State v. Santiago, SC 17413
| Decision Date | 25 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | SC 17413 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Connecticut |
| Parties | STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. EDUARDO SANTIAGO |
Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald and Espinosa, Js.**
Mark Rademacher, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Harry Weller, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom were Matthew A. Weiner, deputy assistant state's attorney, and, on the brief, Kevin T. Kane, chief state's attorney, Gail P. Hardy, state's attorney, Susan C. Marks, supervisory assistant state's attorney, and Marjorie Allen Dauster, Donna Mambrino and John F. Fahey, senior assistant state's attorneys, for the appellee (state).
Constance de la Vega, pro hac vice, and Hope R. Metcalf filed a brief for experts on international humanrights and comparative law as amicus curiae.
Alex V. Hernandez and Brian W. Stull filed a brief for legal historians and scholars as amicus curiae.
Sandra J. Staub, David J. McGuire and Lauren R. Masotta filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Connecticut as amicus curiae.
Kent S. Scheidegger, pro hac vice, and Judith Rossi filed a brief for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as amicus curiae.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Although the death penalty has been a fixture of Connecticut's criminal law since early colonial times, public opinion concerning it has long been divided. In 2009, growing opposition to capital punishment led the legislature to enact Public Acts 2009, No. 09-107 (P.A. 09-107), which would have repealed the death penalty for all crimes committed on or after the date of enactment but retained the death penalty for capital felonies committed prior to that date. Then Governor M. Jodi Rell vetoed P.A. 09-107, however, and it did not become law. Three years later, in 2012, the legislature passed a materially identical act that prospectively repealed the death penalty; see Public Acts 2012, No. 12-5 (P.A. 12-5); and, this time, Governor Dannel P. Malloy signed it into law. During the public hearings on both P.A. 09-107 and P.A. 12-5, supporters argued that the proposed legislation represented a measured and lawful approach to the issue. Others raised serious concerns, however, as to whether, following a prospective only repeal, the imposition of the death penalty would violate the state constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Perhaps most notably, Chief State's Attorney Kevin T. Kane, who serves as this state's chief law enforcement officer and represents the state in the present case, testified before the legislature that such a statute could not pass constitutional muster.1 Additionally, the Division of Criminal Justice submitted written testimony, in which it advised the legislature that a prospective only repeal would be a "fiction" and that, 2 In the present appeal, the defendant, Eduardo Santiago, raises similar claims, contending that, following the decision by the elected branches to abolish capital punishment for all crimes committed on or after April 25, 2012, it would be unconstitutionally cruel and unusual to execute offenders who committed capital crimes before that date. Upon careful consideration of the defendant's claims in light of the governing constitutional principles and Connecticut's unique historical and legal landscape, we are persuaded that, following its prospective abolition, this state's death penalty no longer comports with contemporary standards of decency and no longer serves any legitimate penological purpose. For these reasons, execution of those offenders who committed capital felonies prior to April 25, 2012, would violate the state constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
Following a trial on charges that included capital felony in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 53a-54b (2)3 and General Statutes § 53a-8, a jury foundthe defendant guilty as charged, and the trial court, Lavine, J., rendered judgment accordingly.4 The court then conducted a penalty phase hearing pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 53a-46a, at which the jury found the existence of an aggravating factor, one or more jurors found the existence of one or more mitigating factors, and the jury found that the aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating factor or factors. The trial court thereupon imposed a sentence of death,5 and the defendant appealed to this court from both the judgment of conviction and the death sentence. See State v. Santiago, 305 Conn. 101, 117-18, 49 A.3d 566 (2012) (Santiago I). While the appeal was pending, the legislature repealed the death penalty for all crimes committed on or after the effective date of the repeal, April 25, 2012. See P.A. 12-5. On June 12, 2012, this court ultimately affirmed the judgment of conviction but reversed the sentence of death and remanded the case for a new penalty phase hearing on the ground that the defendant had been deprived of the opportunity to review and use certain potentially mitigating evidence. See State v. Santiago, supra, 215, 308. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion for reconsideration in which he asked this court to consider, among other things, whether the prospective repeal leads inexorably to the conclusion that capital punishment has ceased to comport with state constitutional requirements. The adoption of P.A. 12-5, when considered in light of the history of capital punishment in our state and other recent legal developments, compels us to conclude that the death penalty now constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the state constitution. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the trial court with respect to the sentence of death on the capital felony count and remand the case to that court with direction to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of release on that count.6
The underlying facts of this case, which are set forth in detail in Santiago I, may be summarized briefly as follows. In December, 2000, Mark Pascual agreed to give the defendant a snowmobile from Pascual's repair shop if the defendant would kill the victim, Joseph Niwinski, for whose girlfriend Pascual had developed romantic feelings. Id., 121. That same month, with the assistance of Pascual and another friend, the defendant entered the victim's apartment and shot and killed the victim as he slept. Id., 123. The defendant was charged with, among other things, the capital felony of "murder committed by a defendant who is hired to commit the same for pecuniary gain," in violation of § 53a-54b (2).
In his original appeal to this court, the defendant raised numerous challenges to his conviction of capital felony and his conviction on other charges, as well as his death sentence. Id., 142-46. This court affirmed the defendant's conviction on all counts; see id., 118, 143, 308; and declined his invitation to revisit our prior deci-sions holding that the death penalty is not a per se violation of the Connecticut constitution.7 Id., 307. We also concluded, however, that the trial court, Solomon, J., improperly had failed to disclose to the defendant certain confidential records in the possession of the Department of Children and Families that were mitigating in nature. Id., 215, 239-41. Accordingly, we reversed the trial court's judgment with respect to the sentence of death and remanded the case to the trial court for a new penalty phase hearing. Id., 241, 308.
While the defendant's appeal was pending in this court, the legislature passed and the governor signed P.A. 12-5, which repealed the death penalty for all crimes committed on or after the date of passage, April 25, 2012. See generally P.A. 12-5. Shortly before we released our opinion in Santiago I, the defendant filed a motion for permission to file a supplemental brief in support of his argument that the prospective abolition of capital punishment barred the state from seeking the death penalty at his new penalty...
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