State v. Sanders

• Decision Date: 12 December 1997
• Docket Number: No. 76807,76807
• Citation: State v. Sanders, 263 Kan. 317, 949 P.2d 1084 (Kan. 1997)
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Lyle Craig SANDERS, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 1084

949 P.2d 1084

263 Kan. 317

STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v.Lyle Craig SANDERS, Appellant.

No. 76807.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Dec. 12, 1997.

Syllabus by the Court

1.The right to cross-examine witnesses is subject to evidentiary rules, and the trial court has broad discretion in controlling the examination.

2.Evidence of specific instances of a witness' conduct only tending to prove a trait of his or her character is inadmissible.

3.The trial court may declare a mistrial when prejudicial conduct makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without injustice to the defendant.

4.In order to show a trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant a mistrial, the party seeking the mistrial has the burden of showing the party was substantially prejudiced by the error.

5.In deciding whether improper and unsolicited remarks by a witness regarding a defendant's invocation of his or her Fifth Amendment rights requires a mistrial, we focus our inquiry upon whether a limiting instruction was given, the degree of prejudice, and whether the erroneous admission of evidence was of such a nature as to affect the outcome of the trial.

6.In reviewing a Batson v. Kentucky challenge concerning the State's use of a peremptory challenge, the applicable appellate standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining whether the challenged strikes were constitutionally permissible.

7.The Batson v. Kentucky challenge involves a three-step process.First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race.Second, if the requisite showing has been made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the jurors in question.Finally, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried his or her burden of proving purposeful discrimination.

8.The second step of the Batson v. Kentucky process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive or even plausible, but requires merely facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation.Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.The ultimate burden of persuasion rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.

9.When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, the appellate standard of review is whether, after a review of all of the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the appellate court is convinced that a rational factfinder could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

10.If an inference drawn from the evidence is a reasonable one, the jury has the right to make the inference.

Mary Curtis, Assistant Appellate Defender, argued the cause, and Steven R. Zinn, Deputy Appellate Defender, was with her on the brief, for appellant.

Charles R. Reimer, Assistant District Attorney, Nola Foulston, District Attorney, and Carla J. Stovall, Attorney General, were on the brief, for appellee.

LARSON, Justice:

Lyle Craig Sanders appeals his jury convictions and sentences from his second trial for first-degree murder (K.S.A.1992 Supp. 21-3401) and an aggravated weapons violation (K.S.A. 21-4202[Ensley 1988] ).We reversed Sanders' prior convictions on these charges stemming from the 1993 killing of Latonya Edmond in State v. Sanders, 258 Kan. 409, 904 P.2d 951(1995), on the ground the trial court erred in failing to instruct on the lesser included charge of second-degree murder.

In this appeal, Sanders raises five issues: (1) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Sanders to cross-examine the detective who interviewed him regarding the detective's resignation from the police force and successful diversion of a theft charge?(2) Did the trial court err in refusing to grant a mistrial after a State witness made an unsolicited comment regarding Sanders' assertion of his right to silence during his police interrogation?(3) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in finding Sanders had failed to prove purposeful discrimination on the part of the State in the use of its peremptory strikes during jury selection?(4) Was the imposition of three consecutive life sentences pursuant to the Habitual Criminal Act an illegal sentence?(5) Was there sufficient evidence for the jury to convict Sanders of the aggravated weapons violation?

The issues to be decided in this appeal do not necessitate a recitation of all the facts, which are substantially set forth in 258 Kan. at 410-13, 904 P.2d 951.Additional facts will be referred to as necessary during our discussion of the issues.

Use of diversion agreement for impeachment

At trial, the State moved in limine to prevent Sanders from questioning Wichita police detective Randy Lawson about his resignation from the police force and his successful diversion of a theft charge.The court ruled a diversion was not a conviction and thus was not proper impeachment and prohibited Sanders from inquiring as to why Lawson no longer worked for the Wichita Police Department.

In raising this issue, Sanders first emphasizes that the credibility of Lawson was crucial to the State's case.Lawson was the detective in charge of Edmond's murder investigation and had testified that Sanders told him during an interrogation that he had gone to Edmond's house around the time of the murder.

Insofar as the alleged error is the ruling on the State's motion in limine, we apply the abuse of discretion standard of review.State v. Bornholdt, 261 Kan. 644, 659, 932 P.2d 964(1997).Further, we have said the admission or exclusion of evidence, subject to exclusionary rules, is within the trial court's discretion.State v. Baacke, 261 Kan. 422, 427, 932 P.2d 396(1997).A trial court may only be said to have abused its discretion when its action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when no reasonable person would adopt the view of the trial court.

K.S.A. 60-420 provides:

"Subject to K.S.A. 60-421 and 60-422, for the purpose of impairing or supporting the credibility of a witness, any party including the party calling the witness may examine the witness and introduce extrinsic evidence concerning any conduct by him or her and any other matter relevant upon the issues of credibility."

K.S.A. 60-421 limits evidence of a conviction of a crime in order to impeach a witness' credibility.It reads, in relevant part: "Evidence of the conviction of a crime not involving dishonesty or false statement shall be inadmissible for the purpose of impairing his or her credibility."

Further limitations upon the admissibility of evidence affecting credibility are set forth in K.S.A. 60-422:

"As affecting the credibility of a witness ... (c) evidence of traits of his or her character other than honesty or veracity or their opposites, shall be inadmissible; (d) evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct relevant only as tending to prove a trait of his or her character, shall be inadmissible."

In the present case, Sanders acknowledged evidence of the diversion for theft was evidence of a prior bad act, not a conviction.He may not now assert on appeal that the diversion was a conviction of a crime involving dishonesty such that 60-421 allows its admission, especially as he presents absolutely no argument or authority that a diversion constitutes a conviction for purposes of 60-421.Nor has Sanders presented any credible argument that evidence of this bad act is admissible for any purpose other than to impeach Lawson's character trait of veracity.As such, the evidence must be excluded pursuant to 60-422(d).

The trial court did not err in ruling this evidence was inadmissible to impeach Lawson.

Sanders further contends, however, that the trial court's ruling unconstitutionally denied him his right to confront and cross-examine Lawson, prevented him from presenting his defense, and precluded him from receiving a fair trial.

In Bornholdt, we noted:

" 'The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment affords the accused the right to cross-examination.[Citation omitted.]A proper and important function of the right to cross-examination is the exposure of the witness' motivation in testifying.[Citation omitted.]Generally, the right to cross-examine witnesses is subject to evidentiary rules, and the trial court has broad discretion in controlling the examination.[Citation omitted.]

" 'Error in restriction of cross-examination is subject to a harmless error standard if the reviewing court can declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had little if any likelihood of changing the result of the trial.[Citation omitted.]However, there are certain circumstances in which the denial of effective cross-examination amounts to a constitutional error of such magnitude that no showing of prejudice is required for reversal.[Citation omitted.]' "261 Kan. at 654, 932 P.2d 964(quotingState v. Rinck, 256 Kan. 848, 854, 888 P.2d 845[1995] ).

Sanders has failed to show the evidence he sought to cross-examine Lawson about had any bearing upon Lawson's motivation for testifying in this case.Sanders simply wanted to use this evidence to attack Lawson's credibility, thereby impeaching his testimony.Restricting such cross-examination in no way deprived Sanders of his constitutional right to confront witnesses.As no error, constitutional or otherwise, was committed in the exclusion of these questions pursuant to our rules of evidence, this issue fails.

Right to remain silent

Sanders next claims the State improperly admitted his invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to silence during the direct examination of Lawson.He argues this reference was so prejudicial as to amount to reversible error.

On the day Edmond's body was discovered, Sanders contacted the police and agreed to come to the station to talk.Sanders was...