State v. Scherrer

• Docket Number: ED110639
• Decision Date: 29 August 2023
• Parties: STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent, v. MELVIN J. SCHERRER, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

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STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent,
v.
MELVIN J. SCHERRER, Appellant.

No. ED110639

Court of Appeals of Missouri, Eastern District, First Division

August 29, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Francois County 13SF-CR01545-01 Honorable Jerel L. Poor II

ROBERT M. CLAYTON III, PRESIDING JUDGE

Melvin J. Scherrer ("Defendant") appeals the judgment, following a jury trial, finding him guilty of murder in the second degree (Count I), armed criminal action (Count II), felonious restraint (Count III), and abandonment of a corpse (Count IV). The trial court sentenced Defendant to consecutive terms of life imprisonment for Count I, fifteen years of imprisonment for Count II, seven years of imprisonment plus a $5,000 fine for Count III, and four years of imprisonment plus a $5,000 fine for Count IV. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 1, 2013, the State charged Defendant with multiple crimes for his involvement in an incident which resulted in Victim's death. A jury trial subsequently took place on February 15-18, 2022, in the Circuit Court of St. Francois County ("trial court" or "court").

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A. Relevant Evidence Adduced at Trial

Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdicts, the following relevant evidence was adduced at Defendant's trial through the testimony of investigating officers and four eyewitnesses present during the course of events. On December 15, 2012, Defendant brought Victim to Defendant's house for a "tattoo party" that stretched over several days and was attended by multiple other people. People would drift in and out of the party, and some stayed up "[a]ll night" "drinking and doing drugs," including methamphetamine. Sometime during the evening of December 18, 2012, Defendant came to believe Victim had a gun and intended to "rob and kill" Defendant. Defendant struck Victim multiple times with a baseball bat and taped Victim's hands behind his back. After several hours of searching, nobody in the home was able to find a gun belonging to Victim. Defendant again struck Victim with a baseball bat, and a witness testified Defendant appeared "high on drugs."

Defendant and two associates ("associate one" and "associate two") then went outside, removed a large toolbox from the bed of a truck, and slid the toolbox inside the house. Defendant forced Victim into the toolbox while another associate ("associate three") stood nearby holding a gun. Once Victim was inside the toolbox, Defendant wrapped Victim's head with Gorilla Tape, covering his "whole head" such that "you couldn't see [any] flesh at all." Defendant pushed Victim down into the toolbox and closed the lid. Victim kicked the inside of the toolbox and made other noises for between ten and twenty minutes, but eventually all sounds coming from the toolbox stopped.

Associate one and associate two helped Defendant return the toolbox to the truck bed. Defendant and associate one then left in the truck with Victim's body in back, proceeding to drive around for approximately two hours until deciding where to dump the body. Eventually, Defendant stopped at a vacant house with several septic tanks, and associate one helped

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Defendant tip the body from the toolbox into one of the septic tanks. Defendant later stopped again to put some of Victim's property into an old washing machine and burn it.

The following morning, Victim's wife, who knew Victim had been at Defendant's home, discovered multiple "angry," "erratic," and "desperate" text messages sent to her by Victim at some point during the previous night. After attempting to contact Victim multiple times and receiving no response, Victim's wife called Defendant, who told her Victim had "left in the middle of the night." Five days later, Victim's wife filed a missing persons report in St. Francois County and cooperated with police. Based on the subsequent investigation, police obtained a search warrant for Defendant's home.

During a search of Defendant's home on January 29, 2013, police seized multiple items including carpet fibers, carpet tacking, a baseball bat, and other items containing blood. Victim's body remained undiscovered until July 2013, when associate one led police to the location of the septic tank with the body still inside. The forensic pathologist who performed Victim's autopsy determined the death was a homicide and testified that Victim's nose and mouth were sufficiently covered to have asphyxiated him. A fiber on Victim's boot was found to be similar to Defendant's living room carpet. At trial, the State called an expert witness who testified that blood found on the carpet seized from Defendant's home was consistent with Victim's DNA. Additionally, police discovered Victim's tattoo equipment in Defendant's house.

B. Relevant Procedural Posture

After hearing the above evidence, a jury found Defendant guilty of murder in the second degree, armed criminal action, felonious restraint, and abandonment of a corpse. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for new trial asserting that, inter alia, the trial court erred in: (1) violating his right to a speedy trial; (2) denying his motion to suppress the physical evidence seized from Defendant's home and in admitting such evidence; and (3) admitting allegedly

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prejudicial photographic evidence containing the logo of a motorcycle club. The trial court denied the motion for new trial and sentenced Defendant to consecutive terms of life imprisonment for murder in the second degree, fifteen years of imprisonment for armed criminal action, seven years of imprisonment plus a $5,000 fine for felonious restraint, and four years of imprisonment plus a $5,000 fine for abandonment of a corpse. This appeal followed.^[1]

II. DISCUSSION

Defendant raises three points on appeal. In his first point, Defendant asserts he was denied his right to a speedy trial. In his second point, Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and in admitting incriminating evidence obtained during a search of his home. In his third and final point on appeal, Defendant claims the trial court erred in admitting photographic evidence alluding to his membership in a motorcycle club.

A. Defendant's First Point on Appeal

We initially address Defendant's argument in his first point on appeal asserting he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. "[W]hile the trial court's factual findings are subject to deferential review, [an appellate] [c]ourt will review de novo whether [a defendant's] Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated." State v. Sisco, 458 S.W.3d 304, 313 (Mo. banc 2015).

1. General Law and Analysis

"The federal and Missouri constitutions provide equivalent protection for a defendant's right to a speedy trial." Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted). "Orderly expedition of a case, not mere speed, is the essential requirement behind a speedy trial." State v. Greenlee, 327 S.W.3d 602, 611 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010). A primary purpose of the right to a speedy trial is "to guard against inordinate delay between public charge and trial," and thus prevent prejudice to a

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meritorious defense or interference with a defendant's liberty. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 537 (1972) (White, J., concurring). In determining whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated, courts must consider all of the relevant circumstances and balance four factors, (1) the length of the delay in bringing the defendant to trial; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) any prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the delay. Sisco, 458 S.W.3d at 313, 314 n.11; State ex rel. Garcia v. Goldman, 316 S.W.3d 907, 911 (Mo. banc 2010); see also Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-33. We refer to these as the “Barker factors.” See State v. Smith, 491 S.W.3d 286, 305 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016).

a. The Length of Delay

The first factor, the length of the delay in bringing the defendant to trial, triggers the need to determine whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated, because unless there is a delay that is presumptively prejudicial, the appellate court need not consider the other three factors. Garcia, 316 S.W.3d at 911; Smith, 491 S.W.3d at 305. If the delay between the time of the defendant's indictment and his trial is eight months or more, such a delay is presumptively prejudicial. See id.

In this case, the delay of over eight years between the time the complaint was filed against Defendant on August 1, 2013, and the beginning of his trial on February 15, 2022, is presumptively prejudicial. See id. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of Defendant, and we proceed to consider and balance the other three Barker factors. Id.

b. The Reasons for Delay

In evaluating the second factor, the reasons for the delay in bringing the defendant to trial, we determine which delays are attributable to the State, which delays are caused by neutral and valid reasons, which delays are attributable to the defendant, and assign different weights to different reasons for the delay. Id.; Sisco, 458 S.W.3d at 313-14. A deliberate attempt by the

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State to delay a defendant's trial in order to hamper the defense weighs heavily against the State. Id. Delays by the trial court for more neutral reasons, such as overcrowded dockets or negligence of the State, also weigh against the State, but less heavily. Sisco, 458 S.W.3d at 314. Other neutral delays caused by valid reasons, including the unavailability of witnesses, continuances requested jointly by the State and a defendant, and the COVID-19 pandemic, justify an appropriate delay and do not weigh against either party. Id. at 313-14; State v. Oliver, 655 S.W.3d 407, 418-20 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022); Edwards v. State, 636 S.W.3d 606, 612 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021). However, delays attributable to the defendant weigh heavily against him. Sisco,...