State v. Santee

• Decision Date: 12 April 1900
• Citation: State v. Santee, 111 Iowa 1, 82 N.W. 445 (Iowa 1900)
• Parties: STATE v. SANTEE.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

111 Iowa 1

82 N.W. 445

STATE

v.SANTEE.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 12, 1900.

Appeal from district court, Polk county; C. A. Bishop, Judge.

An information was filed against defendant for using gasoline in illuminating a building, without the use of the Welsbach hydrocarbon incandescent lamp or lamps.The case was tried to a jury in the district court, on appeal, upon a stipulation of facts, resulting in a directed verdict of not guilty, and the state appeals.Reversed.Milton Remley, Atty. Gen., for the State.

Thos. F. Stevenson and Cummins, Hewitt & Wright, for appellee.

DEEMER, J.

The material part of the statute under which defendant was prosecuted reads as follows: “If any person sell or offer for sale or use any product of petroleum for illuminating purposes which will emit a combustible vapor at a temperature of less than 105 degrees standard--Fahrenheit thermometer, closed test, except that the gas or vapor thereof shall be generated in closed reservoirs outside the building to be lighted thereby, and except the lighter products of petroleum when used in the Welsbach hydrocarbon incandescent lamp, he shall be punished,” etc.Code, § 2508.It is agreed that the defendant used gasoline of a quality that would emit a combustible vapor at temperature of less than 105° for illuminating purposes, that the vapor was not generated in closed reservoirs outside the building, and that he did not use it in Welsbach hydrocarbon incandescent burners.It is further agreed that the lamp used by the defendant was constructed on the same principle as the Welsbach, though not manufactured by the same company, and that it was constructed substantially as the Welsbach; that results were reached in substantially the same way, and by the same means; and that the lamps were the mechanical equivalents of each other.The attorney general contends that the exception or proviso found in the statute as to the character of lamp to be used in the use of the lighter products of petroleum means that the lamp must be the identical one therein referred to, and that defendant is guilty, on the admitted facts.He further contends that even if the proviso be found to be unconstitutional, as creating a monopoly, still the defendant is guilty, under the conceded facts, for the reason that, if the proviso be eliminated, then defendant had no right to use gasoline for illuminating purposes unless the vapor was generated outside the building that was to be lighted, while the defendant contends that the proviso in question relates, not to the Welsbach lamp, by name, but to any lamp constructed on the same general principles, and accomplishing the same general results with equal safety to the public; that, if this be not true, the proviso is unconstitutional, and, if unconstitutional, then the whole act must fall; and that there is no prohibition against the use of the lighter products of petroleum.If the proviso does refer to a specific lamp by name, it is undoubtedly unconstitutional, as obnoxious to article 1, § 6, of the constitution of Iowa, which provides that “the general assembly shall not grant to any citizen or class of citizens privileges or immunities, which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens.”Special privileges and monopolies are always obnoxious, and discriminations against persons or classes still more so.The constitution of the United States forbids legislation by the states that shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States, or to deny to any persons within their jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.If the attorney general's contention as to the proper construction of the words found in the proviso under consideration be correct, it is clear that such provision violates both the federal and state constitutions.City of Chicago v. Rumpff, 45 Ill. 90;Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 661, 8 Sup. Ct. 273, 31 L. Ed. 205.Exclusive privileges and franchises may, no doubt, be granted, when absolutely necessary to insure safety to the people, but not otherwise.SeeSlaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394.In this casethe parties agreed, however, that there are other lamps, operated on the same general principles as the Welsbach, that are equally safe, and that secure the same results.This being true, the legislature has no power to select one and reject the other.To do so would be to create the most odious of monopolies.The statute under consideration was enacted in virtue of the police power of the state, but the legislature cannot under this guise create a monopoly.Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220;State v. Coke Co., 18 Ohio St. 262;Mayor, etc., v. Thorne, 7 Paige, 261;Norwich Gaslight Co. v. Norwich City Gas Co., 25 Conn. 19.The business of manufacturing lamps, or the use of gas or vapor for illuminating purposes, is not unusual, and does not depend primarily on governmental permission.Defendant would have the right to use any lamp and kind of gas or vapor he chose for the purposes of lighting his building, in the absence of some police regulation imposed by the legislature; and a law that required him to use a particular lamp, when others equally safe were in the market, would be a violation of his constitutional rights and would also give to the manufacturer special privileges over others producing equally meritorious lamps.If the state had bestowed a right on defendant, the prosecution of which was not a common, natural right, it might create a monopoly in this right; for with the abolition of the monopoly thus created would disappear all right to carry on the trade.Cooley, Torts, 77, 278.These views in no manner conflict with the rules announced in Des Moines St. R. Co. v. Des Moines B. G. St. Ry. Co., 73 Iowa, 513, 33 N. W. 610, and35 N. W. 602.There a mere privilege was granted by a city in the use of its streets.No question of natural right was involved.In the grant of special privileges, no doubt, a monopoly may be created without violating the constitutional inhibition.Do the words contained in the statute, “the Welsbach hydrocarbonincandescent lamp,” mean that particular lamp, or a lamp constructed on the same general principles, and reaching results in substantially the same manner?In construing the language of an act that is claimed to be unconstitutional, that interpretation will be adopted, if possible, which will not render it obnoxious to the constitution.But courts may not by construction import words into an act, nor make a statute read otherwise than as the legislature intended.In order to arrive at the legislative intent, a rule of construction is provided by Code, § 48, par. 2, which reads as follows: “Words and phrases shall be construed according to the context and the approved usages of language.The technical words and phrases and such other words as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law shall be construed according to such meaning.”In the stipulation of facts it is agreed that there is a lamp known to the trade as the “Welsbach Hydrocarbon Incandescent Lamp,” and that there is another lamp, not so known, but constructed on the same general principles, and reaching results in substantially the same manner.Viewing the language of the statute in the light of these facts, it seems clear that the legislature had in mind the lamp known as the “Welsbach Hydrocarbon Incandescent,” and not some other lamp, although operated on the same principle.To hold otherwise would be to import into the language used some other words, and give to it an effect that was evidently not intended by the legislature.It does not appear how many lamps operated on the same general principles as the Welsbach were in existence when the act in question was passed, but the reasonable inference from the agreed statement of facts is that there was at least one other kind known to the trade.To avoid holding a statute unconstitutional, we are not warranted in forcing on its language a meaning which, upon a fair test, is repugnant to its terms.French v. Teschemaker, 24 Cal. 518;Bigelow v. Railway Co., 27 Wis. 478.It is only where the language of the act will bear two constructions that a court is justified in applying a rule that will sustain the act, rather than one which will defeat it.There is no room for interpretation when the language...