State v. Sayles

Citation244 A.3d 1139,472 Md. 207
Decision Date29 January 2021
Docket NumberNo. 17, Sept. Term, 2020,17, Sept. Term, 2020
Parties STATE of Maryland v. Karon SAYLES State of Maryland v. Bobby Jamar Johnson State of Maryland v. Dalik Daniel Oxely
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Argued by Karinna M. Rossi, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Petitioner.

Argued by Kristin Tracy, Assigned Public Defender (Law Offices of Thomas M. Donnelly, LLC, Baltimore, MD; Kenneth E. McPherson, Assigned Public Defender, Kenneth E. McPherson, Chtd., Fulton, MD; Rachel Marblestone Kamins, Assistant Public Defender of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Respondent.

Rachel Marblestone Kamins, Esq., Assistant Public Defender, Office of the Public Defender, Appellate Division, Baltimore, MD, Counsel for Respondent Karon Sayles.

Kristin Tracy, Esq., Assigned Public Defender, Law Offices of Thomas M. Donnelly, LLC, Baltimore, MD, Counsel for Respondent Bobby Jamar Johnson.

Kenneth E. McPherson, Esq., Assigned Public Defender, Kenneth E. McPherson, Chtd., Fulton, MD, Counsel for Respondent Dalik Daniel Oxely.

Argued before: Barbera, C.J.; McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, Booth and Biran, JJ.

Watts, J. Anecdotally speaking, jury nullification occurs where individual jurors, or the jury as a whole, in a criminal case may believe a defendant to be guilty, but nevertheless choose not to convict because the jury considers the law involved in the case to be unjust or wrong or perhaps the jury simply does not want to apply the law. Legally speaking, "jury nullification" has been defined as:

A jury's knowing and deliberate rejection of the evidence or refusal to apply the law either because the jury wants to send a message about some social issue that is larger than the case itself or because the result dictated by law is contrary to the jury's sense of justice, morality, or fairness.

Jury Nullification , Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

This case raises as a matter of first impression the question of whether a jury in Maryland has the authority to engage in jury nullification and whether, in responding to questions from a jury, the trial court correctly instructed the jury, among other things, that it was not authorized to engage in nullification and that doing so would violate the jury's oath. In this case, Karon Sayles, Bobby Jamar Johnson, and Dalik Daniel Oxely, Respondents, were each charged with multiple offenses related to a home invasion, armed robbery, and kidnapping that occurred over the course of two days on August 1 and 2, 2017, in Silver Spring, Maryland. At a joint trial in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, during jury deliberations, the jury sent three notes inquiring about jury nullification. In the first note, the jury asked whether it had the right to use jury nullification. The circuit court provided a written response advising that the jury's verdict must be based solely on the evidence, that the choices were guilty or not guilty, and that the jury should reread the court's instructions.

Later, in a second more insistent note, a juror asked that the question about the right to use jury nullification be answered with a yes or no response. In answer, the circuit court orally instructed the jury, among other things, that: jury nullification is "a juror's knowing and deliberate rejection of the evidence or refusal to apply the law"; a jury cannot engage in jury nullification; the jury was to decide the case based on the evidence as it found it and apply the law as given to it by the court; and jury nullification should not be a consideration.

In a third note that was "[f]rom juror #112[,]" the juror directly asked whether any law in Maryland prohibited jury nullification. In response, the circuit court orally instructed the jury as a whole, among other things, that the jury could not engage in jury nullification, jury nullification is improper, contrary to the law, and would violate the jury's oath, and jury nullification would violate the court's order and that the jury must apply the law as explained by the court. At the end of the next day, the jury returned verdicts finding Respondents guilty of numerous crimes, including home invasion, armed robbery, and kidnapping.

Respondents each appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which, in a reported opinion, reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case to that court for a new trial. See Sayles v. State, 245 Md. App. 128, 167, 226 A.3d 349, 372 (2020). In doing so, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that the power of jury nullification exists and held that the circuit court's instructions in response to the second and third jury notes concerning jury nullification "were legally incorrect and prejudicial." Id. at 151, 144, 226 A.3d at 362, 359. The State filed petitions for writs of certiorari , which we granted. See State v. Sayles, 469 Md. 659, 232 A.3d 259 (2020) ; State v. Johnson, 469 Md. 658, 232 A.3d 258 (2020) ; State v. Oxely, 469 Md. 658, 232 A.3d 258 (2020).

Against this backdrop, we must decide whether the Court of Special Appeals was incorrect in concluding that a jury has the power to engage in jury nullification and whether the circuit court abused its discretion in instructing the jury that it could not engage in jury nullification. Basically, we must determine whether jury nullification is authorized in Maryland, i.e ., whether juries have the right to engage in jury nullification. We must also decide whether the circuit court's instructions were incorrect and prejudiced Respondents, as the Court of Special Appeals concluded.

We hold that, despite the circumstance that jury nullification occurs, jury nullification is not authorized in Maryland and a jury does not have a right to engage in jury nullification. No case, statute, or rule in Maryland authorizes or gives juries the right to engage in jury nullification, i.e. , there is no grant of authority permitting a jury to nullify. Rather, Maryland case law makes clear that it is improper for an attorney to argue jury nullification to a jury, and that jury instructions on the law are binding and trial courts must advise juries as much. On request, during voir dire , a trial court must ask whether any prospective jurors are unwilling or unable to comply with the jury instructions on certain fundamental principles. In addition, a verdict resulting from jury nullification is analogous to the return of legally inconsistent verdicts because in both instances a jury acts contrary to a trial court's instructions as to the proper application of the law and both occurrences are impermissible. Taken together, these principles lead us to conclude that jury nullification is not authorized in Maryland.

Stated otherwise, although a jury may have the ability to nullify, and we recognize that jury nullification occurs, a jury does not have the right to engage in jury nullification. As such, for the reasons explained herein, we hold that, in this case, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when, in response to the second and third jury notes about jury nullification, it instructed the jury, among other things, that: jury nullification is a juror's knowing and deliberate rejection of the evidence or refusal to apply the law; the jury could not engage in jury nullification; jury nullification is contrary to the law and engaging in it would violate the jury's oath; jury nullification would violate the court's order; and, in Maryland, the jury must apply the law as instructed by the court. The circuit court's instructions were neither legally incorrect nor prejudicial. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remand the case to that Court for consideration of the remaining issues not addressed on appeal.1

BACKGROUND

On September 7, 2017, Respondents were each charged with forty-two offenses, including home invasion, armed robbery, kidnapping, first- and second-degree assault, false imprisonment, burglary, motor vehicle theft, fourth-degree sexual offense, and multiple conspiracy offenses. From August 20 to 31, 2018, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County conducted a joint jury trial of Respondents. On August 31, 2018, the jury found Sayles and Oxely each guilty of home invasion, five counts of armed robbery, kidnapping, second-degree burglary, first-degree assault, five counts of second-degree assault, five counts of false imprisonment, motor vehicle theft, and related conspiracies. The jury found Johnson guilty of home invasion, five counts of armed robbery, kidnapping, second-degree burglary, five counts of second-degree assault, five counts of false imprisonment, motor vehicle theft, and related conspiracies. The jury found Johnson not guilty of first-degree assault and conspiracy to commit first-degree assault.2 On November 20, 2018, Sayles was sentenced to a total of forty-two years' imprisonment, Johnson was sentenced to a total of forty years' imprisonment, and Oxely was sentenced to a total of fifty years' imprisonment.

The Home Invasion and Armed Robbery

Because providing the details of the underlying crimes is not necessary for resolution of the questions presented, we give only a brief overview of the facts for context. On the night of August 1, 2017, Respondents, together with two other individuals, Younus Muayad Alaameri and Edwin Ajeo, disguised themselves as maintenance workers and gained entry into a two-bedroom apartment in Silver Spring that Aracely Ochoa shared with her husband, David Rivera; her mother, Blanco Armina Campos; her stepfather, Rolando Callejas; and her son, who was a minor. Ochoa, who worked as a manager at a nearby Cash Depot, where customers came to cash checks and send money orders, recognized Alaameri as a regular customer of the store. The men attacked Rivera and bound him, Ochoa, and Callejas with zip-ties and forced them to lie face-down on the floor. Over the course of the night and following morning, the assailants engaged in multiple failed...

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17 cases
  • Harris v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • July 28, 2021
    ...that is, discretion manifestly unreasonable or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons." State v. Sayles , 472 Md. 207, 230, 244 A.3d 1139 (2021). Appellant has not made such a showing here. A trial court is required to give a specific instruction when "(1) the instruction ......
  • Williams v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • July 7, 2021
    ...the intent-to-inflict-serious-physical-injury modality without disregarding the circuit court's instructions. See State v. Sayles , 472 Md. 207, 246, 244 A.3d 1139 (2021) ("In Maryland, a jury is required to determine the facts and render a verdict based on the instructions on the law provi......
  • Williams v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • March 25, 2022
    ......It is clear that in Stewart , this Court did not overrule McNeal or the use of the required evidence test in determining the existence of legally inconsistent verdicts. In addition, later, after Hemming , in State v. Sayles , 472 Md. 207, 244, 244 A.3d 1139, 1160-61 (2021), this Court reaffirmed the holding in McNeal and the distinction between legally and factually inconsistent verdicts. Having explained that, under Stewart and McNeal , a determination as to whether verdicts are legally inconsistent involves ......
  • Williams v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Maryland
    • March 25, 2022
    ...evidence test in determining the 23 existence of legally inconsistent verdicts. In addition, later, after Hemming, in State v. Sayles, 472 Md. 207, 244, 244 A.3d 1139, 1160-61 (2021), this Court reaffirmed the holding in McNeal and the distinction between legally and factually inconsistent ......
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