State v. Schloesser
| Decision Date | 07 December 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 2006-257-C.A.,2006-257-C.A. |
| Citation | 940 A.2d 637 |
| Parties | STATE v. Keith SCHLOESSER. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., and GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, SUTTELL, and ROBINSON, JJ.
Justice SUTTELL, for the Court.
The defendant, Keith Schloesser, appeals from a judgment of conviction on three counts of first-degree child molestation and one count of second-degree child molestation for the sexual assault of his son, whom we shall refer to as Jason, a fictitious name. The defendant argues that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new trial. Contending that the jury verdict was against the weight of the evidence presented at trial and failed to do substantial justice, the defendant maintains that the trial justice improperly analyzed the evidence in deciding the motion for a new trial. After reviewing the record and considering the written and oral submissions of the parties, we are satisfied that the trial justice appropriately discharged his responsibilities in considering the motion for a new trial. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction.
The defendant was charged with four counts of molestation committed on three separate occasions over a two-year period. The state presented only two witnesses at trial, Jason and Christine Barron, M.D., a forensic pediatrician. We report the pertinent facts as recounted by Jason in his testimony.
Jason testified that the first incident of sexual abuse occurred when he was nine years old. He said that defendant called him into the living room, demanded that he take off his clothes, and threatened to kill his mother if he told anyone. Standing in front of Jason, defendant began to rub Jason's penis. Jason testified that defendant then moved to stand behind him and "[h]e stuck his penis up my butt." Jason described his body posture as, "[s]lightly hunched over" and said he could not see defendant, but he remembered defendant grabbing Jason's shoulders. Jason, who was fourteen years old and five feet six inches tall at the time of trial, could not say how tall he was at the time of the incident. Jason testified that similar acts of sexual abuse occurred once or twice a week for the next two years, but he recounted only two such similar incidentsone when he was ten years old and the other in May 2003.
Doctor Barron, the director of the Child Protection Program at Hasbro Children's Hospital, testified as a pediatric forensic expert. She testified that a staff physician with the Child Protection Program at Hasbro Children's Hospital examined Jason in June 2004 using a colposcope to magnify and document any trauma to Jason's genitals. The examination showed that Jason had a flattening of the bumps around the anus, called "rugae," and two scars on his anus. Although the medical examination could not determine when or how the abuse occurred, the examination was consistent with a history of chronic anal penetration and trauma.
On April 28, 2006, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on three counts of firstdegree child molestation and one count of second-degree child molestation. The defendant's motion for a new trial was denied on June 26, 2006, and on July 21, 2006, the trial justice sentenced defendant to forty years on each first-degree child molestation charge, with twenty years to serve, and thirty years on the second-degree child molestation charge, with ten years to serve, the sentences to be served concurrently. The defendant filed his appeal on July 24, 2006.1
The responsibility of a trial justice in considering a motion for a new trial is well known. "In ruling on a motion for a new trial, `the trial justice acts as a thirteenth juror and exercises independent judgment on the credibility of witnesses and on the weight of the evidence.'" State v. Hallenbeck, 878 A.2d 992, 1011 (Rd. 2005) (quoting State v. Lynch, 854 A.2d 1022, 1046 (R.I.2004)). "In fulfilling this role, the trial justice must (1) consider the evidence in light of the jury charge, (2) independently assess the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence, and then (3) determine whether he or she would have reached a result different from that reached by the jury." State v. Morales, 895 A.2d 114, 121 (R.I.2006) (citing State v. Banach, 648 A.2d 1363, 1367 (R.I. 1994)). "If, after conducting this independent review, the trial justice agrees with the jury's verdict or if the evidence is such that reasonable minds could differ as to the outcome, the motion for a new trial should be denied." State v. Gomez, 848 A.2d 221, 234 (R.I.2004) (quoting State v. Otero, 788 A.2d 469, 472 (R.I.2002)).
On review, we afford substantial deference to the ruling of the trial justice, "the man [or woman] in the arena."2 "Provided that the trial justice has `articulated an adequate rationale for denying a motion,' a trial justice's ruling on a new trial motion is entitled to great weight." Lynch, 854 A.2d at 1046 (quoting State v. Rieger, 763 A.2d 997, 1002 (R.I.2001)). "A trial justice's ruling on a new-trial motion will not be overturned unless the trial justice was clearly wrong or unless he or she overlooked or misconceived material and relevant evidence that related to a critical issue in the case." Id. (quoting State v. Bolduc, 822 A.2d 184, 187 (R.I.2003)).
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial justice was deficient in performing his function of assessing the credibility and weight of the material evidence and then determining the proper inferences that may be drawn therefrom. Specifically, he contends the trial justice failed to consider the "physical impossibility" of the penetration occurring while both defendant and his nine-year-old son were in a standing position. The defendant also asserts that the fact that neither Jason nor his mother ever detected any blood in the boy's underwear seriously undermines Jason's credibility. Moreover, defendant argues that the medical evidence was ambiguous in that a physical examination of Jason in June 2003, shortly after the alleged acts of sexual molestation had ended,...
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State v. Russell
...and then (3) determine whether he or she would have reached a result different from that reached by the jury." State v. Schloesser, 940 A.2d 637, 639 (R.I.2007) (quoting State v. Morales, 895 A.2d 114, 121 (R.I.2006)). "If, after conducting this independent review, the trial justice agrees ......
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