State v. Sanchez-Cazares

• Decision Date: 24 October 2003
• Docket Number: No. 89,268.,89,268.
• Citation: 276 Kan. 451,78 P.3d 55
• Parties: STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. FRANCISCO SANCHEZ-CAZARES, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

276 Kan. 451

78 P.3d 55

STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. FRANCISCO SANCHEZ-CAZARES, Appellant.

No. 89,268.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Opinion filed October 24, 2003.

Adebayo Ogunmeno, of Law Offices of Henry O. Boaten, P.A., of Topeka, argued the cause, and Henry O. Boaten, of the same firm, was with him on the brief for appellant. Robert D. Hecht, district attorney, argued the cause, and Deborah L. Hughes, assistant district attorney, and Phill Kline, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

NUSS, J.:

Francisco Sanchez-Cazares appeals the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and to set aside convictions for two counts of first-degree premeditated murder and three counts of aggravated battery. He raises three issues:

1. Whether the pleas were knowingly and voluntarily made;

2. Whether the pleas were the result of ineffective assistance of counsel;

3. Whether the pleas to the murder charges were supported by evidence sufficient to establish premeditation.

Our jurisdiction is under K.S.A. 22-3601(b)(1), conviction of an off-grid crime, and we affirm.

FACTS

On September 16, 2001, a shooting occurred at a baptismal party on Kansas Avenue in Topeka which left two people dead and three injured. Witnesses informed the police that a Hispanic male with an assault rifle had approached, shot two men as they left the building, and then fled in a 1980's model Chevrolet Camaro or Pontiac Trans Am. Several witnesses identified Francisco Sanchez-Cazares as the gunman and the decedents as Billy Hester and Ralph Mingee.

The following morning, Topeka police contacted Sanchez-Cazares at his home. After receiving Miranda warnings in both English and Spanish, he admitted to the shooting. He stated he had been angry that the two men had arrived at the party drunk and danced disrespectfully with the women. He admitted that he drove his car around to the front of the building, retrieved his SKS semiautomatic assault rifle from the trunk, and fired approximately 10 shots toward the two men, killing them and injuring three other partygoers who were still inside. Afterwards, he entered the passenger side of his car and fled the scene. He then gave his assault rifle and ammunition to a friend, who locked the items in his garage. The State charged Sanchez-Cazares with two counts of premeditated murder and three counts of aggravated battery. He initially pled guilty to the counts as charged on October 18, 2001. Approximately 1 month later, however, he filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing and alleged, among other things, ineffective assistance of counsel and denial of due process. Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion. On March 7, 2002, the court sentenced him to two concurrent life sentences for the premeditated murder charges. For the aggravated battery charges, the court sentenced him to an additional 82 months, 41 months each on two of the counts, with those sentences to run consecutive to the life sentences, and 12 months on the third count, with that sentence to run concurrent with the other two aggravated battery sentences.

ANALYSIS

Issue 1: Were Sanchez-Cazares' guilty pleas knowingly and voluntarily made?

Sanchez-Cazares claims that the district court erred when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas for several reasons. First, he argues the pleas were not knowing because he did not comprehend the English language well enough to understand the terms "premeditation" and "intentionally." Second, he argues the guilty pleas were not voluntary because his attorneys told him that he would make the judge angry if he did not sign the plea agreement.

We begin our analysis by examining K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 22-3210, which governs pleas. It provides:

"(a) Before or during trial a plea of guilty or nolo contendere may be accepted when:

(1) The defendant or counsel for the defendant enters such plea in open court; and

(2) in felony cases the court has informed the defendant of the consequences of the plea, including the specific sentencing guidelines level of any crime committed on or after July 1, 1993, and of the maximum penalty provided by law which may be imposed upon acceptance of such plea; and

(3) in felony cases the court has addressed the defendant personally and determined that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea; and (4) the court is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea.

. . . .

"(d) A plea of guilty or nolo contendere, for good cause shown and within the discretion of the court, may be withdrawn at any time before sentence is adjudged. To correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea."

We have stated that when a district court evaluates a motion to withdraw a plea under this statute, it should consider whether: "(1) the defendant was represented by competent counsel, (2) the defendant was misled, coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken advantage of, and (3) the plea was fairly and understandingly made." State v. Bey, 270 Kan. 544, 545, 17 P.3d 322 (2001). When we review the district court's decision, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 22-3210(d). Discretion is abused only when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the district court. The defendant bears the burden of establishing such an abuse of discretion. 270 Kan. at 545-46.

Now that the analytical framework has been established, we examine Sanchez-Cazares' specific claims. His argument that he did not speak or comprehend English well enough to understand the meanings of "premeditated" and "intentionally" is disingenuous because it fails to consider the impact of his own testimony and his personal interpreter's testimony. The court assigned Richard Jones to work with Sanchez-Cazares' lawyers as his personal Spanish interpreter. Jones, who is also an attorney, has served as criminal defense counsel for Spanish-speaking defendants in both the Shawnee County and federal courts. Jones testified that although Sanchez-Cazares had questions regarding the meaning of premeditation, there were no questions pending at the time of his plea. Jones believed that Sanchez-Cazares' attorneys had properly advised Sanchez-Cazares of the meaning of premeditation, and that Sanchez-Cazares understood the meaning of premeditation at the time of his plea. Jones further testified that he would have intervened if Sanchez-Cazares' attorneys had improperly advised Sanchez-Cazares regarding the term premeditation.

Regarding Sanchez-Cazares' understanding of the meaning of intentional, Jones testified that Sanchez-Cazares constantly raised questions about his intent to shoot the three partygoers who were injured because he did not intend to shoot them. Jones, however, noted that Sanchez-Cazares' attorneys used an analogy to help Sanchez-Cazares understand the legal concept of transferred intent as it applied to the three counts of aggravated battery.

While Sanchez-Cazares testified through an interpreter at the hearing on the motion to withdraw his plea, he also testified in English without the aid of an interpreter during the same hearing. He testified that he told his attorneys when he did not understand something. He admitted that the word "intentional" was explained to him, but he simply refused to accept his attorneys' explanation for the term. He also demonstrated his willingness to ask questions when he asked the judge what "intentional" meant at the plea hearing.

Essentially, Sanchez-Cazares' complaints about the terms "premeditated" and "intentionally" demonstrate his disagreement with the legal meanings for the words. According to Sanchez-Cazares' attorney, Jason King, his client believed that he did not commit premeditated murder because he did not sit at home and plan to kill the two men. King testified that Sanchez-Cazares understood the meaning of premeditation but disagreed that his actions constituted premeditation. Likewise, Sanchez-Cazares did not believe that he committed intentional aggravated battery on the three injured people because he did not intend to harm them directly. Nevertheless, Sanchez-Cazares' lack of agreement with the legal meanings of the words does not equate to a lack of understanding about their meanings and does not support the withdrawal of his guilty plea.

Sanchez-Cazares relies on Clinkingbeard v. State, 6 Kan. App. 2d 716, 634 P.2d 159 (1981), to support his argument that his plea should be set aside because of his lack of understanding. Clinkingbeard, however, can be easily distinguished on its facts. There, the defendant pled guilty to second-degree murder for killing his stepson. The only evidence before the court was Clinkingbeard's affidavit, which claimed that he was trying to remove the shells from the gun before his stepson found it and shot someone with it. It stated that his stepson grabbed the barrel of the gun, which discharged while Clinkingbeard was pushed backwards. Clinkingbeard believed that the gun would not fire because the safety was on. Finding no strong evidence of the intent necessary to support a second-degree murder conviction, the court determined that his plea was not knowingly made and granted his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. 6 Kan. App. 2d at 719-20. At his plea hearing, he stated that he did not shoot his stepson on purpose. The Clinkingbeard court found this statement to be an attempt to deny any intention to shoot his stepson. 6 Kan. App. 2d at 718.

The facts in the instant case are much different. Sanchez-Cazares admitted to retrieving his assault rifle from the trunk of his car, driving to the front of the building, shooting complete strangers because they were dancing rudely with women at a party, and fleeing the scene after the shooting. Unlike Clinkingbe...