State v. Sanders, 48920
| Decision Date | 11 June 1962 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,No. 48920,48920,1 |
| Citation | 358 S.W.2d 45 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Ronald Lee SANDERS, Appellant. . Division |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
G. W. Marsalek, Burton H. Shostak, St. Louis, for appellant.
Thomas F. Eagleton, Atty. Gen., Frank P. Motherway, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.
Defendant Ronald Lee Sanders was, in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, convicted by a jury verdict on a charge of an assault with intent to rob with malice aforethought. A previous conviction was alleged and proven. The trial court assessed Sanders' punishment at imprisonment in the State Penitentiary for a term of twenty years. An appeal was taken to this court. Sanders was represented by courtappointed counsel who filed a motion for new trial and also briefed and argued the case here on appeal.
Defendant did not offer any evidence. The Stat's evidence justifies the following statement: Gilbert Layton operated a tavern and confectionery at 1901 Benton, St. Louis, Missouri. On January 27, 1961, at about 10:30 p. m., five people were in the place of business, among whom were Rhonda Thompson, a small girl, and a man named James Simon. Layton was there conducting the business. About this time, the defendant and a man named Cook entered the tavern. After looking about, defendant Sanders purchased a bag of potato chips and Cook went to a telephone booth. When Cook left the telephone booth, he announced that this was a 'stick up' or 'hold up.' Sanders made a similar statement and with a pistol in his left hand threatened to shoot the little girl Rhonda unless all present would go to a back room. No one present went to the back room and after some maneuvering, James Simon and Cook entered into an altercation,--whereupon Cook ran for the door and Simon followed him to the street. Sanders ordered Layton to lie down which Layton refused to do. Finally, Sanders moved toward the front door, still holding the pistol in his left hand. About that time, Layton threw a bottle at Sanders and Sanders shot at Layton. The bullet lodged in Layton's arm. He was taken to a hospital where the bullet was removed and turned over to the police department. While Layton was at the hospital (January 30, 1961), Sanders and Cook were arrested. Sanders was identified at the hospital by Layton as the man who had fired the shot. One Collins, arrested on some charge not here material, took a police officer to a place where a weapon was found. A ballistics expert testified that the bullet taken from Layton's arm had been fired from the pistol which was found by the police with the aid of Collins. At the trial, Layton, as well as others who were present at Layton's place on the night in question, identified Sanders as being the man who had a snub-nosed pistol and who threatened to shoot Rhonda Thompson if those present disobeyed his orders.
The points briefed by the defendant are, in substance, that the trial court erred in permitting two witnesses to testify whose names had not been previously endorsed on the information; further that the evidence of these two witnesses tended to prove the commission of a different and separate crime and therefore should not have been admitted; that the court erred in admitting into evidence a photograph of the defendant taken in a police 'line up'; that this amounted to compelling the defendant to testify against himself; that the court erred in giving an instruction on reasonable doubt because the instruction lessened the State's burden of proof; that an instruction informing the jury that a severance had been granted was erroneous because it did not inform the jury how Cook, the co-defendant had pleaded to the charge; that the court erred in permitting the State's attorney, in his argument to the jury, to make statements that defendant may have used dye to color his hair.
We shall dispose of the points in the order stated. The matter of endorsing the names of two witnesses on the information came about in the following way: Sanders was charged in six separate cases. On March 9, 1961, Woodruff Marsalek was appointed as attorney for the defendant in all six cases. The present trial began on May 1, 1961. Marsalek was notified that the names of Vernon and Edna McDonald would be endorsed as witnesses. Through some mistake in the clerk's office, the number of the case stated in the notice was another of the six cases against Sanders but not the one involving the offense now before us. This mistake was discovered on the day before the evidence was introduced before the jury. The court, after a hearing, permitted the witnesses to testify and overruled defendant's objection. The court then commented that the error in numbering the case on the notice was an oversight and that defendant's counsel had notice that the two witnesses were to be used in a Sanders case. Further, the court noted that the Daily Record carried the item of the endorsement of the names on the information a number of days before the trial.
In view of the circumstances, the trial court's ruling was not an abuse of discretion. The record does not show any prejudice to the rights of the defendant. The prosecuting officials in good faith attempted to comply with S.Ct. Rule 24.17, V.A.M.R. State v. Thost, Mo., 328 S.W.2d 36, l.c. 38(4); State v. Churchill, Mo., 299 S.W.2d 475, l. c. 478(10, 11); State v. Lindsey, Mo., 80 S.W.2d 123, l. c. 126(7-9).
In connection with the objection to the endorsement of the names of the McDonalds on the information, the defendant urges that the evidence of these two witnesses was superfluous to identify the defendant as the person committing the crime at Layton's tavern; further, that the evidence 'was violently prejudicial to defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial.' Suffice to say, as to the point that the evidence was not needed to identify the defendant, there was a dispute as to identity. Defendant's attorney cross-examined a number of State witnesses in an attempt to show that the identification was not positive. Note counsel's statement in the argument of the brief on another point where he said,
The second point, that the evidence was prejudicial to the rights of the defendant because it tended to prove a separate crime, is without merit. Identity of the defendant was in dispute and, as indicated in the statement of facts, the bullet taken from Layton was shown to have been fired from a pistol not in the defendant's...
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