State v. Sandoval

• Decision Date: 07 October 2003
• Docket Number: No. 27,881.,27,881.
• Citation: 2003 NMSC 27,134 N.M. 453,78 P.3d 907
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. Anthony Joseph SANDOVAL, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

78 P.3d 907

134 N.M. 453

2003 NMSC 27

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. Anthony Joseph SANDOVAL, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 27,881.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

October 7, 2003.

Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, Max Shepherd, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Petitioner.

John Bigelow, Chief Public Defender, Karl Erich Martell, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent.

OPINION

SERNA, Justice.

{1} The district court sentenced Defendant Anthony Sandoval as a habitual offender based on three prior felony convictions. Defendant appealed his sentence to the Court of Appeals on the ground that it violated the requirement in Rule 5-604(B)(1) NMRA 2003 that the habitual criminal proceeding be commenced within six months of arraignment. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the district court lacked authority to grant a petition to extend the time for commencement of trial once the six month time period under Rule 5-604 expired. State v. Sandoval, 2003-NMCA-031, ¶ 16, 133 N.M. 399, 62 P.3d 1281, cert. granted, No. 27,881, 133 N.M. 413, 63 P.3d 516 (2003). On certiorari, we hold that Rule 5-604 allows the court a reasonable time to rule on timely-filed petitions to extend. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals.

I. Facts

{2} Defendant was arraigned on the State's supplemental information on August 4, 2000. As a result, the six-month rule was scheduled to run on February 4, 2001. See Rule 5-604(B)(1). On January 25, 2001, the State filed a motion in the district court to extend the date for commencement of trial to May 4, 2001. The State noted in its motion that a new trial date was necessary because the judge assigned to the case had been presiding over another trial on the previously set trial date of January 23, 2001. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on February 21, 2001, based on the fact that the district court had not granted an extension before the expiration of the six months provided in Rule 5-604. At a hearing the following day, the district court denied Defendant's motion and granted the State's petition to extend. The district court then proceeded with Defendant's habitual offender proceeding on February 22, 2001. After being sentenced as a habitual offender, Defendant appealed.¹

II. The District Court's Authority to Rule on a Timely Petition to Extend

{3} Under Rule 5-604, parties may petition either the district court or this Court to extend the time for commencement of trial for good cause shown. Rule 5-604(C)-(E). Absent exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the State or the trial court, "[t]he petition shall be filed within the applicable time limits prescribed by this rule." Rule 5-604(E). The State complied with this rule by filing its petition within the applicable time limits. However, Rule 5-604 does not provide a time within which the district court, this Court, or a justice of this Court must rule on a timely-filed motion. Rule 5-604 is effectively silent on this question.

{4} Defendant contends that, even though the State's petition was timely filed, the district court lacked authority to rule on the State's petition to extend the time for commencement of trial once the six-month rule expired on February 4, 2001. Defendant relies on Rule 5-604(F), which states: "In the event the trial of any person does not commence within the time specified in Paragraph B of this rule or within the period of any extension granted as provided in this rule, the information or indictment filed against such person shall be dismissed with prejudice." Defendant contends that the directive "shall be dismissed" creates a mandatory requirement that implicitly deprives this Court and the district court of authority to rule on any petition to extend after the six month period has expired, even if the petition was filed in a timely manner before the end of the applicable time limit.

{5} The State, in contrast, contends that Rule 5-604 must be construed according to other rules of criminal procedure because the rule is silent with respect to the time limit for ruling on a timely-filed petition. The State relies on Rule 5-601(F) NMRA 2003, which establishes a general rule that "[a]ll motions shall be disposed of within a reasonable time after filing," and Rule 5-104(B)(1) NMRA 2003, which recognizes the discretion of the district court to enlarge a time limitation contained in the Rules of Criminal Procedure if requested before the applicable time limitation expires. The State contends that, under these rules, the district court has a reasonable time after filing to rule on a timely-filed Rule 5-604(E) petition, regardless of the expiration of the six-month period under Rule 5-604(B)(1). We agree.

{6} We begin by addressing Rule 5-104(B). This rule currently provides:

When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court, an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause shown may, at any time in its discretion:

(1) with or without motion or notice, order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order; or

(2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done; but it may not extend the time for making a motion for new trial, for taking an appeal, for making a motion for acquittal or for extending time for commencement of trial.

Rule 5-104(B).

{7} The Court of Appeals rejected the State's interpretation of Rule 5-104(B). Sandoval, 2003-NMCA-031, ¶¶ 6-12, 133 N.M. 399, 62 P.3d 1281. The Court noted that this rule was initially enacted as Rule 4 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, N.M. Rule Crim. Proc. 4(b) (originally codified at NMSA 1953, § 41-23-4(b)), which became effective on July 1, 1972. Sandoval, 2003-NMCA-031, ¶ 8, 133 N.M. 399, 62 P.3d 1281. The Court of Appeals also noted that the original compilation of this rule differed from the currently published rule because parts one and two of Subsection B were originally separated by a comma rather than a semicolon and there were no paragraph breaks within Subsection B. Id. ¶ 9. The Court determined that this change first occurred in 1986 with a recompilation. Id. The Court of Appeals could not account for this change because, according to the Court, "[t]he Supreme Court has not amended the rule since its adoption in 1972." Id. ¶ 10. The Court of Appeals focused on the following language that appears in subpart two: "but [the court] may not extend the time for making a motion for new trial, for taking an appeal, for making a motion for acquittal or for extending time for commencement of trial." Rule 5-104(B)(2). The Court of Appeals relied on the use of a comma between the subparts, instead of a semicolon, in the original compilation to conclude that this phrase applies to both motions filed after the expiration of the specified period, as discussed in subpart two, and motions filed before the time period expires, as discussed in subpart one. Sandoval, 2003-NMCA-031, ¶ 11, 133 N.M. 399, 62 P.3d 1281. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the interpretation of the rule would differ if the semicolon appearing in the published rule were accurate because the last clause of the rule would then grammatically apply only to subpart two, consistent with the State's argument. See id. ¶ 7. However, the Court attributed the changes in the rule to the compiler rather than this Court. Id. ¶ 10. By analogy to the proposition that footnote statements by the compiler are not controlling, see Treider v. Doherty & Co., 86 N.M. 735, 738, 527 P.2d 498, 501 (Ct.App. 1974),

the Court determined that "[a] compiler's modification, without Supreme Court action, does not have substantive effect." Sandoval, 2003-NMCA-031, ¶ 10,

133 N.M. 399,

62 P.3d 1281. The Court of Appeals thus applied the rule as originally compiled in 1972 and concluded that the final phrase in Rule 5-104(B) excludes both timely and untimely petitions to extend the time for commencement of trial from the district court's discretionary power of enlargement. Sandoval, 2003-NMCA-031, ¶ 11,

133 N.M. 399,

62 P.3d 1281. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of Rule 5-104(B).

{8} The Court of Appeals' premise that the compiler modified Rule 5-104(B) is incorrect for two reasons. First, despite the Court of Appeals' statement to the contrary, this Court in fact amended Rule 5-104 on August 17, 1995, and we re-adopted the rule in full at that time. We further ordered that the rule be published in the Bar Bulletin and in Supreme Court Rules Annotated. The rule now appears in New Mexico Rules Annotated in the exact form adopted by this Court in 1995, and the amendment is reflected by the effective date, which is a part of the rule adopted by this Court, as well as in the compiler's annotation. Because the amended version of Rule 5-104 applies to all cases filed in district court on or after October 1, 1995, it governs the present matter. As a result, any modification of the rule in the 1986 recompilation is irrelevant for purposes of this case. {9} Second, this Court ordered the recompilation of court rules, instructions, and forms in 1986, which we entitled the 1986 Supreme Court Rules Annotated. We authorized the Compilation Commission to follow a set of drafting guidelines in the recompilation, and we approved the recompiled version of the rules, instructions, and forms. Thus, the version of Rule 5-104(B) appearing in the 1986 Supreme Court Rules Annotated was an official version approved by this Court. Additionally, compiled versions of statutes and court rules, certified by the Compilation Commission, are presumptively official. See NMSA 1978, § 12-1-3(B)-(C) (1979) (empowering the New Mexico Compilation Commission "to provide for official, annotated compilations of the New Mexico statutes" and ...