State v. Scales
| Decision Date | 18 September 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 960745-CA,960745-CA |
| Citation | 946 P.2d 377 |
| Parties | 326 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Carl William SCALES, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
Manny Garcia, Salt Lake City, for Defendant and Appellant.
Jan Graham, Attorney General, and J. Frederic Voros Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Division, Salt Lake City, for Plaintiff and Appellee.
Before WILKINS, Associate P.J., and BILLINGS and ORME, JJ.
Defendant Carl William Scales appeals from a final judgment entered after a jury trial in which the jury found him guilty of one count of murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1995), and five counts of theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995). We affirm.
"In reviewing a jury verdict, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict," and recite the facts of this case accordingly. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1205-06 (Utah 1993).
In May 1995, defendant and Kayleen Jones were married in Arizona. The next month, they moved into a trailer owned by Kayleen's brother, Wade Jones, on a ranch in Upton, Utah. Wade had left three firearms, two .22 caliber rifles and a 30-06, in a hidden compartment in the trailer.
On Sunday, August 6, 1995, Wade was working at a water well near the trailer. Defendant told Wade he was going to clean out a storage tank that contained a rat he wanted to shoot. To enable defendant to kill the rat, Wade loaned him a .22 Ruger automatic rifle and a loaded clip.
That night, Kayleen's mother, who lived in a house near the trailer, was working outside in her yard. While she was out working, around 9:30 p.m., she heard defendant and Kayleen yelling at each other in the trailer. After about five minutes, the yelling stopped. Kayleen's mother did not see or hear Kayleen or defendant the rest of the evening.
The next morning, defendant visited Kayleen's grandmother, who also lived on the ranch. Defendant told her that he was having problems with his car and that he was supposed to be in South Fork, which was approximately six or seven miles away, in thirty minutes. He said Kayleen had told him her grandmother might be willing to let him borrow her car so he could get to South Fork on time. Kayleen's grandmother told him her car, a Monte Carlo, was unlicensed and did not have very much gasoline in it. Defendant told her he had gasoline. Kayleen's grandmother then gave him the keys and told him not to drive the car farther than South Fork.
Defendant then went back to the trailer and loaded Wade's four weapons--the two .22 rifles, the 30-06, and the Ruger .22--into the Monte Carlo's trunk. After leaving the trailer, where he left his wallet, defendant drove west on Interstate 80. On the way, defendant picked up two hitchhikers. Defendant did not appear to the hitchhikers to be purposely driving toward any particular destination. When asked by the hitchhikers where he was going, defendant gave a vague response. Defendant told the hitchhikers that "he had a little trouble at home," and that he "just wanted to get away for a while."
Defendant also told the hitchhikers he had some guns he wanted to sell because he was short on money. Defendant sold the 30-06 to a man in a bar in Wells, Nevada for $100 and two beers. He also sold the Ruger .22 for $25 at a gas station in Valmy, Nevada.
That evening, Kayleen's mother walked over to the trailer to talk to Kayleen, but found all three exterior doors to the trailer locked. Concerned, Kayleen's mother called Wade, who came over. Wade unlocked and entered the trailer. He found Kayleen's dead body on the bed in the master bedroom. One pillow covered her head and was saturated with blood. Another pillow was next to her head. Spent .22 casings were strewn about the room. It was later determined that the spent casings had been fired from the Ruger .22 Wade had loaned to defendant to kill the rat in the storage tank. The trailer contained no signs of either a struggle or a forced entry. In addition, no defensive wounds were found on Kayleen's body. On the floor at the entrance to the master bedroom was a necklace. Inside on the bedroom floor was Kayleen and defendant's marriage certificate, which had been torn into pieces. It was later determined that Kayleen had been killed by being shot with the Ruger .22 five or six times in the head through the two pillows.
Defendant, who was still driving the borrowed Monte Carlo, was apprehended the next day in Reno, Nevada. Wade's two .22 rifles were found in the car's trunk.
Defendant was charged in a single information with one count of murder and five counts of theft. 1 He was appointed an attorney, Glen Cook, and pleaded not guilty to all counts.
In October 1995, following his arraignment, defendant filed a pro se motion to have Cook removed as his counsel. The record contains no minute entry or order regarding this motion; however, the trial court's docket entry indicates that a motion hearing was held and that the trial court struck defendant's motion because "the problem ha[d] been resolved."
In January 1996, defendant filed a second pro se motion to have Cook removed as his counsel. Defendant's motion alleged several grievances regarding his relationship with Cook, including that After holding another hearing, the trial court granted this second motion. The court then appointed Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. to represent defendant.
In February 1996, upon learning that his former wife had just died of cancer, defendant began a fast. Defendant refused to eat solid foods, stating that he wanted to experience the suffering his former wife experienced while she was dying of cancer. Forty-one days into the fast, the State filed both a Petition for Inquiry into Mental Condition of Defendant and a Petition to Force-Feed Defendant. In response to these motions, the trial court ordered that defendant be committed to the Utah State Hospital for thirty days for observation and treatment. After defendant's condition was assessed, the trial court held another hearing. The trial court concluded defendant was competent to stand trial.
In April 1996, defendant, through Fratto, moved to sever the murder count from the theft counts on the ground that "the substance of these offenses do not constitute a single criminal episode." After a hearing the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and denied the severance motion.
Also in April 1996, defendant, independently of Fratto, sent the Utah State Bar a letter requesting both a change of venue and that Fratto be dismissed as his counsel. In the letter, defendant alleged that his confidence in Fratto was shaken, that Fratto's investigator had failed to follow up with defendant as promised, that Fratto had initiated and arranged with the prosecuting attorney to transfer defendant to the Utah State Hospital, and that Fratto ignored defendant's social worker's request to have legal materials sent to the hospital.
On May 3, 1996, twenty-seven days before the trial was scheduled to begin, Fratto moved to withdraw as defendant's counsel. In an affidavit, Fratto testified to circumstances evidencing that his relationship with defendant had deteriorated. These circumstances included defendant's refusal to meet with Fratto, defendant's letter to the Utah State Bar requesting a change of venue and dismissal of Fratto as his counsel, and defendant's requests for copies of documents and information relating to his case.
Later that month, the trial court held a hearing. On May 24, the court denied Fratto's motion to withdraw, but ordered that the case be continued from May 29, 1996, to July 9, 1996, "at the request of defendant's counsel to enable him to prepare for trial with or without the cooperation of defendant." The court denied Fratto's motion to withdraw because of the following four reasons: (1) the court had already removed one attorney, Cook, from the case at defendant's request; (2) Fratto was an experienced, qualified, and competent attorney; (3) there was no legitimate basis for defendant's refusal to speak or cooperate with Fratto in the preparation of the case; and (4) the court had no reason to believe, based on defendant's past behavior, that defendant would cooperate or be satisfied with another attorney.
Over a month later, on July 9, defendant's trial began with Fratto still acting as defendant's attorney. After a three-day trial, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on all counts. Defendant now appeals.
Defendant challenges his convictions by asserting two main arguments on appeal: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) the trial court erroneously denied his motion to sever the murder charge from the theft charges. We review each of these arguments in turn.
We first examine defendant's argument that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Defendant specifically complains that the deterioration of his relationship with Fratto required the trial court to grant Fratto's motion to withdraw, and that the denial of Fratto's motion, and Fratto's subsequent continued representation of defendant, denied defendant his right to counsel.
Whether to allow an indigent defendant's attorney to withdraw after the attorney has expressed concern about his or her relationship with the defendant is a matter committed to the trial court's sound discretion and will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. See Utah Code Jud. Admin. R4-604(1)(A) (...
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...by conduct resulting in another charge.” State v. Hildreth, 2010 UT App 209, ¶ 32, 238 P.3d 444 (citing State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377, 385 (Utah Ct.App.1997)); see also State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649, 653 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (“[W]hen criminal conduct resulting in a second charge is precipitate......
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