State v. Schimanski
| Decision Date | 03 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | AC 41802 |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Anastasia SCHIMANSKI |
Aaron J. Levin, certified legal intern, with whom was James B. Streeto, senior assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Kathryn W. Bare, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Patrick J. Griffin, state's attorney, and Sean P. McGuinness, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
Elgo, Bright and Moll, Js.*
The defendant, Anastasia Schimanski, appeals from the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court following her conditional plea of nolo contendere to operating a motor vehicle while her license was suspended in violation of General Statutes § 14-215 (c) (1). On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred in denying her motion to dismiss directed to (1) count one of the state's first substitute information charging her with a violation of § 14-215 (c) (1), and (2) count two of the state's first substitute information charging her with operating a motor vehicle not equipped with a functioning ignition interlock device (IID) in violation of General Statutes § 14-227k (a) (2). We conclude that (1) the court properly denied the defendant's motion to dismiss as to count one of the state's first substitute information, and (2) the defendant's claims directed to the denial of her motion to dismiss as to the second count of the first substitute information are either moot or not ripe. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as to the denial of the motion to dismiss the second count of the first substitute information for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and we affirm the judgment of conviction.
The following procedural history and facts, as undisputed or made a part of the record at the time the defendant entered her plea, are relevant to our resolution of the defendant's claims. On September 18, 2017, the defendant was arrested and charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a. Pursuant to General Statutes § 14-227b (i), the Department of Motor Vehicles (department) suspended the defendant's license for a period of forty-five days, beginning on October 18, 2017, and ending on December 2, 2017, as a result of the defendant's refusal to take a chemical alcohol test. On December 4, 2017, the trial court, Spader, J. , granted the defendant's application for the pretrial alcohol education program. See General Statutes § 54-56g. In connection with doing so, the court engaged in the following colloquy with the defendant:
That same day, shortly after leaving the courthouse following the hearing, the defendant operated a motor vehicle, which did not have an IID installed in it, and allegedly struck another motor vehicle. As a result of that incident, the defendant was issued a misdemeanor summons and complaint, giving rise to the present case, charging her with operating a motor vehicle while her license was under suspension in violation of § 14-215, evasion of responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 14-224 (b), and following another motor vehicle too closely in violation of General Statutes § 14-240. On February 23, 2018, the state filed its first substitute information. In count one, the state charged the defendant with operating a motor vehicle while her license was under suspension in violation of § 14-215 (c) (1). In count two, the state charged the defendant with operating a motor vehicle not equipped with an IID in violation of § 14-227k (a) (2). In count three, the state charged the defendant with evasion of responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle in violation of § 14-224 (b) (3).
On March 5, 2018, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss counts one and two of the first substitute information. With respect to count one, the defendant argued that she could not properly be charged with having committed a violation of § 14-215 (c) (1) on December 4, 2017, because at such time, her license was not under suspension on account of § 14-227b (i) (1). According to the defendant, the forty-five day suspension of her license pursuant to § 14-227b (i) (1) had expired on December 2, 2017. With respect to count two, the defendant argued that she was not obligated on December 4, 2017, either by direction of the department or by order of the trial court, to operate a motor vehicle with an IID installed, and, thus, she could not properly be charged with having violated § 14-227k (a) (2) on that date.1
On March 19, 2018, after having heard argument on March 9, 2018, the trial court issued a memorandum of decision denying the defendant's motion to dismiss in its entirety. As to count one charging the defendant with a violation of § 14-215 (c) (1), the court determined that, pursuant to §§ 14-227a and 14-227b, the installation of an IID is a "mandatory statutory requirement implemented by the state legislature that must be fulfilled to ‘unsuspend’ a suspended license." The court further determined that the defendant did not have an IID installed on December 4, 2017, and that the department did not lift her suspension and restore her privilege to operate a motor vehicle until January 2, 2018, by which time the defendant had installed an IID. In addition, the court addressed and rejected the merits of a claim raised by the defendant during oral argument that requiring the installation of an IID in order to lift the suspension of a person's license would violate the equal protection clause of the United States constitution by imposing undue burdens on indigent individuals.
In light of the foregoing, with respect to count one, the court concluded that the state could prosecute the defendant for a violation of § 14-215 (c) (1). With respect to count two, the court determined that during the hearing held on December 4, 2017, it unequivocally and directly had ordered the defendant not to operate any motor vehicle without an IID installed. Thus, the court concluded, the state could prosecute the defendant for a violation of § 14-227k (a) (2).
On May 9, 2018, the state filed a second substitute information charging the defendant solely with operating a motor vehicle while her license was under suspension in violation of § 14-215 (c) (1). On May 25, 2018, pursuant to General Statutes § 54-94a, the defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to that charge, conditioned on her right to take an appeal from her conviction on the basis of the court's denial of her motion to dismiss. After a canvass, the court accepted the conditional plea, entered a finding of guilty, and sentenced the defendant to a term of one year of incarceration, execution suspended, with one year of probation.2 This appeal followed.3 Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
The defendant first claims that the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss count one of the state's first substitute information charging her with operating a motor vehicle while her license was under suspension in violation of § 14-215 (c) (1). Specifically, the defendant contends that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, her failure to have installed an IID did not extend the suspension of her license under § 14-227b (i) (1) beyond the forty-five day period, which expired on December 2, 2017, and, as a result, she could not have been charged with having committed a violation of § 14-215 (c) (1) on December 4, 2017. Additionally, the defendant contends that interpreting the statutory requirements in §§ 14-215 (c), 14-227a, and 14-227b to mandate the installation of an IID as a condition to lift the suspension of a person's license violates the equal protection clause of the United States constitution. These contentions, which we address in turn, are unavailing.
The defendant first contends that the trial court should have dismissed the charge under § 14-215 (c) (1) because, pursuant to §§ 14-215 (c) (1), 14-227a, and 14-227b, the suspension of her license expired on December 2, 2017, and was not extended to December 4, 2017, as a result of her failure to install an IID. We disagree.
At the outset, we set forth the standard of review and legal principles that apply to the defendant's claim. "Because a motion to dismiss effectively challenges the jurisdiction of the court, asserting that the state, as a matter of law and fact, cannot state a proper cause of action against the defendant ... review of the court's legal conclusions and resulting denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss is de novo." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kallberg , 326 Conn. 1, 12, 160 A.3d 1034 (2017).
Resolving the defendant's claim requires us to interpret various provisions in our motor vehicle statutes. ...
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