State v. Sanders, 25,569.
Court | Supreme Court of New Mexico |
Citation | 2000 NMSC 32,129 N.M. 728,13 P.3d 460 |
Decision Date | 19 October 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 25,569.,25,569. |
Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard E. SANDERS a/k/a Eddie Sanders, Defendant-Appellant. |
13 P.3d 460
129 N.M. 728
2000 NMSC 32
v.
Richard E. SANDERS a/k/a Eddie Sanders, Defendant-Appellant
No. 25,569.
Supreme Court of New Mexico.
October 19, 2000.
Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, James O. Bell, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.
OPINION
BACA, Justice.
{1} Defendant, Richard Eddie Sanders, was convicted of willful and deliberate first degree murder contrary to NMSA 1978, § 30-2-1(A)(1) (1994) and numerous other crimes1 stemming from his involvement in a drug trafficking ring that operated in southern New Mexico. Sanders' sentence to life imprisonment vests this Court with jurisdiction. See N.M. Const. art. VI, § 2 (as amended 1965); see also Rule 12-102(A)(1) NMRA 2000. Sanders appeals his conviction on three grounds. He alleges that the district court: (1) improperly admitted his confession in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition against coerced confessions; (2) committed reversible error by improperly rejecting his proffered jury instructions regarding the voluntariness of his confession; and (3) improperly denied his motion to monitor the jury culling process. Finding no error in the rulings of the trial court, we affirm Sanders' convictions.
I.
{2} Sanders' conviction resulted from a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) probe into a suspected drug organization operating in southern New Mexico. In conjunction with its drug investigation, the FBI was also investigating the disappearance of Darrett McCauley, a purported member of the drug organization. During the course of their investigation, the FBI learned of a threat on Sanders' life and that members of the drug organization considered him a "loose end that had to be taken care of." The FBI has a policy of alerting intended victims of threats on their lives which they have learned of during the course of an investigation. Accordingly, two agents, Mr. Colbridge and Mr. Pittman, visited Sanders' father's feed store in Alamogordo on July 27, 1994, in an attempt to contact Sanders. Because Sanders was not available, the agents spoke with his father, advised him of the threat, and left a contact number for Sanders to reach them. The next day, Sanders called the FBI and left a cellular telephone number where he could be reached. FBI Special Agent Pittman returned Sanders' call. Statements made during this initial conversation between Special Agent Pittman and Sanders provide the basis for Sanders' Due Process challenge. The conversation occurred as follows:
SA Pittman: Well, we, we ... ah talked to your father, Jim Eddie Sanders: Yeah. SA Pittman: Yesterday, um ... we ... like we told him ... we needed to contact you and advise you that ... ah ...(Agent Pittman and Sanders then arranged a tentative time to meet in Las Cruces.).
Eddie Sanders: I should get over there ... ah ... I just call you sometime in the morning and let you know where I'm at and everything. SA Pittman: Okay. Eddie Sanders: Cause ... ah ... I'd like for you all to go ahead and keep track of me. SA Pittman: Okay. Eddie Sanders: You know ... cause ... ah .... I don't know what the investigation is about but I have a sneaking suspicion about how it's originated. SA Pittman: Okay. Eddie Sanders: And ... ah ... I've. SA Pittman: Now if we ... I'm gonna be frank with you Eddie, if we get together I don't, I don't wanna dance around. I want, I would like to get to the point and get to the bottom of this. Eddie Sanders: Me too. No problem at all. SA Pittman: Okay. Eddie Sanders: Ah, you know I've been ... this has been kind of in the back of my head, bugging me for probably a year. SA Pittman: Okay.(Conversation ends with confirmation that Defendant should call in the morning to arrange meeting with Special Agent Pittman.).
{3} Following this conversation, Sanders met Special Agent Pittman and Agent Colbridge at a Super 8 Motel in Las Cruces, New Mexico. Sanders was driven to the Super 8 by his girlfriend and his father. During this meeting, Sanders gave what was to be the first of a number of detailed confessions in which he described the killing of Darrett McCauley and provided information that led to the discovery of McCauley's remains in the forest of Catron County. At the conclusion of the initial interview on July 28, 1994, Sanders signed an FBI Advice of Rights interrogation form which contained his rights under Miranda and the following statements: "I understand and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been made to me and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me." He again signed advice of rights forms when he met with the FBI on August 9, 1994, and August 15, 1994.
{4} Sanders was subsequently charged with the murder of Darrett McCauley. Sanders filed a motion to suppress the contents of his confession, alleging that it was coerced by Special Agent Pittman's indication that he would communicate his cooperation to the United States Attorney's office. Sanders also maintained that the FBI coerced his confession by informing him of the threat on his life. The district court conducted a suppression hearing at which Sanders and the FBI agents testified. In addition to the transcript of the conversation, the trial court also considered a number of other relevant factors. The trial court detailed those findings of fact after the suppression hearing: (1) Defendant, an adult male born March 1953, completed high school and reads and understands the English language; (2) Defendant was having some "problems" in 1994 which included the suspicious destruction of both his truck and home and the rape of his girlfriend; (3) In May of
II.
{5} Sanders was not in custody and was free to leave when he gave his initial confession and therefore he does not assert that his confession was taken in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Instead, Sanders asserts that his confession was improperly induced by police coercion and that the use of the confession at trial was in contradiction of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See State v. Cooper, 1997-NMSC-058, ¶ 31, 124 N.M. 277, 949 P.2d 660 (detailing the analytical distinction between a Miranda analysis and a voluntariness analysis); see also Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461, 80 L.Ed. 682 (1936) (seminal case holding that a confession obtained by brutality and violence was constitutionally invalid under the Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
{6} We review the voluntariness of a defendant's confession based on the totality of the circumstances. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (reaffirming the "totality of the circumstances" as the proper inquiry); Cooper, 1997-NMSC-058, ¶ 26, 124 N.M. 277, 949 P.2d 660. "Voluntariness means `freedom from official coercion.' " State v. Munoz, 1998-NMSC-048, ¶ 21, 126 N.M. 535, 972 P.2d 847 (quoting Miller v. Dugger, 838 F.2d 1530, 1538 (11th Cir.1988)). However, not all confessions obtained by police violate the Due Process Clause. "The police may be midwife to a declaration naturally born of remorse, or relief, or desperation, or calculation." Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 576, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961). Therefore, it is the duty of this Court to determine whether Sanders' "will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired" in such a way as to render his confession the product of official coercion. Munoz, 1998-NMSC-048, ¶ 20, 126 N.M. 535, 972 P.2d 847 (quoting Culombe, 367 U.S. at 602), 81 S.Ct. 1860. "[W]e review the entire record and the circumstances under which the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Dangcil, A-56 September Term 2020
...v. Barnoski, 418 Mass. 523, 638 N.E. 2d 9, 13-14 (1994) ; Davis v. State, 767 So. 2d 986, 992 (Miss. 2000) ; State v. Sanders, 129 N.M. 728, 13 P.3d 460, 467-68 (2000) ; State v. Hyde, 352 N.C. 37, 530 S.E. 2d 281, 291-92 (2000).Having determined that defendant and counsel were not entitled......
-
People v. Phillips, Appeal No. 3–13–0270
...such promise is offered, a credible threat of violence does not affect the voluntariness of a confession. See, e.g. , State v. Sanders , 129 N.M. 728, 13 P.3d 460, 466 (2000) (although FBI agent communicated a credible threat to the defendant of violence from a drug organization, the defend......
-
State v. Martinez, S-1-SC-36502
...jury instructions that give "undue emphasis to the [d]efendant's theory of the case" are improper. State v. Sanders , 2000-NMSC-032, ¶ 23, 129 N.M. 728, 13 P.3d 460. Commentary on the evidence is "implicitly" inappropriate in a jury instruction and "is a matter that should be left for argum......
-
State v. Baroz, S-1-SC-34839.
...¶ 32, 146 N.M. 319, 210 P.3d 216. "Voluntariness means freedom from official coercion." State v. Sanders , 2000-NMSC-032, ¶ 6, 129 N.M. 728, 13 P.3d 460 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Promises of leniency on the part of police can be 404 P.3d 779coercive and may render a ......
-
State v. Dangcil, A-56 September Term 2020
...v. Barnoski, 418 Mass. 523, 638 N.E. 2d 9, 13-14 (1994) ; Davis v. State, 767 So. 2d 986, 992 (Miss. 2000) ; State v. Sanders, 129 N.M. 728, 13 P.3d 460, 467-68 (2000) ; State v. Hyde, 352 N.C. 37, 530 S.E. 2d 281, 291-92 (2000).Having determined that defendant and counsel were not entitled......
-
People v. Phillips, Appeal No. 3–13–0270
...such promise is offered, a credible threat of violence does not affect the voluntariness of a confession. See, e.g. , State v. Sanders , 129 N.M. 728, 13 P.3d 460, 466 (2000) (although FBI agent communicated a credible threat to the defendant of violence from a drug organization, the defend......
-
State v. Martinez, S-1-SC-36502
...jury instructions that give "undue emphasis to the [d]efendant's theory of the case" are improper. State v. Sanders , 2000-NMSC-032, ¶ 23, 129 N.M. 728, 13 P.3d 460. Commentary on the evidence is "implicitly" inappropriate in a jury instruction and "is a matter that should be left for argum......
-
State v. Baroz, S-1-SC-34839.
...¶ 32, 146 N.M. 319, 210 P.3d 216. "Voluntariness means freedom from official coercion." State v. Sanders , 2000-NMSC-032, ¶ 6, 129 N.M. 728, 13 P.3d 460 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Promises of leniency on the part of police can be 404 P.3d 779coercive and may render a ......