State v. Sandoval
| Citation | 263 Conn. 524,821 A.2d 247 |
| Decision Date | 13 May 2003 |
| Docket Number | (SC 16660) |
| Parties | STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. EDWIN SANDOVAL |
| Court | Supreme Court of Connecticut |
Sullivan, C. J., and Borden, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js. Paula J. Waite, with whom, on the brief, was William T. Gerace, for the appellant (defendant).
Timothy J. Sugrue, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom were Lisa Herskowitz, assistant state's attorney, and, on the brief, James E. Thomas, state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
A jury found the defendant, Edwin Sandoval, guilty of one count each of the crimes of attempt to commit aggravated sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-70a (a) (2)1 and 53a-49 (a) (2),2 sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (1),3 and attempt to commit assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-60 (a) (1)4 and 53a-49 (a) (2), and two counts each of the crimes of attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-59 (a)5 and 53a-49 (a) (2), and assault in the second degree in violation of § 53a-60 (a).6 The trial court rendered judgment7 in accordance with the jury verdict,8 from which the defendant appealed. On appeal,9 the defendant claims that the trial court improperly: (1) admitted into evidence a prior consistent statement of the victim; (2) precluded him from introducing certain evidence; (3) denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the charges of attempt to commit aggravated sexual assault in the first degree and attempt to commit assault in the first degree; and (4) instructed the jury to disregard testimony that the victim had applied to the state office of victim services for compensation. We reject the defendant's claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On August 5, 1998, the defendant, an engineer, and the victim,10 a medical assistant, had been involved in an exclusive, intimate relationship for approximately four years.11 On that date, the victim learned that she was pregnant and so informed the defendant. The defendant indicated that he did not want the victim to have the baby and urged her to have an abortion. The victim stated that she would not do so, and the defendant responded angrily. The next day, however, the defendant spoke to the victim on the telephone and told her that they should not fight about the matter, and that they would work something out.
On August 9, 1998, the defendant went to the victim's home, ostensibly to have breakfast. The defendant indicated that he was not hungry, however, and asked the victim to have sex with him. The victim agreed, and the couple proceeded to engage in intercourse. At one point, the defendant inserted his fingers into the victim's vagina, something that he never before had done to her. The defendant stopped, however, when the victim told him that he was hurting her.
The next day, August 10, 1998, the defendant returned to the victim's home for breakfast. After breakfast, the defendant asked the victim to have sex with him, and she agreed. Despite the victim's protests, the defendant again inserted his fingers into the victim's vagina, causing her significant pain. The victim told the defendant to stop, but he would not do so. Eventually, however, the victim was able to push the defendant away from her. She then told him to leave, which he did. Soon thereafter, the victim lay down and fell asleep.
The victim awoke at approximately 11 a.m. and discovered that she was experiencing vaginal bleeding. At approximately 2:45 p.m. that same day, the victim went to see Marcia Waitzman, an obstetrician-gynecologist. Upon arriving at Waitzman's office, the victim explained to Waitzman that the defendant had inserted his fingers into her vagina against her will, causing her pain. While conducting an internal examination of the victim, Waitzman discovered two pills located approximately three to four inches inside the victim's vagina. The victim told Waitzman that she was unaware that the pills were there and indicated that the defendant must have inserted them into her vagina without her knowledge.
Both of the pills that Waitzman had found in the victim's vagina bore the legends "Searle" and "1461." Waitzman identified the pills as Cytotec,12 a prescription medication containing misoprostol. Misoprostol is an abortifacient that can cause a woman to suffer a miscarriage by inducing strong uterine contractions.13 According to Waitzman, the vaginal bleeding that the victim experienced was consistent with exposure to misoprostol, which, in small doses, is used to induce labor.14
After completing her examination of the victim, Waitzman placed the two pills in a plastic container and telephoned the Glastonbury police department to report the incident. The victim took the pills to the Glastonbury police department and turned them over to Officer William Sanderson, who sent them to the state toxicology laboratory for analysis. The victim told Sanderson about the defendant's request that she have an abortion, her refusal to do so and the defendant's subsequent acts of inserting his fingers into her vagina against her will. The victim signed a written statement detailing those events. Two days later, on August 12, 1998, the victim called the defendant at his place of employment, explained to him that she knew what he had done to her and asked him why. After initially refusing to answer, the defendant told the victim that he had done so to protect himself because he did not want to have a child with her. The defendant continued to urge the victim to have an abortion, but when she emphatically refused to terminate the pregnancy, the defendant threatened to kill her if she told anyone about what had happened.
On August 14, 1998, the police sought and obtained a search warrant for the defendant's home. Upon executing the warrant, the police found, inter alia, a plate with a white powder residue, an emery board, a silver metal hammer, instructions in Spanish for administering medication orally and intravaginally and three white pills bearing the legends "Searle" and "1461."15 The police sent the plate, the emery board and one of the white pills to be analyzed by the state toxicology laboratory.
On August 17, 1998, the victim returned to the police department and provided the police with a second statement. She also spoke to Beverly Warga, the victim services coordinator for the Glastonbury police department, about having been assaulted sexually by the defendant. As required by law, Warga informed the victim of her right to seek compensation from the state office of victim services. See General Statutes § 54-220 (a). The victim subsequently filed an application for compensation with that office pursuant to General Statutes § 54-204.
Thereafter, the state toxicology laboratory issued its report regarding the two pills that had been recovered from the victim's vagina and one of the pills that had been seized from the defendant's home. Laboratory personnel concluded that each of the pills contained misoprostol.16 Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly permitted the state to introduce the victim's prior consistent statement and that such impropriety constituted a violation of his rights under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the United States constitution.17 We disagree.
The following additional facts are necessary to our resolution of this claim. On direct examination, the victim testified about her relationship with the defendant and the events leading up to the discovery of the two pills in her vagina. On cross-examination, defense counsel inquired into the victim's application for compensation that the victim had filed with the state office of victim services. The victim explained that, upon her second visit to the police department on August 17, 1998, she had spoken to Warga, who advised her of her right to seek such compensation. The victim further testified that she thereafter submitted an application for compensation to the office of victim services. Following the victim's testimony, Sanderson testified for the state. Sanderson stated that he was on duty on August 10, 1998, when the victim had arrived at the police station to lodge a criminal complaint against the defendant. According to Sanderson, the victim provided him with a detailed explanation of the facts relating to her allegations against the defendant and, without objection, Sanderson summarized those facts for the jury. Sanderson further testified that he also had taken a written statement from the victim.
The state then sought to introduce that written statement into evidence as a prior consistent statement pursuant to § 6-11 (b) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence.18 Over defense counsel's objection, the trial court allowed the state to introduce the statement into evidence for the limited purpose of rebutting the inference, raised by defense counsel during his cross-examination of the victim, that the victim's testimony had been motivated by a desire to obtain compensation from the office of victim services. Thereafter, the court explained to the jury that it could use the victim's statement solely for the purpose of evaluating the victim's credibility and not as evidence of the truth of the matter asserted therein.
Waitzman subsequently testified about her examination of the victim on August 10, 1998, and her discovery of the two pills in the victim's vagina. Waitzman also testified about what the victim had told her during the examination. In particular, Waitzman testified that the victim had explained that the defendant had inserted his fingers into her vagina against her will.
Finally, at the conclusion of the case, the trial...
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