State v. Sandoval

• Decision Date: 23 November 1982
• Docket Number: No. 13939,13939
• Citation: 1982 NMSC 143,655 P.2d 1017,99 N.M. 173
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose Moises SANDOVAL, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Page 1017

655 P.2d 1017

99 N.M. 173

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose Moises SANDOVAL, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13939.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Nov. 23, 1982.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 21, 1982.

[99 NM 174] Michael Dickman, Appellate Defender, David Stafford, Asst. Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for defendant-appellant.

Jeff Bingaman, Atty. Gen., Marcia E. White, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee.

OPINION

PAYNE, Chief Justice.

This appeal involves two alleged errors committed during Sandoval's penitentiary riot murder trial. The State's case was based primarily on testimony by David Fuentes, who saw Sandoval enter the victim's cell and later saw the victim lying in a pool of blood but did not see Sandoval hit the victim, and testimony by Tunnell, who did see Sandoval hit the victim and to whom Sandoval stated that he had killed the victim.

The State disclosed statements of two witnesses after certifying compliance with N.M.R.Crim.P. 27, N.M.S.A. 1978 (Repl.Pamp.1980). The State also disclosed two statements by Fuentes for the first time during the trial, after certifying full compliance with Rule 27. Rule 27(a)(6) provides:

(a) Information subject to disclosure. [W]ithin ten days after arraignment * * * the state shall disclose or make available to the defendant:

* * *

* * *

(6) exculpatory evidence. Any material evidence favorable to the defendant which the state is required to produce under the due process clause of the United States constitution.

These witnesses and the substance of their statements were:

1. James French--two statements that he saw the murder and that only blacks were involved (the defendant is not black).

2. Kari Oranen--statements dealing with the murder which were inculpatory but different from the versions of the State's witnesses.

3. David Fuentes--one early statement about the murder in general in which he did not mention Sandoval, and one statement that when the killing began Sandoval was in Tunnell's cell sexually abusing Tunnell. All the other statements had indicated that Sandoval sexually abused Tunnell before and after the murder.

Sandoval moved for a mistrial or a continuance. He was granted a one week recess to allow him to further prepare in light of the newly ascertained witnesses and statements. He asserts reversible error only as to the failure to disclose Fuentes' statements.

During the recess, the media extensively covered an attempted escape incident at the penitentiary and the trials of Sandoval and Jessie Trujillo. The trial judge admonished the jury not to read anything regarding Sandoval's case. No evidence was presented that any of the jurors violated this admonition, but Sandoval moved for a mistrial and for voir dire of the jury to determine whether any of them had read the material. These motions were denied, and Sandoval claims this was reversible error.

1) VIOLATION OF RULE 27.

Sandoval argues that the State's failure to provide the statements of Fuentes constitutes reversible error because the statements were material to the defense and the delayed disclosure was prejudicial. Tunnell, the state's only eye-witness, was sexually abused on numerous occasions by Sandoval. The defense strategy was to exclude this fact because it could be prejudicial to Sandoval. The court agreed and excluded the evidence, leaving the defense to attack Tunnell's credibility by other means. On the other hand, the defense could have used the fact of abuse to impeach Tunnell by imputing a revenge motive. The latter approach may have been used if the State had disclosed Fuentes' statement because it provided a partial alibi for Sandoval, and places in doubt Tunnell's ability to observe the killing. The statement also conflicts with Tunnell's version of the events. Sandoval claims the one week recess was incapable of remedying the defect because the defense could not change their strategy in mid-trial without impairing their own credibility before the jury.

Sandoval seeks application of the three-prong test announced in State v. Lovato, 94 N.M. 780, 617 P.2d 169 (Ct.App.1980), pursuant to which he asserts that his conviction must be reversed.

The three-part test includes three elements:

1. The State either breached some duty or intentionally deprived the defendant of evidence;

2. The improperly "suppressed" evidence was material; and

3. The suppression of this evidence prejudiced the defendant.

Id. at 782, 617 P.2d at 171.

The Lovato case involved a situation where evidence had been destroyed. The three-part test there announced does not cover a situation where the State initially deprives the defendant of evidence but then later produces the evidence. Therefore, in cases when the evidence is introduced during the trial, a fourth consideration is necessary; namely, whether the failure to timely disclose the evidence was cured by the trial court.

In the present case, there is no doubt that the State breached its duty in failing to timely disclose the statement.

The materiality part of the test requires consideration of the proposition for which the evidence is offered and the issues in the case. E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence Sec. 185 at 434 (2d Ed.1972). Here, the proposition for which Sandoval claims the evidence could have been offered was that he was sexually abusing Tunnell at the time of the murder and therefore was not guilty of the murder. Under this analysis, the evidence was material.

The prejudice part of the test requires the court to assess whether the omitted evidence created a reasonable doubt which did not otherwise exist. The constitutional dimensions of this part of the test were addressed by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). There, the Court discussed the problem of a prosecutor's failure to disclose evidence when the defense counsel has made no request for it or only a general request. The Court noted that a general request "really gives the prosecutor no better notice than if no request is made," and that any duty to respond to such a request "must derive from the obviously exculpatory character of certain evidence in the hands of the prosecutor." Id. at 106-107, 96 S.Ct. at 2398. The Court reiterated its rejection of the proposition that a prosecutor has a constitutional duty to routinely provide defense counsel access to his entire file. Then the Court stated the following standard:

[I]f the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has been committed. This means that the omission must be evaluated in the context of the entire record. If there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not the additional evidence is considered, there is no justification for a new trial. On the other hand, if the verdict is of questionable validity, additional evidence of relatively minor importance might be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt.

Id. at 112-113, 96 S.Ct. at 2401.

To apply this standard we must first determine the nature of the request made by defense counsel. Counsel relies on Rule 27 and does not refer to any more specific request. We hold that Rule 27 constitutes a general request under Agurs. Therefore the standard set forth above...