State v. Santiago

• Decision Date: 13 May 1992
• Docket Number: No. 9950,9950
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Pedro SANTIAGO.

Page 666

610 A.2d 666

27 Conn.App. 741

STATE of Connecticut v. Pedro SANTIAGO.

No. 9950.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 30, 1991.

Decided May 13, 1992.

Edward Y. O'Connell, J., dissented and filed opinion.

Pamala J. Favreau, Deputy Asst. Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).

Margaret G. Radionovas, Deputy Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were, Mark S. Solak, State's Atty., and Roger Caridad, Deputy Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before DUPONT, C.J., and EDWARD Y. O'CONNELL and LAVERY, JJ.

LAVERY, Judge.

The defendant appeals challenging the denial of his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to General Statutes § 54-94a. ¹ The defendant was convicted of possession of a narcotic substance in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279(a). The defendant was sentenced to a five year term of imprisonment, to run consecutive to any sentence then being served. The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress narcotics. The defendant claims that (1) the trial court improperly found probable cause to arrest him allegedly on the sole basis of an uncorroborated statement from a confidential informant, and (2) the warrantless search was not justified in the absence of probable cause. Because we disagree with the defendant's first claim, we need not reach the second.

The following evidence was presented at the suppression hearing. On May 25, 1990, Officers Dennis Griswold and Larry Kozikowski of the Willimantic police department approached an individual who had often served as a confidential informant. On previous occasions, the informant had given Griswold information leading to fifteen arrests for narcotics violations. ² Griswold was a detective investigating narcotics violations for four years prior to the incident, and had a total of fifteen years of experience as a police officer. Griswold testified that he had attended federal, state, and local schools that train narcotics investigators, and had made approximately 1000 narcotics arrests. The officers asked the informant if he had any information for them that evening. In response, the informant told them that he had just left the Shark Club, a local bar, where he had seen the defendant selling "dope and coke," vernacular for heroin and cocaine. Griswold knew that the Shark Club was a popular location for the sale of illegal narcotics. The informant identified the defendant by name. Griswold recognized the name of the defendant as a convicted narcotics dealer who was on parole, and was aware that the defendant had been arrested on prior occasions for drug offenses.

After receiving the information from the informant, the officers returned to their car and radioed police headquarters. Within minutes of receiving the information from the informant, they entered the bar and located the defendant. They approached him and asked him to come outside with them. They then took the defendant by the arms and escorted him outside. Once outside, the officers searched the defendant. In one of his pockets, the officers found five small plastic bags containing white powder, which field tested positive as heroin. The officers then arrested the defendant and took him to police headquarters where he was more thoroughly searched. ³ This search at police headquarters produced three small plastic packets, which tests proved to be cocaine. Thereafter, Griswold completed an affidavit of probable cause to support the warrantless search. ⁴

"Under both the federal and state constitutions, a warrantless search is per se unreasonable, subject to a few well defined exceptions. State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, 121, 547 A.2d 10 (1988); State v. Januszewski, 182 Conn. 142, 151-52, 438 A.2d 679 (1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922, 101 S.Ct. 3159, 69 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1981)." State v. Quinones, 21 Conn.App. 506, 510, 574 A.2d 1308 (1990). One of these well defined exceptions is a search incident to a lawful arrest. "It is an established rule that a properly conducted warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest is not illegal.... Section [54-1f ⁵] of the General Statutes authorizes a police officer to arrest, without a warrant, 'any person who such officer has reasonable grounds to believe has committed or is committing a felony.' " (Citations omitted.) State v. Penland, 174 Conn. 153, 155, 384 A.2d 356, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906, 98 S.Ct. 2237, 56 L.Ed.2d 404 (1978); State v. Velez, 215 Conn. 667, 672, 577 A.2d 1043 (1990). ⁶

In State v. Barton, 219 Conn. 529, 546, 594 A.2d 917 (1991), our Supreme Court adopted the "totality of the circumstances" analysis of the probable cause requirement as set forth in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). ⁷ The court set forth the analysis as follows. "In essence, our adoption of a 'totality of the circumstances' analysis of the probable cause requirement of article first, § 7, [of the Connecticut constitution] means simply this: When a search warrant affidavit is based on information provided to the police by confidential informants, the magistrate should examine the affidavit to determine whether it adequately describes both the factual basis of the informant's knowledge and the basis on which the police have determined that the information is reliable. If the warrant affidavit fails to state in specific terms how the informant gained his knowledge or why the police believe the information to be trustworthy, however, the magistrate can also consider all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit to determine whether, despite these deficiencies, other objective indicia of reliability reasonably establish that probable cause to search exists. In making this determination, the magistrate is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the facts presented. When a magistrate has determined that the warrant affidavit presents sufficient objective indicia of reliability to justify a search and has issued a warrant, a court reviewing that warrant at a subsequent suppression hearing should defer to the reasonable inferences drawn by the magistrate. Where the circumstances for finding probable cause are detailed, where a substantial basis for crediting the source of information is apparent, and when a magistrate has in fact found probable cause, the reviewing court should not invalidate the warrant by application of rigid analytical categories." State v. Barton, supra, 544-45, 594 A.2d 917. Indeed, "the reviewing court should pay great deference to the trial court's determination regarding the existence of probable cause." State v. Velez, supra, 673, 577 A.2d 1043.

On the basis of the evidence, the trial court found that the officers had probable cause for their belief that the defendant was in possession of illegal narcotics at the time of the search. The court considered the facts that the defendant had been previously arrested for a narcotics violation, and the informant had given information leading to fifteen narcotics arrests. The court further found that although the informant in the present case did not explicitly tell the officers that he saw the actual narcotic substances, Griswold was entitled to draw the inference that the informant would recognize a drug transaction when he saw one because both the officer and the informant were familiar with drug transactions. Consequently, the trial court found that the arrest was based on probable cause and the warrantless search was valid, and denied the defendant's motion to suppress.

In McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 87 S.Ct. 1056, 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967), the United States Supreme Court examined whether information gained from a confidential informant was sufficient to establish probable cause so as to validate an arrest and subsequent warrantless search. In McCray, the informant had supplied the arresting officers with information about narcotics activities on at least fifteen prior occasions, with the information leading to numerous arrests and convictions. Id., at 303, 87 S.Ct. at 1058. The arresting officer was familiar with the petitioner. Id., at 302, 87 S.Ct. at 1058. After receiving information from the informant that the petitioner would be in a certain location, the arresting officers located the petitioner there. Id. The court stated that "[u]pon the basis of those circumstances, along with the officers' personal observations of the petitioner, the court was fully justified in holding that at the time the officers made the arrest 'the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense....' " (Citations omitted.) Id., at 304-305, 87 S.Ct. at 1059; see also Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 312-14, 79 S.Ct. 329, 333, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959) (information from a reliable informant verified by direct observation can give police probable cause to make warrantless arrest); United States v. James, 466 F.2d 475, 477 (D.C.Cir.1972) (identifying information coupled with the arresting officer's verification of this information is adequate probable cause for an arrest). In both McCray v. Illinois, supra, and Draper v. United States, supra, the court sanctioned the warrantless arrest made on the basis of information from confidential informants similar to the information provided by the informant in the present case. ⁸

Here, the informant told the officers that he actually saw the defendant selling narcotics inside the bar. Furthermore, there was other corroboration of the informant's tip. The bar where the defendant was seen selling drugs was known to the police as a place where drugs were frequently sold, and the defendant was known to the police as a narcotics dealer who had been arrested and convicted in the past for drug offenses. There was sufficient evidence before the officers to constitute probable...