. Brown, 2006–NMSC–023, ¶ 8, 139 N.M. 466, 134 P.3d 753 ; see also Cardenas–Alvarez, 2001–NMSC–017, ¶ 6, 130 N.M. 386, 25 P.3d 225 (“The constitutionality of a search or seizure is a mixed question of law and fact and demands de novo review.”).

{10} In CardenasAlvarez, we held that the New Mexico Constitution applies to evidence seized by federal agents at an interior fixed checkpoint when the State seeks to introduce the evidence in state court criminal proceedings. 2001–NMSC–017, ¶ 20, 130 N.M. 386, 25 P.3d 225. The question remains whether the greater protections that exist at an interior fixed checkpoint also exist at the international border checkpoint. To answer this question, we apply the interstitial approach announced in State v. Gomez, 1997–NMSC–006, ¶¶ 19–22, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1.

{11} Under the interstitial approach,

the court asks first whether the right being asserted is protected under the federal constitution. If it is, then the state constitutional claim is not reached. If it is not, then the state constitution is examined. A state court adopting this approach may diverge from federal precedent for three reasons: a flawed federal analysis, structural differences between state and federal government, or distinctive state characteristics.

Id. ¶ 19 (citations omitted).

{12} The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause....” (Emphasis added.) Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution provides that [t]he people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures....” Article II, Section 10 parallels the federal Fourth Amendment and embodies “the fundamental notion that every person in this state is entitled to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusions.” State v. Gutierrez, 1993–NMSC–062, ¶ 46, 116 N.M. 431, 863 P.2d 1052 (emphasis added).

I. The United States Constitution was not violated

{13} The events in this case occurred at an international border checkpoint, not at an interior fixed checkpoint. “This is an important distinction as a citizen's Fourth Amendment rights at a checkpoint located on the border ... are significantly less than inside the border.” United States v. Rascon–Ortiz, 994 F.2d 749, 752 n. 4 (10th Cir.1993). The federal government's “interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith...

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  • State v. Walker-Brazie
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • 24 Septiembre 2021
    ...later declined to extend its holding in Cardenas-Alvarez to an international border checkpoint. State v. Sanchez, 2015-NMSC-018, ¶ 28, 350 P.3d 1169.9 Roving patrols are one of three statutorily authorized "kinds of inland traffic-checking operations"—in addition to temporary and permanent ......
  • State v. Walker-Brazie
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    • 24 Septiembre 2021
    ... ... 543 ... (1976)." [ 4 ] Id ... ¶ 10. We noted that ... "[f]ederal courts have theoretically validated such ... checkpoints up to one hundred air miles from the physical ... border of the United States." Id ... (citing ... Almeida-Sanchez v. United States , 413 U.S. 266, 268 ... (1973)). Because the constitutionality of the checkpoint was ... not at issue, we assumed that the checkpoint met the criteria ... for the functional equivalent of the border and concluded ... that Article 11 did not apply to the ... ...
  • State v. Antonio M.
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    • 17 Marzo 2022
    ...identifications are nonetheless admissible." Martinez , 2021-NMSC-002, ¶ 72, 478 P.3d 880 ; see State v. Sanchez , 2015-NMSC-018, ¶ 26, 350 P.3d 1169 ("The general rule is that cases are not authority for propositions not considered." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).{49} Se......
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    • 1 Abril 2020
    ...require bifurcation, we reject this argument. We review issues of constitutionality de novo. State v. Sanchez , 2015-NMSC-018, ¶ 9, 350 P.3d 1169 ("If a constitutional provision applies, claims arising under it are ... reviewed de novo."). Defendant does not cite a single case supporting th......
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