State v. Saucier
Citation | 876 A.2d 572,90 Conn. App. 132 |
Decision Date | 12 July 2005 |
Docket Number | (AC 25038). |
Court | Appellate Court of Connecticut |
Parties | STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RICHARD SAUCIER. |
Glenn W. Falk, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Christine Collyer, special deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John A. Connelly, state's attorney, and Robin Lipsky, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
The defendant, Richard Saucier, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of four counts of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (1) and one count of kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-92 (a) (2) (A). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) prohibited him from cross-examining the victim1 about her 2000 federal income tax return, (2) prohibited him from presenting the victim's alias to the jury and from testifying about the victim's use of an alias to avoid creditors, and (3) excluded as hearsay a statement made by the victim. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On January 10, 2002, the defendant telephoned the victim and asked her to cover a shift as a bartender at a restaurant. The victim agreed and later was picked up by the defendant, who drove her to work. Following her shift, the victim drove with the defendant to a friend's house, where they smoked marijuana. The two left after twenty minutes. The victim was under the impression that the defendant was going to drive her home. Instead, he drove her to a deserted tractor-trailer park, then to a highway underpass and finally to his home. The defendant brutally and repeatedly sexually assaulted the victim at each location. Early the next morning, after the defendant had fallen asleep, the victim escaped and ran virtually naked to a nearby business, where the police were called. The police took the victim to a hospital, stopping briefly en route in order for the victim to point out the defendant's home. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
The defendant claims that the court violated his sixth amendment right to confront witnesses by prohibiting him from cross-examining the victim about her 2000 federal income tax return. We disagree.
While cross-examining the victim, defense counsel delved into her financial affairs. After eliciting testimony from the victim that as a bartender at the restaurant, tips were her primary source of income, defense counsel inquired whether she had reported those tips on her federal income tax returns. The victim responded: A few questions later, defense counsel asked the victim: "Then, in the year 2001, prior to April 15, 2001, did you file a federal income tax return for any wages earned during—" At that point, the state objected on the ground of relevance, arguing that defense counsel was "fishing." The court excused the jury, after which defense counsel explained that the victim's failure to report income on her tax returns pertained to her credibility. The court then heard the following offer of proof:
Following the offer of proof, the court asked defense counsel whether he had a good faith basis to believe that the victim had neglected to file a tax return for that year. Defense counsel answered that he did indeed have a good faith basis, namely, that the defendant told him that the victim had worked under the table at the restaurant. The court then sustained the state's objection, reasoning as follows: "Number one, at this point, I do understand the point of the question, but the information that she's processed gives me no basis and, two, from the source of where it's coming from, the court has some questions as to whether there's a basis for asking that question." The court also noted that it already had allowed some questions regarding the topic and that the right to cross-examination is not unfettered.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Howard F., 86 Conn. App. 702, 716, 862 A.2d 331 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 924, 871 A.2d 1032 (2005).
The first question, therefore, is whether the defendant's cross-examination of the victim satisfied the constitutional standards required by the sixth amendment. See State v. Brown, 273 Conn. 330, 340, 869 A.2d 1224 (2005). "The constitutional standard is met when defense counsel is permitted to expose to the jury the facts from which [the] jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 339-40. "[W]e consider the nature of the excluded inquiry, whether the field of inquiry was adequately covered by other questions that were allowed, and the overall quality of the cross-examination viewed in relation to the issues actually litigated at trial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 340. Here, although the court disallowed a question in a legitimate field of inquiry; see State v. Morgan, 70 Conn. App. 255, 274, 797 A.2d 616 (), cert. denied, 261 Conn. 919, 806 A.2d 1056 (2002); that field of inquiry already was covered adequately by questions that the court had allowed. As noted previously, defense counsel was allowed to ask the victim how she was paid while working as a bartender at the restaurant, whether the tips she received were her primary source of income and whether she had disclosed those tips on her federal income tax returns. Her evasive and equivocal response to the third question——permitted the defendant to expose to the jury facts from which the jurors could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness. See State v. Brown, supra, 341. Moreover, defense counsel elicited, before the jury, testimony from the victim that she had used different names throughout her lifetime, that she had smoked marijuana and consumed alcohol on the day in question and that she had smoked marijuana in the past. Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant's cross-examination of the victim met the constitutional standards required by the confrontation clause.
The second question is whether the court nonetheless abused its discretion by prohibiting the defendant from cross-examining the victim about her tax return. See id., 341. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Morgan, supra, 70 Conn. App. 272-73, citing, inter alia, Conn. Code Evid. § 6-6 (b).
"Despite the fact that our Supreme Court has held that questions asked of a witness regarding whether he or she has cheated on his or her income taxes may be permissible to demonstrate a lack of veracity; see State v. Sharpe, 195 Conn. 651, 658-59, 491 A.2d 345 (1985); such questions are not permissible automatically." State v. Morgan, supra, 70 Conn. App. 274. Here, we find no reason to second-guess the court's evidentiary ruling regarding the victim's tax return because it was made following the introduction of ample evidence related to the victim's credibility. See id. Indeed, as already noted, defense counsel elicited, before the jury, testimony from the victim that she was unsure whether she had disclosed the tips on her federal income tax returns, that she had used different names throughout her lifetime, that she had smoked marijuana and consumed alcohol on the day in question and that she had smoked marijuana in the past. Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not...
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