State v. Sanmartin Prado
Decision Date | 11 July 2016 |
Docket Number | No. 100, Sept. Term, 2015.,100, Sept. Term, 2015. |
Citation | 141 A.3d 99,448 Md. 664 |
Parties | STATE of Maryland v. Juan Carlos SANMARTIN PRADO. |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Mary Ann Ince, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Petitioners.
Stephen H. Sacks (Law Office of Stephen H. Sacks, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Respondent.
Paul B. DeWolfe, Esq., Public Defender, Nadine K. Wettstein, Esq., Asst. Public Defender, Office of the Public Defender, Rockville, MD, for Amicus Curiae brief on behalf of Respondent.
Argued before BARBERA, C.J., GREENE, ADKINS, McDONALD, WATTS and LAWRENCE F. RODOWSKY (Retired, Specially Assigned), LYNNE A. BATTAGLIA (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.
In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374, 369, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), the Supreme Court held for the first time that, pursuant to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, “counsel must inform [his or] her client whether his [or her] plea carries a risk of deportation[,]” and that, “when the deportation consequence is truly clear, ... the duty to give correct advice is equally clear.” After Padilla, in Denisyuk v. State, 422 Md. 462, 466, 30 A.3d 914, 916 (2011), this Court held, in relevant part, that “defense counsel's failure to advise [the defendant] of the deportation consequence of his guilty plea was constitutionally deficient [,]” and that, “based on the record developed at the postconviction hearing and the [postconviction] court's express finding on the subject, [ ] counsel's deficient performance prejudiced [the defendant].” Additionally, in the wake of Padilla, courts in other jurisdictions have held that a defendant's counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient where the defendant's counsel either failed to advise the defendant whatsoever of the immigration consequences of the defendant's guilty plea, or affirmatively misadvised the defendant about the immigration consequences of the defendant's guilty plea. Murkier, however, are the waters where a defendant's counsel advises that an offense is deportable and uses “qualifying” words—such as “very likely be deported,” Chacon v. State, 409 S.W.3d 529, 532 (Mo.Ct.App.2013) (emphasis omitted), or “strong chance” of being deported, State v. Shata, 364 Wis.2d 63, 868 N.W.2d 93, 96 (2015) —when advising a defendant of the immigration consequences attendant to a plea.
In this case, we must decide whether defense counsel's advice—that there “could and probably would be immigration consequences” for the defendant's conviction for second-degree child abuse because it was a “deportable” or “possibly deportable” offense—was constitutionally deficient because defense counsel “qualified” his advice, or was correct advice that adequately informed the defendant of the risk of deportation. We hold that, where the coram nobis court found that defense counsel advised the defendant that “this was a ‘deportable offense’ and [the defendant] ‘could be deported ... if the federal government chose to initiate deportation proceedings,’ and it was ‘possible’ that the [defendant] would be deported [,]” and where defense counsel testified that he also advised the defendant that “there could and probably would be immigration consequences” and “that it was a deportable or a possibly deportable offense,” and the advice was given before a plea of not guilty by way of an agreed statement of facts proceeding, such advice was not constitutionally deficient, but rather was “ correct advice” about the “risk of deportation,” as required by Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369, 374, 130 S.Ct. 1473.
On June 8, 2010, Juan Carlos Sanmartin Prado (“Sanmartin Prado”), Respondent, a citizen of Ecuador and a legal permanent resident of the United States, was charged by criminal information filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County (“the circuit court”) with first-degree child abuse causing severe physical injury, second-degree child abuse, and second-degree assault against his three-year-old daughter. On January 6, 2011, Sanmartin Prado pleaded not guilty by way of an agreed statement of facts to Count 2, second-degree child abuse,1 pursuant to an agreement with the State.2 At that time, Sanmartin Prado's trial counsel (“trial counsel”) engaged in a waiver colloquy with Sanmartin Prado; and the following exchange occurred as to Sanmartin Prado's immigration status:
Thereafter, the circuit court announced that “Sanmartin Prado ha[d] waived his rights to a jury trial and to a Court trial in this matter, and that he ha [d] done so voluntarily and understanding the rights that he has.”
The State then read into the record the following agreed statement of facts:
The circuit court found Sanmartin Prado guilty of second-degree child abuse, and sentenced him to five years' imprisonment with all but two years suspended, followed by two years of supervised probation with the condition that Sanmartin Prado complete a physical offender treatment program and a parenting course offered by the Department of Social Services. The charges for first-degree child abuse causing severe physical injury and second-degree assault were nol prossed. Sanmartin Prado did not appeal the conviction.
Over two years later, on October 21, 2013, Sanmartin Prado filed in the circuit court a “Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis” (“the petition”), contending that, as a result of the conviction, he was facing a significant collateral consequence, namely, “that he is automatically deportable from the United States[.]” Sanmartin Prado stated that, as of the time of the filing of the petition, he was “in proceedings before the Immigration Court with one of the allegations being the conviction in the [ ] case to substantiate or to support the government's claim for deportation.” Sanmartin Prado alleged that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel at the January 6, 2011...
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...to the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. State v. Sanmartin Prado , 448 Md. 664, 681, 141 A.3d 99 (2016). When a defendant claims that this right has been violated, he or she must satisfy a two-step test known as the Stri......
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Duncan v. State, 2519, Sept. Term, 2016
...L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) and its progeny.The State also argues that, according to the Court of Appeals interpretation, in State v. Sanmartin Prado , 448 Md. 664, 141 A.3d 99 (2016), of the holding in Padilla v. Kentucky , 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), trial counsel here di......
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State v. Armstead
...violated, we make our own independent analysis by reviewing the law and applying it to the facts of the case.State v. Sanmartin Prado, 448 Md. 664, 679, 141 A.3d 99, 108 (2016) (quoting State v. Jones, 138 Md. App. 178, 209, 771 A.2d 407, 425 (2001), aff'd, 379 Md. 704, 843 A.2d 778 (2004))......
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State v. Armstead
...violated, we make our own independent analysis by reviewing the law and applying it to the facts of the case. State v. Sanmartin Prado , 448 Md. 664, 679, 141 A.3d 99, 108 (2016) (quoting State v. Jones , 138 Md. App. 178, 209, 771 A.2d 407, 425 (2001), aff'd , 379 Md. 704, 843 A.2d 778 (20......