State v. Sanchez
| Decision Date | 08 August 2017 |
| Docket Number | DA 16-0111 |
| Citation | 388 Mont. 262,399 P.3d 886,2017 MT 192 |
| Parties | STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Adam SANCHEZ, Jr., Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
For Appellant: Chad Wright, Chief Appellate Defender, Koan Mercer, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana.
For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Katie F. Schulz, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Carey Ann Haight, Cascade County Attorney, Joshua A. Racki, Deputy County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana.
¶1 Adam Sanchez, Jr. appeals from his October 2015 conviction and sentence for deliberate homicide and several other offenses. We affirm.
¶2 The issue on appeal is whether the District Court abused its discretion by giving jury instruction No. 12: "When circumstantial evidence is susceptible to two interpretations, one that supports guilt and one that supports innocence, the jury determines which is most reasonable."
¶3 This case arises from an August 2014 incident in Cascade County, Montana. A Montana Highway Patrol Trooper observed Sanchez's vehicle driving over the speed limit and attempted to make a traffic stop. Sanchez did not stop but continued driving through the Great Falls area, often at high speed, while being pursued by officers. Pursuing officers and citizens in the area observed Sanchez slowing when he needed to avoid a collision with other vehicles, and they observed him waiting for oncoming traffic to clear before passing other vehicles. Officers observed Sanchez maneuver around barriers at high speed, including driving into the roadside ditch, all the while maintaining control of his vehicle.
¶4 Cascade County Deputy Sheriff Joe Dunn placed his patrol car off the side of the road with emergency lights flashing and attempted to lay spike strips on the highway ahead of Sanchez's vehicle. Motorists on the same roadway saw Deputy Dunn on or near the roadway, and slowed or stopped in response. Witnesses observed that Sanchez did not stop, but passed another vehicle then swerved his vehicle to Deputy Dunn's side of the roadway and struck him. Witnesses reported that Dunn was in plain view and that Sanchez could have avoided him but instead swerved toward Dunn striking him with his vehicle. Witnesses and patrol car video showed that Sanchez had a clear field of vision and that there was no oncoming traffic when he swerved to hit Deputy Dunn. There was no evidence that Sanchez slowed or attempted to brake as he hit Deputy Dunn, who died from the impact.
¶5 Sanchez did not stop. After hitting Deputy Dunn, he continued to elude pursuit at high speeds. Other drivers narrowly avoided being hit by Sanchez's vehicle, and Sanchez swerved toward another officer who was on the road setting up tire spikes. In that incident, Sanchez left his lane of travel, crossed a double center line and swerved in front of oncoming traffic toward the officer. Fortunately, that officer was not injured. Sanchez eventually stopped in Black Eagle after officers disabled the tires of his vehicle. Sanchez continued to try to move his vehicle, resisted arrest, and fought with officers. He was eventually subdued.
¶6 The State charged Sanchez with felony offenses of deliberate homicide ( § 45-5-102, MCA ); assault with a weapon ( § 45-5-213, MCA ); assault on a police officer ( § 45-5-210, MCA ); and two counts of criminal endangerment ( § 45-5-207, MCA ). The jury convicted Sanchez of all the charged offenses but one. On that charge the jury convicted him of a lesser included offense, negligent endangerment, § 45-5-208, MCA. The District Court sentenced Sanchez to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
¶7 A district court has broad discretion when instructing a jury, which this Court reviews for abuse of discretion. State v. Zlahn , 2014 MT 224, ¶ 14, 376 Mont. 245, 332 P.3d 247. We review the instructions as a whole to determine whether they fully and fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law. State v. Kaarma , 2017 MT 24, ¶ 7, 386 Mont. 243, 390 P.3d 609. Reversible error occurs only when the instructions prejudice the defendant's substantial rights. Zlahn , ¶ 14.
¶8 Issue: Whether the District Court abused its discretion by giving jury instruction No. 12: "When circumstantial evidence is susceptible to two interpretations, one that supports guilt and one that supports innocence, the jury determines which is most reasonable."
¶9 At trial Sanchez properly preserved his objection to this instruction. He argues that the disputed instruction relieved the State of its burden to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. He contends that the instruction violated his right to due process by allowing the jury to convict him based upon evidence that was only "reasonable," instead of requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. He contends that the disputed instruction conflicted with his entitlement to a presumption of innocence. Sanchez contends that this was especially important in his case because his mental state during the events was a primary issue, and that the jury was instructed that mental states "often may not be proved directly" but may be proved through circumstantial evidence.
¶10 The State argues that taken as a whole the jury instructions in this case fully and fairly covered all relevant points of law, and that Sanchez cannot establish that the instructions shifted the State's burden to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The State contends that the disputed instruction is supported by clear case law and that it only assists the jury in resolving certain disputed issues of fact regarding circumstantial evidence. The State further contends that the case against Sanchez was not based primarily upon circumstantial evidence, but was based almost entirely upon direct evidence of the events such as contemporary video recordings, photographs, eyewitness accounts, and physical evidence.
Instruction No. 4. The Court instructed that each charge is a separate offense; Sanchez could be found guilty only if the State met its burden to prove each element of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Instruction No. 6. The District Court instructed the jurors that they "are the sole judges of the credibility, that is, the believability, of all the witnesses." Instruction No. 8.
¶12 The District Court instructed the jury to determine the "weight or relative weight to be given to the testimony of each witness" and to "carefully consider all the testimony given, the circumstances under which each witness has testified, and every matter in evidence that tends to indicate whether a witness is worthy of belief." Instruction No. 8. The District Court instructed the jury that they could rely on the appearance of witnesses; their manner; their apparent candor, fairness, and intelligence; and their knowledge of the subject of their testimony.
¶13 The District Court instructed that there is seldom direct proof of a person's purpose or knowledge, and that the jury could consider "any relevant circumstantial evidence" in that regard. Instruction No. 13. The District Court instructed the jury that they "may infer the defendant's state of mind or mental state, including his purpose and knowledge, from the Defendant's statements, acts, and conduct in conjunction with any and all other relevant facts and circumstances in evidence." Instruction No. 13.
¶14 The District Court then gave separate instructions as to each of the charges, beginning with deliberate homicide in the death of Deputy Dunn under the felony murder rule. That instruction required the State to "prove beyond a reasonable doubt" that Sanchez committed the offense of assault with a weapon against Deputy Dunn, and that in the course of doing so caused the death of Deputy Dunn. The District Court instructed that a person commits assault with a weapon if he purposely or knowingly causes another reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury by use of a weapon. The District Court instructed the jury on the statutory requirements for the mental states of purposeful and knowing conduct, and on the definition of "cause," "serious bodily injury," and "weapon." The District Court again instructed that the State must prove all the elements of the felony murder charge "beyond a reasonable doubt." Instruction No. 14.
¶15 The record is clear that the District Court instructed the jury separately on the elements of each of the offenses, including the requisite mental state for each. Each of the individual offense instructions required the jury to convict only if the State proved each element of the offense "beyond a reasonable doubt," and to acquit if the State did not.
¶16 Upon review of all the instructions, we conclude that the disputed instruction on its face did not relieve ...
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