State v. Savage
| Decision Date | 12 January 2015 |
| Docket Number | A14-0357 |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Chris William Savage, Appellant. |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
Affirmed
Hennepin County District Court
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Melissa Sheridan, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Crippen, Judge.*
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
On appeal from his conviction of second-degree controlled-substance crime, appellant Chris Savage argues: (1) the evidence police obtained after they stopped appellant must be suppressed because police did not have articulable, particularized facts to justify stopping appellant; (2) the evidence that police discovered after they pat searched appellant should have been suppressed because police did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that appellant was armed and dangerous; and (3) the evidence police obtained as a result of the drug-detection dog sniff must be suppressed because police did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug activity to expand the scope of appellant's detention. We affirm.
Around 10:00 p.m. on the night of June 27, 2010, police officers executed a search warrant at a residence located in Maple Grove. The warrant authorized a search of the residence and its appurtenant structures based on probable cause that methamphetamine would be located inside the home.1 While executing the search warrant, officers found "a white crystalline substance that was consistent with the appearance of methamphetamine," along with glass bubble pipes, baggies, and false containers. The officers also found a false container that looked like a Dr. Pepper pop can but with a twist-off lid and a hollow inside filled with baggies containing a substance that appearedto be methamphetamine residue. The officers testified that these types of false containers are often used to conceal drugs and cash.
Around 1:30 a.m., while the officers were securing the residence and carrying equipment to their unmarked cars, a car pulled into the driveway. Officer Daniel Irish approached the driver's side of the car, identified himself as a police officer, and identified the driver as appellant Chris William Savage. While speaking with Savage, Officer Irish saw a Dr. Pepper can in the center console that was "kind of beat up and dirty." Suspecting the can was another false container containing contraband, Officer Irish ordered Savage to exit the vehicle. Savage was pat searched for weapons, and the officers found $912 in cash. A K-9 unit was called to sniff-search the vehicle.
During the dog sniff, the K-9 alerted at the driver's door and then again on the Dr. Pepper can. The officers opened the can and found suspected methamphetamine inside. The officers then completed a search of the entire car. In the trunk, they found a WD-40 can with a screw-off bottom that contained a bag of "similar crystalline substance that appeared to be methamphetamine." Savage was arrested and charged with second-degree controlled-substance crime.
Before trial, Savage filed a motion to suppress evidence seized in the search. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court filed an order denying Savage's motion to suppress. Savage waived his right to a jury trial and agreed to submit the case on stipulated evidence pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. Based on the stipulated evidence—including police reports, Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension test results, and certified copies of Savage's prior controlled-substanceoffenses—the district court found Savage guilty. Savage filed this appeal to challenge the denial of his suppression motion.
When reviewing a district court's pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, "we review the district court's factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the district court's legal determinations de novo." State v. Jordan, 742 N.W.2d 149, 152 (Minn. 2007). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if, after reviewing the record, this court "reaches the firm conviction that a mistake was made." State v. Kvam, 336 N.W.2d 525, 529 (Minn. 1983). We review de novo a district court's determination that there existed a reasonable, articulable suspicion justifying a search. State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution guarantee an individual's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. Evidence resulting from an unreasonable seizure or other constitutional violation usually must be suppressed. State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 177-78 (Minn. 2007); State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn. 1999). "Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless they fall under an established exception." State v. Hummel, 483 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. 1992) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1967)). However, "an officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicionthat criminal activity is afoot." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968)).
Savage argues that the police officers unconstitutionally seized him when he pulled into the driveway because they lacked any reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity. To address this issue, we must determine (1) at what point Savage was seized and (2) whether the police had a reasonable, articulable suspicion at the time of the seizure.
Savage claims that he was seized as soon as he arrived at the premises. He makes several arguments as to why this seizure was unjustified, arguing that the search of the residence was already completed by the time he arrived, stating that proximity to a crime alone cannot justify a seizure, and pointing to the officers' own testimony that they did not think Savage had done anything to indicate criminal activity when he first arrived.
Savage's arguments rest on an improper assumption—that he was seized immediately upon arriving on the scene. Not all contacts between police and an individual constitute a seizure of the individual. In re Welfare of E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779, 781 (Minn. 1993) (citation omitted). Instead, a seizure occurs if, "in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was neither free to disregard the police questions nor free to terminate the encounter." State v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn. 1995); see State v. Lopez, 698 N.W.2d 18, 21 (Minn. App. 2005) (). In adopting this standard, the Minnesota Supreme Court articulated a number of factors that might illustrate when a seizure has taken place: "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d at 781.
It is undisputed that Savage entered the driveway voluntarily. That the officers simply approached Savage upon his arrival does not automatically raise the level of the encounter to a seizure. Generally, "the mere act of approaching a person who is standing on a public street or sitting in a car that is parked and asking questions is not a 'seizure.'" E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d at 782. Here, the officers simply approached Savage, identified themselves as police, and asked for identification. While there were multiple officers at the scene, there was no evidence of threatening conduct or the display of a weapon. Savage was never physically touched and nothing indicates that the officers used a tone implying that his compliance was compulsory.
While the initial conversation did not constitute a seizure, Savage was certainly seized once he was told to get out of the car. E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d at 782 (). At that moment, a reasonable person would not have believed that that he was "free to disregard the police questions nor free to terminate the encounter." Cripps, 533 N.W.2d at 391.
A "police officer . . . [may] stop and temporarily seize a person to investigate that person for criminal wrongdoing if the officer reasonably suspects that person of criminal activity." State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). An appellate court "review[s] de novo a district court's determination of reasonable suspicion of illegal activity." State v. Smith, 814 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2012).
"The reasonable-suspicion standard is not high," Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 843 (quotation omitted), and is "less demanding than probable cause or a preponderance of the evidence," Smith, 814 N.W.2d at 352 (quotation omitted). But "it still requires at least a minimal level of objective justification." Id. (quotation omitted). "Reasonable suspicion must be particularized and based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Id. (quotations omitted)...
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