State v. Saucier

• Citation: 926 A.2d 633,283 Conn. 207
• Decision Date: 17 July 2007
• Docket Number: No. 17502.,17502.
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Richard SAUCIER.

926 A.2d 633

283 Conn. 207

STATE of Connecticut v. Richard SAUCIER.

No. 17502.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued October 25, 2006.

Decided July 17, 2007.

Glenn W. Falk, special public defender, with whom, on the brief was, Caitlin McCann, law student intern, for the appellant (defendant).

Julia K. Conlin, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John A. Connelly, state's attorney, and Robin Lipsky, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

BORDEN, NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, VERTE FE UILLE, ZARELLA and SULLIVAN, Js.^*

KATZ, J.

The issue in this certified appeal is whether a particular statement made by the victim¹ to an acquaintance in reference to the defendant, Richard Saucier, the day after she had identified the defendant as her attacker, should have been admitted into evidence at trial pursuant to the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, § 8-3(4) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence.² Pursuant to that inquiry, we also must consider whether the Appellate Court properly reviewed this ruling by the trial court under the plenary, rather than the abuse of discretion, standard of review. The defendant appeals, upon our grant of certification,³ from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of four counts of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a)(1) and one count of kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-92 (a)(2)(A). State v. Saucier, 90 Conn.App. 132, 134, 876 A.2d 572 (2005). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the statement was hearsay not subject to the state of mind exception. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts, as set forth in the opinion of the Appellate Court. "On January 10, 2002, the defendant telephoned the victim and asked her to cover a shift as a bartender at a restaurant [at which they both previously had worked]. The victim agreed and later was picked up by the defendant, who drove her to work. Following her shift, the victim drove with the defendant to a friend's house, where they smoked marijuana. The two left after twenty minutes. The victim was under the impression that the defendant was going to drive her home. Instead, he drove her to a deserted tractor-trailer park, then to a highway underpass and finally to his home. The defendant brutally and repeatedly sexually assaulted the victim at each location. Early the next morning, after the defendant had fallen asleep, the victim escaped and ran virtually naked to a nearby business, where the police were called. The police took the victim to a hospital, stopping briefly en route in order for the victim to point out the defendant's home." Id., at 134-35, 876 A.2d 572.

Thereafter, the state charged the defendant with six counts of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of § 53a-70 (a)(1), and one count of kidnapping in the first degree in violation of § 53a-92 (a)(2)(A). The jury returned verdicts of guilty on the first four counts of sexual assault and on the kidnapping charge, and not guilty on the fifth and sixth counts of sexual assault. The trial court rendered a judgment of conviction in accordance with the jury's verdict, and sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence of thirty years imprisonment, with ten years special parole.

The defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court affirmed the defendant's convictions, concluding, inter alia,⁴ that the trial court properly had sustained the state's objection on hearsay grounds to the admission of the following statement made by the victim, the day after the assault, to John J. Hoban, an acquaintance, "`I got Richie. I got him good.'" Id., at 143, 876 A.2d 572. The Appellate Court, relying primarily on our decision in State v. Freeney, 228 Conn. 582, 595, 637 A.2d 1088 (1994), concluded that this statement did not fall within the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule; see Conn.Code Evid. § 8-3(4); because it was a statement of past intent or motive after an act, rather than a statement of present or future intent. State v. Saucier, supra, 90 Conn. App. at 145-46, 876 A.2d 572. This certified appeal followed. See footnote 3 of this opinion.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the Appellate Court improperly upheld the exclusion of the victim's statement to Hoban because that statement was relevant and not hearsay in that it was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, or if the statement was hearsay, it is subject to the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. The defendant contends that the exclusion of the statement was not harmless error because the statement was noncumulative evidence of the victim's credibility in a case resting largely on her testimony. In response, the state claims that we should not review the defendant's claim that the statement was not hearsay because he: (1) failed to preserve it before the trial court; and (2) did not brief that claim in the Appellate Court. The state also contends that the trial court properly excluded the victim's statement to Hoban because it was: (1) so ambiguous as to be meaningless and therefore, irrelevant; and (2) offered as a statement of memory or belief to prove a fact, specifically, that she had fabricated the allegations against the defendant. Finally, the state claims that any evidentiary impropriety in this case is harmless error. We conclude that: (1) the defendant abandoned his claim that the statement was not hearsay by failing to raise it before the Appellate Court; and (2) the statement was not admissible pursuant to the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule.

The record reveals the following additional relevant facts and procedural history. After the state had rested its case and the trial court denied the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal, the defendant called Hoban as a witness. Hoban testified during an offer of proof outside the jury's presence, that he had been friendly with the victim for a couple of years, and that she frequently had confided in him. Hoban also testified, however, that he did not know her last name at any time. He then was questioned by defense counsel about the conversation that he had had with the victim on January 10, 2002, the day after the assault:

"Q. [D]irecting your attention, sir, to the day after January 10, 2002, did [the victim] confide something in you on that date?

"A. I got a call in the morning from her.

"Q. What did she confide in you, sir?

"A. I didn't understand it, but she says, `I got him. I got him good.' "Q. What did you respond to that?

"A. I said . . . what are you talking about? `I got Richie. I got him good.' And she hung up.

"Q. That was it?

"A. Yeah. And I didn't know what she was talking about. I went over to my office about an hour and a half later, read the paper . . . ." (Emphasis added.)

At that point, the state argued that Hoban's testimony about the victim's statement to him was inadmissible hearsay. In response, the defendant argued, inter alia, that the statement was offered to show the victim's state of mind.⁵ The trial court concluded that the statement was inadmissible under the state of mind exception because that exception applies to "present mind for future or past acts," and the victim's statement referred to a past act.⁶ Accordingly, the trial court sustained the state's objection.

I

We note at the outset that the defendant's claim requires that we clarify the standard of review applicable to a trial court's ruling about whether evidence is admissible pursuant to an exception to the hearsay rule. The defendant relies on the standard applied by the Appellate Court in this case, that "[w]hether evidence offered at trial is admissible pursuant to one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule presents a question of law" subject to plenary review. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Saucier, supra, 90 Conn.App. at 144, 876 A.2d 572, quoting State v. Gonzalez, 75 Conn.App. 364, 375, 815 A.2d 1261(2003), rev'd on other grounds, 272 Conn. 515, 864 A.2d 847 (2005). The state contends in response that the Appellate Court improperly engaged in plenary review of the trial court's evidentiary ruling, and that the abuse of discretion standard controls such questions. We recognize that the decisions by our appellate courts have not been a model of clarity in this regard,⁷ and we take this opportunity to resolve the confusion.

There is a split of authority among other jurisdictions on how evidentiary rulings addressing admissibility under the hearsay rule and its exceptions are to be reviewed. A majority of courts review such trial court evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion;⁸ while others engage in de novo review;⁹ and still others engage in a "hybrid" scope of review dependent on whether the hearsay rule or an exception to that rule is under consideration.¹⁰

We recognize the superficial appeal of the aforementioned bright line rules in their ease of application, but conclude that such rules overlook the fundamentally complex nature of evidentiary rulings. We therefore decline to adopt a categorical de novo or abuse of discretion standard because application of either standard will afford unwarranted deference in some cases and unwarranted interference in others, irrespective of the differing nature of inquiries at issue depending on the type of statement and the rule of evidence implicated. Although the "hybrid" approach in our view correctly recognizes that not all claims require the same degree of scrutiny, its categorical distinctions fail to recognize that, even within the hearsay exceptions, a more nuanced approach is demanded. Rather than invoke a rule based strictly on a category, we conclude that the better...