State v. Sanchez

• Decision Date: 01 September 2016
• Docket Number: No. 20140749–CA,20140749–CA
• Citation: 380 P.3d 375,2016 UT App 189
• Parties: State of Utah, Appellee, v. James Raphael Sanchez, Appellant.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

380 P.3d 375

2016 UT App 189

State of Utah, Appellee,

v.James Raphael Sanchez, Appellant.

No. 20140749–CA

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Filed September 1, 2016

John B. Plimpton, Ralph W. Dellapiana, and Teresa L. Welch, Attorneys for Appellant.

Sean D. Reyes and Karen A. Klucznik, Attorneys for Appellee.

Judge J. Frederic Voros Jr

. authored this Opinion, in which Judge Michele M. Christiansen concurred. Senior Judge. Russell W. Bench concurred except as to Part I, in which he concurred in the result, with opinion.¹

Opinion

VOROS

, Judge:

¶1 James Raphael Sanchez appeals his convictions for murder, a first degree felony, and obstruction of justice, a second degree felony. Sanchez beat his girlfriend (Victim) for hours before strangling her. He then attempted to clean the apartment before asking a friend to pick him up. His principal claim on appeal is that the court incorrectly excluded out-of-court statements that supported his mitigation theory of extreme emotional distress. He also claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for obstruction of justice. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 On the morning of May 5, 2011, Sanchez called 911. He refused to identify himself, but told dispatch “there's a woman here, not breathing” at Victim's apartment. When the paramedics arrived at the apartment, they found Victim “badly beaten, [not] breathing, and [with] obvious signs of rigor mortis.” Diffuse “deep red, purple” bruising and swelling covered Victim's face. Her nose was fractured

. “There was blood in the whites of both of her eyes.” The “inner surfaces of her lips” were torn, “as if the lip had been pulled away from the gum.” Her neck was bruised, consistent with strangulation. Victim's torso, abdomen, legs, arms, hands, and buttocks also displayed “extensive” bruises “too numerous to count.” Eight of her ribs were fractured. Possible bite marks were found on Victim's back and buttocks. Police also found blood throughout the apartment. Some of the blood looked diluted or as if someone had tried to wipe it away.

¶3 Victim's neighbor had been kept awake by “muffled yelling, some grunting, and then some running around here and there, and then ... a lot of crying, ... like despair.” The sounds continued for at least five hours, but when the neighbor left for work at 8:15 a.m. “it was dead silent.” Sanchez told police that he “got into a fight with” Victim that lasted all night. He said “that he slapped her, thumped her, and then he called the cops.” When asked to elaborate, he described punching, slapping, kicking, stomping, grabbing, and finally strangling Victim. Sanchez “said that she lost consciousness and that he attempted to revive her on a couple of occasions by breathing for her.” He also put Victim's head under running water in an attempt to revive her. When she lost consciousness for the last time, he lay down next to her and took a nap. When Sanchez woke up and Victim did not, he called a friend, then called 911. He left the apartment, leaving the door open for paramedics and police. His friend drove Sanchez to a convenience store, where Sanchez again called 911. They then went to the friend's house, where Sanchez took off his bloody pants and socks and took a nap.

¶4 At trial, the State introduced an interview between Sanchez and a police detective through the detective's testimony. The interview was audio-recorded and transcribed. In the interview, Sanchez admitted to assaulting Victim. On cross-examination of the detective, Sanchez attempted to elicit testimony that would explain the reason for the assault—that “he started fighting with [Victim] because he thought she was cheating on him with his brother,” that “she admitted it and she kept saying it,” that “she wouldn't tell [him] that” she would stop the affair, and that Victim's statement “hurt [his] feelings.” The trial court excluded the testimony, stating, “If you're seeking to introduce ... hearsay, unless you can give me an exception, it's not coming in.” Sanchez argued, among other things, that the court was required to admit the testimony under rule 106 of the Utah Rules of Evidence

. The court determined that rule 106 did not require the court to admit the testimony. Sanchez did not testify at trial.

¶5 Sanchez also moved for a directed verdict on the obstruction-of-justice charge, arguing that the evidence failed to show that he acted with the requisite intent. The trial court denied the motion.

¶6 The jury convicted Sanchez of murder, a first degree felony, and obstruction of justice, a second degree felony. Sanchez appeals.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

¶7 Sanchez contends that under rule 106 of the Utah Rules of Evidence

, the trial court was required to admit the part of his police interview in which he explained why he assaulted Victim, because it was necessary to qualify, explain, or place into context the part of the statement in which he confessed to the assault.

¶8 Sanchez also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for obstructing justice.

ANALYSIS

I. Utah Rule of Evidence 106

¶9 Sanchez contends that under rule 106 of the Utah Rules of Evidence

, the trial court was required to admit the part of his police interview in which he explained why he assaulted Victim, because it was necessary to qualify, explain, or place into context the part of the statement in which he confessed to the assault. Sanchez attempted to introduce the part of his statement in which he told police that “he started fighting with [Victim] because he thought she was cheating on him with ... his brother.” He said “this enraged him,” that Victim “admitted it and she kept saying it,” and that it “hurt [his] feelings.”

¶10 Rule 106 of the Utah Rules of Evidence

“permits introduction of an otherwise inadmissible statement if the opposing party introduces a portion of the statement.” State v. Jones , 2015 UT 19, ¶ 40, 345 P.3d 1195.

If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part—or any other writing or recorded statement—that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.

Utah R. Evid. 106

. The rule “serves a protective function to prevent a misleading impression created by taking matters out of context.” Jones , 2015 UT 19, ¶ 40, 345 P.3d 1195 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶11 We “review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude specific evidence for an abuse of discretion.” Id. ¶ 12

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “In circumstances where evidence should have been admitted, it is reviewed for harmless error.” State v. Colwell , 2000 UT 8, ¶ 26, 994 P.2d 177. “If it is reasonably likely a different outcome would result with the introduction of the evidence and confidence in the verdict is undermined, then exclusion is harmful.” Id.

¶12 We first consider whether the trial court erred when it excluded Sanchez's statement under the fairness standard of rule 106

. Because we conclude that the court exceeded its discretion when it excluded the statement under the fairness standard, we then consider whether Sanchez's statement was hearsay and, if so, whether rule 106 creates a hearsay exception. And because we conclude that rule 106 does create a hearsay exception, we then consider whether the erroneous exclusion of the statement was harmless.

A. The Fairness Standard

¶13 Rule 106

allows a party to admit the balance of a written or recorded statement “that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time” as the rest of the statement. Utah R. Evid. 106. The rule “establishes a fairness standard that requires admission of those things that are relevant and necessary to qualify, explain, or place into context the portion already introduced.” Jones , 2015 UT 19, ¶ 40, 345 P.3d 1195 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “It thus serves a protective function to prevent a misleading impression created by taking matters out of context.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The trial court has considerable discretion in determining issues of fairness....” State v. Leleae , 1999 UT App 368, ¶ 45, 993 P.2d 232. “In determining whether a disputed portion of a statement must be admitted [under the federal version of rule 106 ], the trial court should consider whether (1) it explains the admitted evidence, (2) places the admitted evidence in context, (3) avoids misleading the jury, and (4) insures fair and impartial understanding of the evidence.” United States v. Lopez–Medina , 596 F.3d 716, 735 (10th Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).²

¶14 The trial court here ruled that “the fairness analysis does not require the admission of [Sanchez's] statements offered to explain the reasons for his brutal assault on the victim,” because the explanation was “a self-serving, after-the-fact explanation.” The court also ruled that the fairness standard did not require the admission of Sanchez's explanation, because it was “temporally removed”—separated by sixteen pages in the transcript—from the confession introduced by the prosecution. Sanchez argues that “neither of these reasons is valid for excluding evidence offered under rule 106

.”

¶15 In ruling that the fairness standard did not require the admission of a self-serving explanation, the trial court relied on this court's opinion in Leleae , 1999 UT App 368, 993 P.2d 232

. In Leleae, the trial court ruled that fairness did not require admission of a statement where “the statement was merely self-serving.” Id. ¶ 45. We concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion, but we did so noting that although the statement had been excluded, “the jury heard testimony that supported defendant's version of the incident and put the admitted portion of defendant's statement in context.” Id. The statement that the defendant sought to admit under rule 106 was therefore not “necessary to qualify, explain, or place into context the portion...