State v. Schladweiler, 16223

Citation436 N.W.2d 851
Decision Date12 January 1988
Docket NumberNo. 16223,16223
PartiesSTATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. James E. SCHLADWEILER and David Schladweiler, Defendants and Appellees. . Considered on Briefs
CourtSupreme Court of South Dakota

Douglas N. Papendick, Davison County State's Atty., Mitchell, for plaintiff and appellant.

Rick Johnson of Johnson, Eklund & Davis, Gregory, for defendant and appellee James E. Schladweiler.

Chris A. Nipe of Bridgman, Larson & Nipe, Mitchell, for defendant and appellee David Schladweiler.

MILLER, Justice.

In this case, the State of South Dakota appeals the circuit court's dismissal of an indictment with prejudice. We hold (1) that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying State a continuance in order to prepare for defense pretrial motions and (2) that the trial court erred in dismissing the indictment with prejudice. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

FACTS

Appellees James E. Schladweiler and David Schladweiler (Schladweilers) took a truck into Dick's Body Shop in Mitchell, South Dakota, for repair work. The repairs were made and the total amount due and owing to the body shop was $6,029.70. Schladweilers later went to the body shop in order to pick up the repaired truck and spoke to the manager concerning arrangements for payment. James Schladweiler showed the manager a check from U.S. Insurance Group made payable to Dick's Body Shop and Schladweilers in the amount of $6,091.71. 1 Schladweilers requested that the manager endorse the insurance check and return it to them; in exchange, Schladweilers would give the body shop a check from Schladweilers' business account for the amount of the repairs ($6,029.70). The manager explained that he did not desire to do this as it was the body shop's normal procedure to keep and deposit insurance checks. However, after further conversation, Schladweilers persuaded the manager to endorse the insurance check in exchange for a check drawn upon Schladweilers' business account. Schladweilers then handed the manager a check from their business account which was signed only by David Schladweiler. The manager noticed that there were two signature lines on the check and inquired as to whether two signatures were necessary to negotiate the instrument. James Schladweiler replied that two signatures were not required and stated that the check would be honored by Schladweilers' bank. The manager accepted the check and returned their truck to them. The check was returned by the bank to Dick's Body Shop unpaid because two signatures were required. The record does not indicate whether any informal steps were taken to collect on Schladweilers' check prior to a complaint being lodged with law enforcement authorities.

On August 17, 1987, Schladweilers were indicted for grand theft in violation of SDCL 22-30A-1. 2 Schladweilers were arraigned, a trial date was set with a pretrial motions hearing scheduled to begin thirty minutes prior to trial.

On the morning of trial, at the pretrial motions hearing, State received copies of various defense motions including a motion for directed acquittal by David Schladweiler. The court heard argument from counsel for each of the Schladweilers concerning their respective motions and from State concerning its resistance thereto. During the hearing, the focus of the arguments shifted from the propriety of Schladweilers' motions and instead turned to whether State had sufficient evidence to prove specifically that Dick's Body Shop had an irrevocable interest in the insurance check which was made payable jointly to the body shop and Schladweilers. The court indicated that if State could not prove that the body shop had such an interest, then State would be unable to make out a prima facie case of theft.

After hearing the court's position, State moved for a continuance so that it could contact someone from the insurance company. The court noted that a panel of prospective jurors was waiting in the courtroom and indicated that it did not believe State was entitled to a continuance. State then moved for dismissal without prejudice. The court, after synopsizing what it believed to be State's theory of the case, indicated that, with its understanding of how the evidence would be presented, State's case would fail as a matter of law. State again moved for a continuance, which Schladweilers resisted, and the court denied the motion. State again moved for dismissal without prejudice, Schladweilers resisted, and the court ultimately denied the motion. State then indicated that it was not in a position to proceed, to which the court replied that it would dismiss the case with prejudice. State again moved for a continuance, which the court denied. State then resisted the court's plan to dismiss the case with prejudice, and noted that State could not proceed with the case. The court reiterated its position that unless State proceeded to immediately prosecute the case, it would dismiss the indictment with prejudice. State, after a short recess, argued that it did not have proper notice of the motion to dismiss filed by Schladweilers and that State could not proceed until it had the opportunity to research Schladweilers' motions. The court noted that it would not grant Schladweilers' motion to dismiss, and stated that it would commence with the selection of the jury. State refused to continue with prosecution of the case at that time, and the court dismissed the indictment with prejudice.

DECISION
I

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING STATE A CONTINUANCE.

State first contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying its motion for a continuance so that State could prepare its response to the motions filed by Schladweilers on the morning of trial. State argues that the untimely service of the motions and supporting briefs did not afford State any opportunity to review, research and effectively argue against the motions for dismissal.

Under our standard, the granting or refusing of a motion for a continuance is ordinarily within the sound judicial discretion of the trial court, and its ruling will not be reversed unless there has been a clear abuse thereof. See State v. Smith, 325 N.W.2d 304 (S.D.1982); State v. DuBray, 298 N.W.2d 811 (S.D.1980); State v. Hickey, 287 N.W.2d 502 (S.D.1980); State v. Lohnes, 266 N.W.2d 109 (S.D.1978); State v. Pickering, 245 N.W.2d 634 (S.D.1976); State v. Barcley, 88 S.D. 584, 225 N.W.2d 875 (1975).

Here, we note that Schladweilers' motions were denied by the trial court as untimely. Because Schladweilers' motions were denied, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in also denying State's motion for a continuance in order to prepare arguments in resistance to Schladweilers' failed motions. See Smith, supra; DuBray, supra.

II

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE INDICTMENT WITH PREJUDICE PRIOR TO JURY SELECTION.

State next asserts that it was entitled to have the indictment against Schladweilers dismissed without prejudice prior to the selection of the jury and that the trial court erred in dismissing the indictment with prejudice. We agree.

SDCL 23A-44-2 provides:

A prosecuting attorney may file a dismissal of an indictment, information or complaint and the prosecution thereupon shall terminate. Such a dismissal may not be filed during a trial without the consent of the defendant.

SDCL 23A-44-5 provides that such dismissal is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense.

SDCL 23A-8-2 provides the grounds under which an indictment or an information may, upon defense motion, be dismissed. 3 As was the case in State v Bingen, 326 N.W.2d 99 (S.D.1982), it does not appear that the indictment here was vulnerable under any of the grounds contained in the statute. From the record, it appears that the trial court dismissed the case because State would not proceed with its p...

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5 cases
  • State v. Cameron
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of South Dakota
    • June 16, 1999
    ...1997 SD 128, ¶ 8, 570 N.W.2d at 41; State v. Bale, 512 N.W.2d 164, 167 (S.D.1994) (Wuest, J., concurring in result); State v. Schladweiler, 436 N.W.2d 851, 854 (S.D.1989). See also Bingen, 326 N.W.2d at 100; State v. Hoekstra, 286 N.W.2d 127, 128 (S.D.1979). "An indictment returned by a leg......
  • State v. Dorhout, 18249
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of South Dakota
    • April 15, 1994
    ...as charged. SDCL 23A-8-2 provides nine grounds under which an indictment may be dismissed on motion of defendant. 1 State v. Schladweiler, 436 N.W.2d 851, 853 (S.D.1989). These statutory grounds are exclusive, State v. Hoekstra, 286 N.W.2d 127, 128 (S.D.1979); see generally State v. Bingen,......
  • State v. Goodroad, 18467
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of South Dakota
    • September 7, 1994
    ...it does not describe a public offense. Based upon this statute, the majority's rationale impugns this Court's holding in State v. Schladweiler, 436 N.W.2d 851 (S.D.1989). In Schladweiler, we held that a trial court cannot inquire into the legality or sufficiency of the evidence upon which a......
  • State v. Springer-Ertl, SPRINGER-ERT
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of South Dakota
    • November 5, 1997
    ...upon which an indictment is based when considering a dismissal under SDCL 23A-8-2." 3 Id. (citations omitted); accord State v. Schladweiler, 436 N.W.2d 851, 854 (S.D.1989); State v. Bingen, 326 N.W.2d 99, 100 (S.D.1982); see also Hoekstra, 286 N.W.2d at 128 ("[A]n information drawn by the p......
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