State v. Sanchez
| Decision Date | 07 March 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 17166,17166 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Larry Brad SANCHEZ, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Alan E. Trimming, Ada County Public Defender, of Boise, for defendant-appellant.
Jim Jones, Atty. Gen. by Myrna A.I. Stahman, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.
This is a sentence review case. In today's opinion, we uphold a prison sentence imposed for grand theft, and we comment on the relationship between the Unified Sentencing Act (I.C. § 19-2513) and the standards of sentence review articulated in State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 650 P.2d 707 (Ct.App.1982).
The background facts may be summarized briefly. Larry Brad Sanchez has been convicted twice of grand theft. The first offense resulted in a grant of probation; but when the second grand theft occurred, Sanchez's probation was revoked and a suspended seven-year, indeterminate sentence was ordered into execution. We upheld that sentence in State v. Sanchez, 114 Idaho 387, 757 P.2d 250 (Ct.App.1988) (hereafter cited as Sanchez I ). With respect to the second grand theft, which was committed after the effective date of the Unified Sentencing Act, Sanchez received a sentence of seven and one-half years, of which two and one-half years were prescribed as the minimum period of confinement. In response to a motion under I.C.R. 35, the district court subsequently reduced the minimum period of confinement to two years. This sentence, running concurrently with the sentence for the first grand theft, is the subject of the instant appeal.
Sanchez contends, as he did in the other appeal, that his sentence is excessive. Our standards of sentence review have been well established since we enunciated them in State v. Toohill, supra. The standards address two questions inherent in sentence review: (1) how to measure the probable duration of confinement under a prison sentence, and (2) what criteria to employ in determining the reasonableness of such confinement. Concerning the first question, we said in Toohill that one-third of the facial length of an indeterminate sentence would be treated as the presumptive measure of confinement, absent a contrary indication in the record. However, this one-third "rule of thumb" is no longer appropriate in cases where a minimum period of confinement has been specified by the judge under the Unified Sentencing Act. In those cases the minimum period generally will be treated as the probable measure of confinement for the purpose of sentence review. By focusing on this period, we do not wholly disregard the aggregate length of the sentence, nor do we suggest that a prisoner will be entitled to parole when the minimum period has elapsed; but we do recognize that he will be eligible for parole at that time.
As to the second question, in evaluating the reasonableness of the duration of confinement we continue to apply the substantive criteria articulated in State v. Toohill:
[A] term of confinement is reasonable to the extent it appears necessary, at the time of sentencing, to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all other related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given case. A sentence of confinement longer than necessary for these purposes is unreasonable.
103 Idaho at 568, 650 P.2d at 710. To the extent that a minimum period of confinement represents the judicially determined "price" of a crime, the criteria of retribution and deterrence are particularly important. Conversely, insofar as the minimum period establishes a prospective time frame for institutional correction programs and for evaluation of the prisoner's eventual suitability for parole, the factors of rehabilitation and protection of society are applicable.
When we apply these criteria to a given case, we conduct an independent review of the record,...
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State v. Kysar
...confinement for the purpose of appellate review. See State v. Maxfield, 115 Idaho 910, 771 P.2d 928 (Ct.App.1989); State v. Sanchez, 115 Idaho 776, 769 P.2d 1148 (Ct.App.1989). We must determine whether a four-year Kysar and his brother were sentenced for taking money from Pizza Hut employe......
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State v. Byington, 23273
...we examine the minimum period of confinement of six years in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence. See State v. Sanchez, 115 Idaho 776, 769 P.2d 1148 (Ct.App.1989). At sentencing, the district court had the benefit of a presentence investigation (PSI) report. The PSI report indicat......
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State v. Dreier
...the reasonableness of a sentence are well established. State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 1 P.3d 299 (Ct.App.2000); State v. Sanchez, 115 Idaho 776, 769 P.2d 1148 (Ct. App.1989); State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 653 P.2d 1183 (Ct.App.1982); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 650 P.2d 707 (Ct.App......
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State v. Brumfield, 26388.
...review, we consider the minimum period of confinement to be the probable duration of incarceration. State v. Sanchez, 115 Idaho 776, 777, 769 P.2d 1148, 1149 (Ct.App.1989). An abuse of discretion will be found only if, in light of the governing criteria, the sentence is excessive under any ......