State v. Sawyer

• Decision Date: 08 August 2006
• Docket Number: No. 16972.,16972.
• Citation: 279 Conn. 331,904 A.2d 101
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Douglas SAWYER.

Page 101

904 A.2d 101

279 Conn. 331

STATE of Connecticut v. Douglas SAWYER.

No. 16972.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued November 21, 2005.

Decided August 8, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Norman A. Pattis, with whom, on the brief, was David B. Bachman, for the appellant (defendant).

Mitchell S. Brody, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Scott J. Murphy, state's attorney, and Vernon Oliver, former assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Michael Fitzpatrick and Richard Emanuel filed a brief for the Connecticut Criminal Defense Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.

Gerard A. Smyth, chief public defender, Martin Zeldis, chief of legal services, and Kent Drager and Lauren Weisfeld, senior assistant public defenders, filed a brief for the office of the chief public defender as amicus curiae.

SULLIVAN, C.J., and BORDEN, NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js.¹

ZARELLA, J.

The defendant, Douglas Sawyer, appeals, following our grant of certification,² from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming his conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of one count each of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a)(1), burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101 (a)(1) sexual assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-72a (a)(1)(A), sexual assault in the third degree in violation of § 53a-72a (a)(1)(B), threatening in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 53a-62 (a)(1) and reckless endangerment in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-63 (a). On appeal, the defendant claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the state to introduce into evidence certain uncharged misconduct evidence, and (2) even if the trial court improperly permitted the state to introduce the uncharged misconduct evidence, the evidentiary error was harmless. We agree with the defendant and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following relevant facts and procedural history. "On July 15, 1998, the victim, D,³ lived with her boyfriend, her children and another couple in the town of Plymouth. After D's boyfriend and the other couple left to go shopping, D remained at home to watch her children. Also present in D's residence were [the] children of the defendant.⁴ The defendant, who lived across the street from D, observed the children playing in a canoe that was in the backyard. He became upset, began to yell at the children and ordered them to stop playing in the canoe. The defendant went over and then entered D's home, and started to berate her for allowing the children to play [in] the canoe.

"D went upstairs to watch television, and the defendant, uninvited, subsequently followed her into the living room. D was sitting in a rocking chair, and the defendant stood behind her. He then proceeded to reach under her shirt and grope her breasts. D repeatedly asked him to stop and to leave her alone. She also informed the defendant that she would tell her boy-friend what he had done.

"The defendant then proceeded to unbutton D's jeans and inserted his finger into her vagina. D told him to stop. She attempted to push him off, but was unable to do so due to the defendant's size and superior strength. The defendant took a folding knife out of a sheath that he carried on his belt and opened it, exposing the blade. The defendant told her that he would kill her if she told anyone what had occurred. He then placed the knife blade on D's chest, causing her pain, but did not use enough force to break the skin.

"The defendant and D heard a motor vehicle arrive at the house. It was D's boyfriend and the other couple who lived with D returning from grocery shopping. The defendant folded the knife blade, placed it back in the sheath and left [D's] home.

"D exhibited noticeable changes in her behavior after the July 15, 1998 assault. She became depressed, scared and withdrawn. On August 20, 1998, approximately five weeks after the defendant had assaulted her, D told her boyfriend and others about the sexual assault perpetrated by the defendant. D filed a complaint with the police department, and the defendant subsequently was arrested and charged." State v. Sawyer, 74 Conn.App. 743, 745-46, 813 A.2d 1073 (2003).

Prior to the start of the trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine to preclude testimony by his former wife, C, who also was D's sister, pertaining to allegations of uncharged misconduct.⁵ During the hearing on the motion, the state argued that C should be allowed to testify under the common plan or scheme and identity exceptions to the evidentiary rule precluding the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence. The state also argued that testimony regarding an incident that had occurred in 1997 in which the defendant, in a fit of anger, used a knife to puncture the tire of his brother-in-law's car should be admitted because it was relevant to prove the defendant's motive and use of weapons to intimidate, to harass and to compel others to comply with his demands. Defense counsel objected to the admission of the uncharged misconduct evidence on the grounds of relevance and its tendency to present the defendant's character and reputation in a negative light. After considering the arguments of the parties, the trial court deferred a ruling on the motion until after the state had made an offer of proof as to the relevancy of the proffered evidence.

In the state's subsequent offer of proof, C testified outside the presence of the jury that, on April 22, 2001, a few months prior to commencement of trial, she and the defendant had a telephone conversation in which the defendant said that he wanted to have sex with her one more time.⁶ C further testified that she had told the defendant that she was not interested because they were no longer married and that she did not want anything more to do with him. The defendant responded by threatening that, if she refused to agree, he would make her life miserable.

The trial court overruled the defendant's objection and determined that the proposed testimony was admissible because D and C were similarly situated. The court noted that both women were (1) unmarried when they were threatened by the defendant, (2) of diminished mental capacity, (3) inferior in strength and intellect to the defendant, (4) accessible to the defendant because he lived in close proximity, and (5) propositioned by the defendant and threatened with harm if they did not submit to his demands.⁷

After the jury returned to the courtroom, C testified that, approximately three months before the start of the trial, she notified the police that the defendant had been harassing her on the telephone and that in one of their conversations he had threatened that if she did not agree to have sex with him he would make her life miserable. Upon her refusal, he further threatened that, if she did not do as he wished, he would tell the person she was dating at the time that she and the defendant were having sex, even though they, in fact, were not. C also testified that the defendant's threats frightened her because he had threatened her in the past and that she had reason to believe that his threats "might come true."

On cross-examination, the defendant admitted that he had told C that he would make her life miserable if she did not agree to have sex with him but denied that she was afraid of him or that his request constituted a threat. Following similar testimony on recross-examination, the state queried the defendant regarding his uncontrollable temper and threats he had made to others.

The state also queried the defendant on cross-examination regarding his collection of knives. The defendant indicated that he had possessed a knife similar to the one that was used to threaten D but that it had been confiscated by the police. Over defense counsel's objection, the court permitted the state to ask the defendant why the knife had been confiscated. The defendant then described an incident in which he had slashed a tire on his brother-in-law's automobile after his brother-in-law failed to comply with the defendant's command to remove the vehicle from the defendant's property. Following this testimony, the state elicited further information from the defendant regarding his threat to slash a second tire if the vehicle was not removed immediately and his subsequent arrest and plea of guilty to the offense.

The defendant's testimony about the tire slashing incident was followed by a series of questions regarding his intimidating persona, the efficacy of his threats, his mordacious temper, his history of medication to control emotional instability, his participation in anger management counseling for more than ten years, his counselor's observation that he was "a ticking time bomb," his fear of losing his temper in court and other threats that he had made to C during their marriage. Defense counsel objected to this line of questioning as irrelevant. On recross-examination, however, the state continued to elicit information from the defendant regarding the threatening telephone call and the tire slashing incident.

During closing arguments, the state asserted that the defendant was attempting to intimidate D when he placed the knife against her chest and ordered her to remain silent about the incident. The state argued that D believed that the defendant would kill her if she reported the incident because she had been present during the tire slashing incident and understood that the defendant had followed through on his threats in the past. Defense counsel responded that evidence regarding the defendant's emotional instability and the tire slashing incident was not relevant to the issue of the defendant's guilt because the defendant...