State v. Sargent, A19-1554

• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)
• Writing for the Court: HUDSON, Justice.
• Citation: 968 N.W.2d 32
• Docket Number: A19-1554
• Decision Date: 29 December 2021
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Carlos Ramone SARGENT, Appellant.

968 N.W.2d 32

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,
v.
Carlos Ramone SARGENT, Appellant.

A19-1554

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed: December 29, 2021

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and Benjamin T. Lindstrom, Cass County Attorney, Walker, Minnesota, for respondent.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and David M. Robbins, Special Assistant Public Defender, Meyer Njus Tanick, PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellant.

OPINION

HUDSON, Justice.

968 N.W.2d 35

This case arises from appellant Carlos Ramone Sargent's appeal of the district court's order denying his motion to suppress evidence. During a routine traffic stop, law enforcement officers questioned Sargent, a passenger in the stopped vehicle, about the conditions of his pretrial release. Sargent was then arrested for violating a condition of his pretrial release and a pat-down search revealed ammunition in his pocket.

The State charged Sargent with illegal possession of ammunition. Sargent moved to suppress the State's evidence, arguing that the officers violated his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when they questioned him about the conditions of his pretrial release during the traffic stop. The district court denied Sargent's suppression motion and he was convicted of illegal possession of ammunition. The court of the appeals affirmed.

We reverse. The Minnesota Constitution requires that a law enforcement officer have reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity to expand the scope and duration of a traffic stop. We conclude that a pretrial release violation does not constitute criminal activity, which means the inquiry by the officers into the conditions of Sargent's pretrial release exceeded the permissible scope of the traffic stop and was an unlawful seizure under Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand to the district court with directions to vacate Sargent's conviction and grant his suppression motion.

FACTS

In May 2017, Sargent was charged with fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance and driving while impaired. The district court granted him pretrial release with conditions that included refraining from the use of alcohol and submitting to random drug tests. Sargent posted bail and was released from custody pending his trial on the two charges.

Six months later, law enforcement officers with the Leech Lake Tribal Police initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle driven by an adult female for failing to properly signal a turn. Sargent was one of three passengers inside of the vehicle. One of the officers recognized Sargent because the officer had recently reviewed Sargent's criminal history in connection with an assault investigation and knew that he was on pretrial release. The officer did not know whether Sargent's pretrial release was subject to any specific conditions.

During the traffic stop, an officer smelled an odor of alcohol coming from inside of the vehicle. The officer asked the adult female driver if she had been drinking; she responded "no." The officer then asked the three passengers in the car the same question, and all the passengers, including Sargent, admitted that they had consumed alcohol earlier that evening. A preliminary breath test confirmed the adult female driver's sobriety.

The officer began questioning Sargent and asked if he had "a no drink" condition

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as part of his pretrial release. Sargent responded in the affirmative. The officer asked Sargent to submit to a preliminary breath test; he agreed and provided a breath sample that showed an alcohol concentration of 0.03.

The officer contacted dispatch and received confirmation that Sargent's pretrial release included a condition prohibiting him from consuming alcohol. The officer attempted to contact the probation agent supervising Sargent's pretrial release but was unable to reach him. Another probation agent told the officer that Sargent should be arrested for violating his pretrial release condition. Sargent was placed under arrest, leading to a pat-down search that revealed ammunition in Sargent's pocket.

The State charged Sargent with illegal possession of ammunition under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2020). Before trial, Sargent moved to suppress the ammunition evidence found in his pocket during the pat-down search, arguing that the officer's questions about the conditions of his pretrial release improperly expanded the scope of the traffic stop. The district court determined that the officer had sufficient reasonable articulable suspicion that Sargent was violating a condition of his pretrial release to expand the scope of the traffic stop and denied the suppression motion. Sargent waived his right to a jury trial and agreed to a stipulated evidence trial to obtain review of the pretrial ruling. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. The district court found Sargent guilty and sentenced him to the mandatory minimum of five years in prison.

Sargent appealed the district court's denial of his suppression motion and the court of appeals affirmed. State v. Sargent, 951 N.W.2d 121, 134 (Minn. App. 2020). In a precedential opinion, the court of appeals determined that the officer's expansion of the traffic stop to investigate the conditions of Sargent's pretrial release was constitutional and reasonable under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Sargent, 951 N.W.2d at 131. The court of appeals acknowledged that the violation of a pretrial release condition is not a crime under Minnesota law and "does not provide a basis for a traditional Terry stop," but the court was "not persuaded that the noncriminal nature of a pretrial-release violation requires a conclusion that expansion of a warrantless seizure to investigate such a violation is never constitutionally reasonable." Id. at 128. Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed.

Sargent asked our court to review the issue of whether law enforcement may expand the scope of a traffic stop to investigate an individual for a potential violation of the conditions of their pretrial release.¹ We granted Sargent's request for review.

ANALYSIS

12 Sargent argues that the district court committed a reversible error by denying his pretrial suppression motion. When reviewing a pretrial motion to suppress, "we review the district court's factual findings for clear error and its legal determinations de novo." State v. Leonard, 943 N.W.2d 149, 155 (Minn. 2020). Under a de novo standard, "we do not defer to the analysis of the courts below, but instead we exercise independent review." Wheeler v. State, 909 N.W.2d 558, 563 (Minn. 2018).

Sargent contends that the law enforcement officer's investigation into the conditions of his pretrial release exceeded the

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permissible scope of the traffic stop and amounted to an unconstitutional seizure. Thus, we begin our analysis with an overview of the law governing the scope and duration of traffic stops. We then turn to the facts of this case to determine whether the officer's investigation exceeded the permissible scope of the traffic stop.

I.

34 Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution protect the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV ; see Minn. Const. art. I, § 10.² The first step when analyzing an alleged violation of Article I, Section 10 is to determine whether the officer's conduct constituted a search or seizure. State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 176 (Minn. 2007). The conduct at issue in this case is the officer's questioning of a passenger during a routine stop for a minor traffic violation. The parties do not dispute that Sargent was seized when the officer began questioning him about the conditions of his pretrial release.³ Thus, the first step of the analysis is complete.

56 Having concluded that a search or seizure occurred, the next step is to decide whether it was unreasonable. A search or seizure conducted without a warrant is considered unreasonable per se. State v. Burbach, 706 N.W.2d 484, 488 (Minn. 2005). Absent a warrant, the State has the burden to show that a search or seizure falls within one of the "specifically established and well delineated exceptions" to the warrant requirement. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

7 Here, the State relies on...