State v. Saturno

• Decision Date: 19 July 2016
• Docket Number: SC 19602
• Parties: STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DONALD SATURNO
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DONALD SATURNO

SC 19602

Supreme Court of Connecticut

Argued April 5, 2016

July 19, 2016

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and Robinson, Js.^*

Lisa J. Steele, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Robert J. Scheinblum, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom were Paul J. Ferencek, senior assistant state's attorney, and, on the brief, Richard J. Colangelo, Jr., state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

EVELEIGH, J. The defendant, Donald Saturno, appeals from the judgments of conviction rendered by the trial court following his conditional pleas of nolo contendere, pursuant to General Statutes § 54-94a,¹ to one count of manufacturing a bomb in violation of General Statutes § 53-80a and one count of possession of child pornography in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-196d (a) (1). The defendant entered these pleas after the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress certain evidence discovered following the execution of an administrative search warrant at his apartment. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress because the administrative search warrant was invalid and improperly executed. Specifically, the defendant contends that the administrative search warrant was invalid because it was: (1) issued without authority; (2) not supported by probable cause; and (3) improperly issued during an ex parte proceeding. The defendant further contends that the search was unlawful because excessive force was used during its execution. We disagree with the defendant's claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. The defendant lived in an apartment located in the basement of a building in the city of Stamford (city). That building was zoned and assessed by the city as a two-family residence. After receiving a complaint indicating that the building had several entry doors and three mailboxes, the city's Department of Health and Social Services (health department)² attempted to conduct an inspection, but was refused entry by the defendant. After two additional attempts to inspect the building proved unsuccessful, the health department presented an application for an administrative search warrant (application) to a judge of the Superior Court. The application included an affidavit signed by two inspectors from the health department, Marjorie Beauchette and Renford Whynes, stating that they had probable cause to believe that an illegal apartment existed in the building in violation of § 146-34 (A) of the Stamford Code of Ordinances.³ The application noted, in particular, the possibility of an illegal apartment in the basement. The Superior Court judge reviewed the application in an ex parte proceeding, determined that probable cause existed, and issued the administrative search warrant.

Subsequently, pursuant to the health department's standard policy, Beauchette scheduled a date for the execution of the administrative search warrant by a team comprised of various city officials⁴ and two officers from the Stamford Police Department. During the inspection, the city officials observed that the first and second floors of the building contained a total of threeapartments. In addition, the city officials noted numerous health, fire, and safety violations. Because the application alleged the potential existence of an illegal apartment in the basement, and because there was no apparent entrance to the basement from the interior of the building, the city officials searched for an exterior entrance. In the backyard, they discovered a locked, fenced area enclosing a staircase that led to a basement door. One of the police officers used a tool to break the lock on the fence, descended the stairs, and knocked on the basement door.

After a considerable period of time, the defendant opened the basement door and identified himself as the property owner.⁵ The police officers informed the defendant about the administrative search warrant and asked him to secure his dogs. The police officers conducted a cursory safety check of the threshold area of the basement and then permitted the city officials to enter the basement while the police officers waited outside. One of the city officials observed what he believed to be a pipe bomb and informed one of the police officers of what he had seen. After inspecting the object, the police officer evacuated the premises and contacted the bomb squad. Upon arrival, the bomb squad X-rayed the object and determined that it did not contain any explosive material, but did include hex nuts and other metallic material consistent with shrapnel. The bomb squad also conducted a protective sweep of the basement and observed items in plain view that were consistent with bomb making.

Consequently, the police officers obtained a criminal search warrant to search the premises for items related to bomb making. Pursuant to this criminal search warrant, the police officers seized the suspected pipe bomb, three computers, and other items related to bomb making. Additionally, a second criminal search warrant was issued to search the hard drives of the seized computers, which resulted in the discovery of child pornography.⁶

The defendant thereafter moved to suppress the seized items on the ground that an administrative search warrant does not authorize the entry of police officers into a private residence and that a criminal search warrant pursuant to General Statutes § 54-33a could not properly issue in this case. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued a ruling from the bench denying the defendant's motion to suppress. In so ruling, the trial court concluded that the administrative search warrant in the present case satisfied the probable cause standard for a targeted administrative inspection and that the police officers had only a "passive" presence during the execution of the administrative search warrant.

The defendant then entered pleas of nolo contendere to one count of manufacturing a bomb in violation of§ 53-80a and one count of possession of child pornography in the first degree in violation of § 53a-196d (a) (1), conditioned on his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. See General Statutes § 54-94a. This appeal followed.⁷ Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

At the outset, we set forth the standard of review. "[O]ur standard of review of a trial court's findings and conclusions in connection with a motion to suppress is well defined. A finding of fact will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record . . . . [When] the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, [our review is plenary, and] we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct . . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Buckland, 313 Conn. 205, 212, 96 A.3d 1163 (2014), cert. denied, U.S. , 135 S. Ct. 992, 190 L. Ed. 2d 837 (2015). In the present case, neither the state nor the defendant challenges the factual findings of the trial court. Our review, therefore, is limited to a determination of whether the trial court's legal conclusions—that the administrative search warrant was properly issued and that the subsequent search was properly executed—were legally and logically correct.

Before addressing the merits of the parties' claims, we begin by setting forth certain constitutional provisions relevant to regulatory inspections conducted pursuant to city ordinances. "The fourth amendment to the United States constitution, which is made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment . . . provides that [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. . . . A search for purposes of the [f]ourth [a]mendment occurs when a reasonable expectation of privacy is infringed. . . . In Camara [v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967)], the United States Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment applies to searches and seizures in the civil as well as the criminal context. . . . Rejecting the notion that an individual's fourth amendment protections are merely peripheral in the context of a regulatory inspection, the Supreme Court stated, [i]t is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the [f]ourth [a]mendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior. . . . Therefore, administrative searches of residences must comply with the fourth amendment."⁸ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bozrah v. Chmurynski, 303 Conn. 676, 683-85, 36 A.3d 210 (2012).

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress the evidence that formed the basis for the charges against him because the Superior Court judge who issued the administrative search warrant lacked authority.⁹ We disagree. A review of the provisions in chapter 368e of the General Statutes, which governs municipal health authorities, reveals that General Statutes § 19a-220 provides an enforcement mechanism for the health department.

As a preliminary matter, we note that the defendant failed to raise this claim before the trial court. We, therefore, review his claim pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). "Under Golding, a defendant may prevail on an unpreserved claim only if the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental...