State v. Sanks, s. 24992

• Decision Date: 23 January 1969
• Docket Number: Nos. 24992,24993,s. 24992
• Citation: 166 S.E.2d 19,225 Ga. 88
• Parties: STATE of Georgia v. Lelia Mae SANKS nee Jones et al. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF ATLANTA et al. v. Lelia Mae SANKS nee Jones et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 19

166 S.E.2d 19

225 Ga. 88

STATE of Georgia v. Lelia Mae SANKS nee Jones et al.

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF ATLANTA et al. v. Lelia Mae SANKS nee Jones et al.

Nos. 24992, 24993.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Jan. 23, 1969.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 6, 1969.

Syllabus by the Court

Code §§ 61-303 and 61-305 do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Code § 1-815) or the corresponding provisions of the Georgia Constitution (Code Ann. §§ 2-102, 2-103, 2-104, Art. I, Sec. I, Pars. II, III, IV, Const.1945).

No. 24992:

Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Alfred L. Evans, Jr., A. Joseph Nardone, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., Atlanta, for appellant.

Charles B. Webb, Robert B. Newman, D. Freeman Hutton, Atlanta, John William Brent, Decatur, for appellees.

No. 24993:

King & Spalding, Charles M. Kidd, Atlanta, for appellants.

Michael D. Padnos, Alfred L. Evans, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert B. Newman, D. Freeman Hutton, Atlanta, for appellees.

UNDERCOFLER, Justice.

This appeal is from the trial court's ruling that Code §§ 61-303 and 61-305 relating to dispossessory warrant proceedings are unconstitutional under the equal protection and due process clauses of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution (Code § 1-815) and corresponding provisions of the Georgia Constitution (Code Ann. §§ 2-102, 2-103, 2-104, Art. I, Sec. I, Pars. II, III, IV, Const.1945).

Code § 61-303 requires a tenant as a condition precedent to filing a defense to a dispossessory warrant to 'tender a bond with good security, payable to the landlord, for the payment of such sum, with costs, as may be recovered against him on the trial of the case.'

Code Ann. § 61-305 directs that if the issue shall be determined against the tenant, judgment shall go against him for double the rent.

1. 'The Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution does not prevent a state from prescribing a reasonable and appropriate condition precedent to the bringing of a suit of a specified kind or class so long as the basis of distinction is real and the condition imposed has reasonable relation to a legitimate object.' 16 Am.Jur.2d 925, § 535; 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 559, p. 507; Jones v. Union Guano Co., 264 U.S. 171, 181, 44 S.Ct. 280, 68 L.Ed. 623. The rule is equally applicable to the filing of a defense.

in our opinion Code § 61-303 requiring a tenant filing a defense to a dispossessory warrant to post a bond to secure the landlord is not unreasonable. To the contrary, it is entirely appropriate and equitable to guarantee payment to the landlord while a tenant resists eviction and has the use and benefit of the premises. The fact that a tenant in a particular case is indigent and unable to furnish a bond does not permit a different conclusion. Napier v. Varner, 149 Ga. 586(2), 101 S.E 580; Reardon v. Bland, 203 Ga. 633, 639(3), 58 S.E.2d 377. 'One of the principles on which this government was founded is that of equality of right, and this principle is emphasized in the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Constitution of the United States is no respector of the financial status of persons, and rich and poor are to be accorded equal rights under it. * * *' 16 Am.Jur.2d 851, § 489.

'The due-process clause, and article 1, section 1, paragraph 4 of the Constitution of Georgia of 1945 (Code Ann. § 2-104) providing that 'No person shall be deprived of the right to prosecute or defend his own cause in any of the courts of this State, in person, by attorney, or both', do not guarantee to the citizen of the State any particular form or method of State procedure. Its requirements are satisfied if he has reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard, and to present his claim or defense, due regard being had to the nature of the proceeding and the character of the rights which may be affected by it.' Zorn v. Walker, 206 Ga. 181(2), 56 S.E.2d 511, 512.

'The proceeding to dispossess a tenant holding over is not instituted primarily for the purpose of collecting rent. Its main purpose is to restore the landlord to the possession of the premises, and the imposition upon the tenant of a liability for double rent is an incident to the proceeding, and is in the nature of a penalty inflicted upon him for the wrong he has committed in refusing to deliver possession of the premises after demand is made upon him.' Willis v. Harrell, 118 Ga. 906, 910, 45 S.E. 794, 796. Hamilton v. McCroskey, 112 Ga. 651, 37 S.E. 859.

It is not unreasonable to allow appropriate damages as provided by Code Ann. § 61-305 against a tenant for unlawfully withholding possession of the landlord's premises. The summary dispossessory warrant proceeding is limited...