State v. Santiago
| Decision Date | 14 July 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 15431,15431 |
| Citation | 245 Conn. 301,715 A.2d 1 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Adrian D. SANTIAGO. |
Jon L. Schoenhorn, Hartford, for appellant (defendant).
Carolyn K. Longstreth, Senior Assistant State's Attorney, with whom were Mark A. Stabile, Supervisory Assistant State's Attorney, and, on the brief, Mark S. Solak, State's Attorney, for appellee (State).
Ann M. Parrent filed a brief for the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union Foundation as amicus curiae.
Before CALLAHAN, C.J., and NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER and McDONALD, JJ.
The defendant, Adrian D. Santiago, was convicted by a jury of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a). 1 In this appeal 2 from the judgment of the trial court, 3 the defendant claims that the trial court improperly: (1) denied his motion to dismiss alleging that the state's failure to disclose certain exculpatory evidence prior to the probable cause hearing rendered his waiver of the hearing ineffective and deprived the trial court of in personam jurisdiction over him; (2) admitted his confession into evidence even though he had not been adequately advised of his Miranda 4 rights and had not knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights; and (3) failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into allegations of juror misconduct. We affirm the judgment of the trial court with respect to the first and second issues raised but reverse the judgment with respect to the third issue.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On the night of November 1, 1993, the defendant had been drinking beer with Mark Aviles and Joanne Negron, fellow residents of the Willimantic YMCA. At some point, Aviles and the defendant left to purchase some marijuana. They encountered Fernando Ilarraza, the victim, on West Avenue in Willimantic and he offered to sell them marijuana. The defendant refused to buy from the victim, however, because he believed that he would be cheated. When Aviles and the defendant saw the victim later that evening, the defendant and the victim "exchanged looks." The defendant subsequently told Aviles that he intended to shoot the victim. Aviles and the defendant walked to a pay phone where the defendant called a friend who lived in a Willimantic neighborhood called Windham Heights. Aviles heard the defendant tell the friend that he was going to "do the mission" and that he needed a "piece" to do it. Aviles and the defendant then walked back to the YMCA. The defendant asked Negron to telephone for a taxi to take him to Windham Heights. He returned with a .22 caliber revolver, which he cleaned and loaded in Negron's apartment. Thereafter, he left wearing a black hat, a full-length black coat, black pants and black boots.
Shortly before 11 p.m. that evening, a Coventry police officer, having just picked up a prisoner from the Willimantic police department, was traveling on Valley Street in Willimantic. He saw the body of the victim lying in the street, and contacted the Willimantic police. The victim was taken by ambulance to Windham Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. An autopsy revealed that the victim had sustained two gunshot wounds, one behind the right ear and one to the right cheek. The gunshot behind the ear was fired from a distance of less than six inches and had caused the victim's death. 5
When the defendant returned that night, Aviles asked him if he had killed the victim and the defendant replied that he had. The next day, Negron confronted the defendant about the shooting. The defendant told her that it was "something he had to do out of his heart" and that no one had told him to do it.
Aviles met with a Willimantic police officer and reported the information. Thereafter, the defendant was arrested and advised of his Miranda rights. When the officers asked him if he had shot the victim, the defendant responded, "si," and nodded his head affirmatively.
Yajira Vega, who lived on West Avenue, testified that she had seen the defendant and Aviles walking on West Avenue toward Valley Street. In addition, a taxi driver identified the defendant as the person he had driven from the YMCA to Windham Heights at approximately 9:30 p.m. on November 1.
The jury found the defendant guilty of murder. The trial court denied the defendant's motions for a new trial, for acquittal and in arrest of judgment, and rendered judgment in accordance with the jury verdict. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as they become relevant in the context of the defendant's specific claims.
We first address the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly concluded that his waiver of a probable cause hearing pursuant to General Statutes § 54-46a 6 was valid because: (1) the state failed to disclose certain allegedly exculpatory information necessary for the defendant to make a "knowing and intelligent waiver"; and (2) the probable cause hearing was postponed beyond the statutorily required sixty day period without the defendant's personal consent.
The defendant contends that because the state had suppressed certain allegedly exculpatory information in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), his waiver of a probable cause hearing was invalid and, therefore, the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The defendant argues that he was unaware of this evidence when deciding whether to waive a probable cause hearing, that such evidence would have affected his decision to do so, and that, therefore, his waiver was invalid because it was not "accomplished with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ramos, 201 Conn. 598, 603, 519 A.2d 9 (1986). The state contends that the nondisclosure did not constitute a Brady violation because the evidence was not material to the defendant's decision to waive the probable cause hearing. We agree with the state.
The following additional facts are relevant to our resolution of this issue. On February 16, 1994, the defendant waived his right to a probable cause hearing and pleaded not guilty. In March, 1994, the defendant filed a motion for disclosure and production, requesting various types of exculpatory information. In July, a hearing was held in response to the defendant's subsequent motion for sanctions because of the state's noncompliance in disclosing the requested information. The trial court ordered that exculpatory information be disclosed and that any disputed evidence be submitted to the court. In September, 1994, the state turned over a copy of the file to the trial court, Rittenband, J., for an in camera review. The court reviewed the file and ordered the state to disclose the following documents to the defendant: (1) a statement by George Jiminez that many people disliked the victim; (2) a statement by Antonio LaBoy, a security guard at the middle school, that Nelson Lojica, the victim's fourteen year old nephew, had told him that the defendant had shot the victim; (3) a statement by Isabel Marcano, the victim's girlfriend, that the victim previously had fought with Ray Soto and Edwin "Pito" Mendez; (4) a statement by Mendez that Soto had obtained a gun from Jose Diaz and had stated to Mendez, "I did it," which comment Mendez assumed referred to the murder of the victim; (5) a police report in which Soto told police that "[the victim] was nothing but trouble" and that no one mourned his death; and (6) a police report describing an incident where Paul Casanova had threatened the victim because he was getting out of a local street gang. The trial court ordered the state to make continuing submissions of new information for in camera inspection.
During the first day of trial, Officer Raymond Evans testified that there were three women who had seen a man running from the scene. The next day, the defendant sought to obtain the statements of the women. The state explained that it was not intending to call any of the women as witnesses and that in the earlier review of the file, the trial court had not ordered the state to turn over any of this information to the defendant. After reviewing the statements, the trial court, Sferrazza, J., ordered the state to give the statements of the women to the defendant despite the fact that the court did not "really see anything that's definitely exculpatory in these statements...." The defendant also requested the statement of Paul Nelson, the man the women had seen running from the scene.
According to Nelson's statement, he was walking on Valley Street at approximately 10:40 p.m. on November 1, 1993, to go to work at a grocery store. He saw two young men, one walking and one riding a bicycle, approaching him. A few seconds after they had passed him, Nelson heard a gunshot. He looked back and saw the man who had been riding the bicycle lying in the street. Nelson started running and heard a second gunshot. When he looked back again, the man was lying in the street and the bicycle and the other person were gone. He ran to the grocery store and called the police. Although he did not see their faces, he described both men as having dark complexions. Nelson described the man who had been walking as short and wearing a waist-length brown leather jacket, a dark knit style hat, and sneakers or shoes that were partially white.
Upon review of the statement, the trial court ordered the state to give it to the defendant, concluding that although the court did not "think there's anything that is clearly exculpatory ... it would be very helpful to the defense to have a more complete picture of what was observed at the time...." The defendant thereafter filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the state's nondisclosure of the allegedly exculpatory evidence had deprived him of his right to a probable cause hearing. 7
A hearing was held on ...
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