State v. Santiago, 6672
Decision Date | 03 January 1989 |
Docket Number | No. 6672,6672 |
Citation | 552 A.2d 438,17 Conn.App. 273 |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Pedro Juan SANTIAGO. |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Francis Thomas Daley, Norwalk, for appellant (defendant).
Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., Deputy Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, was Warren C. Murray, Deputy Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).
Before BORDEN, DALY and EDWARD Y. O'CONNELL, JJ.
The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of possession of narcotics with intent to sell in violation of General Statutes § 21a-277(a). 1 He claims that the trial court erred (1) in denying his motion to suppress, (2) in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal, and (3) in instructing the jury on reasonable doubt. We find no error.
The jury could reasonably have found the following facts. On April 24, 1987, at approximately 12:45 p.m., the defendant was operating his motor vehicle on Paradiso Road in Norwalk accompanied by a passenger. The passenger exited from the vehicle near a parked Briggs Tire truck and the defendant drove away. The passenger then removed two tires from the parked truck. The defendant returned to the scene, the passenger placed the tires in the defendant's vehicle and the two drove away. An eyewitness to the incident immediately notified the police.
Within ten minutes, Officer Arthur Lasprogato of the Norwalk police department arrived at the scene of the theft. The eyewitness gave Lasprogato a description of the vehicle, the driver and the passenger, as well as the vehicle's license plate number. This information was broadcast to other officers on duty.
Lasprogato proceeded to search the vicinity for the vehicle and the suspects. He found one of the suspects in the vehicle nearby on South Main Street. Lasprogato radioed this information to headquarters and then proceeded to pick up the eyewitness so that he could make an identification of the suspect.
Officer Kenneth Riley was on patrol in the area of South Main Street. In response to the broadcast, he proceeded to the vehicle in question and blocked it with his police cruiser. At that time, the driver and sole occupant of the car was Jaime Richetti. Lasprogato and the eyewitness then arrived at the scene. Riley walked Richetti toward the eyewitness for a possible identification. While the vehicle was unoccupied, it began to roll. The defendant, who prior to this moment had not been observed by the police, ran to the vehicle to attempt to stop it from rolling. At this point, the eyewitness identified the defendant as the driver of the motor vehicle.
While walking back to the vehicle to arrest the defendant on the larceny charge, Riley observed the defendant lean down and place something under the driver's seat. The defendant appeared nervous when he realized Riley had observed him. Riley arrested the defendant while he was seated in the driver's seat of the vehicle and informed Lasprogato that the defendant had placed something under the driver's seat. Lasprogato searched under the driver's seat and found a cellophane bag containing twenty-five smaller cellophane bags filled with a white chunky substance. The defendant was searched at police headquarters, and found to be carrying $829 in cash. State toxicological tests subsequently indicated that the cellophane bags contained cocaine. The defendant was also charged with possession of narcotics with intent to sell. General Statutes § 21a-277(a).
The defendant's first claim of error concerns the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the narcotics seized from his car, which were introduced into evidence. He claims that the narcotics should have been suppressed as the product of an unconstitutional search and seizure under the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution. 2 We disagree.
The defendant contends that because he was initially arrested on the larceny charge, the search incident to his arrest should have been limited in scope to his person and to those areas where the stolen tires could have been hidden. The state argues in response that the search and seizure was valid because it was conducted contemporaneously with a lawful arrest.
State v. Lizotte, 11 Conn.App. 11, 17, 525 A.2d 971, cert. denied, 204 Conn. 806, 528 A.2d 1154 (1987). In denying the motion to suppress, the trial court held that the warrantless search of the vehicle was justified as a search incident to a lawful arrest. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981).
State v. Copeland, 205 Conn. 201, 210, 530 A.2d 603 (1987). In New York v. Belton, supra, 453 U.S. at 461, 101 S.Ct. at 2864, the United States Supreme Court held that a lawful custodial arrest justifies a contemporaneous search of the entire passenger compartment of an automobile, whether or not the arrestee actually had control over the area. Bearing in mind the above standards, we do not agree that a search incident to an arrest must be limited to evidence of the crime for which a defendant is initially arrested.
Evidence adduced at the suppression hearing indicated that, prior to his arrest on the larceny charge, the defendant made a furtive move toward the floor space of the driver's seat. Riley testified that, while he did not know what the defendant had placed under the seat, he believed that it could have been a weapon. Given these factors, we conclude that the officers acted reasonably in searching for the suspected presence of a weapon. "An officer should not be made to choose between his own safety and what could later be construed as an illegal search and seizure." State v. Escobales, 16 Conn.App. 272, 276, 547 A.2d 553 (1988). We conclude that the bag containing the narcotics was seized as a result of a valid search and incident to a lawful custodial arrest. The motion to suppress was correctly denied by the trial court.
The defendant next claims error in the trial court's denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal. 3 Specifically, he claims that there was insufficient evidence as to his possession of the drugs in the motor vehicle and, hence, his motion should have been granted. We disagree.
In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a verdict, (Citations omitted.) State v. Cosgrove, 181 Conn. 562, 585, 436 A.2d 33 (1980). ...
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