State v. Schlue

Decision Date10 July 1974
Citation129 N.J.Super. 351,323 A.2d 549
PartiesSTATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Carl C. SCHLUE, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Frank J. Ferry, Atlantic City, for defendant-appellant.

William F. Hyland, Atty. Gen., for plaintiff-respondent (George H. Henningsen, Deputy Atty. Gen., of counsel and on the brief).

Before Judges KOLOVSKY, LEONARD and CARTON.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

KOLOVSKY, P.J.A.D.

Defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of obstruction of justice. At common law it was, and under N.J.S.A. 2A:85--1 it still is, a misdemeanor 'to do any act which prevents, obstructs, impedes, or hinders the due course of public justice.' State v. Cassatly, 93 N.J.Super. 111, 118, 225 A.2d 141, 145 (App.Div.1966).

The indictment on which defendant was tried alleged, in essence, that between July 20, 1971 and August 15, 1971:

(1) The State police were conducting an investigation 'concerning the activities of (defendant) and divers others associated with him in connection with the payment of sums of money by various individuals to (defendant) for the purpose of acquiring and retaining work as ironworkers,' and

(2) Defendant, knowing of the investigation and knowing that one Ricci 'had information germane to the said investigation,' wilfully and corruptly sought to induce and persuade Ricci 'to deny falsely, if questioned in the course of the investigation that he * * * had such information; to the obstruction, hindrance and impedance of the due course of public justice.'

Defendant does not contend that the evidence adduced, consisting primarily of Ricci's testimony and a recorded tape of a meeting between defendant and Ricci, does not furnish plenary support for the jury's verdict. Ricci's testimony and the tapes, if credited, established that in the spring and summer of 1971 defendant, who knew that the State Police were conducting an investigation with respect to payments allegedly made to him by Ricci and others, sought to induce Ricci to mislead the State Police and tell them that he had no information as to any wrongdoing by defendant.

Ricci also testified to events which had allegedly occurred the year before, in April 1970. According to him, he had then paid defendant, who had some official connection with an ironworkers union, $2100 and had agreed to, and thereafter did pay to defendant $10 for each day he worked, this in return for defendant seeing to it that Ricci procured a 'union book' which enabled him to work as an ironworker.

Defendant concedes that evidence with respect to the payments allegedly made by Ricci to him would normally be admissible to show his motive for seeking to induce Ricci to mislead the State Police. However, he contends that in this case the evidence was not admissible because, at a prior trial in October 1972 of an indictment charging him with a violation of N.J.S.A. 2A:93--8 by reason of his having received such payments from Ricci, a jury had found not guilty. Further, defendant argues that the acquittal at the prior trial entitled him to invoke 'double jeopardy' and 'collateral estoppel' as a bar to his prosecution for obstruction of justice.

The several arguments are all without merit. The present prosecution for obstruction of justice based on acts committed by him in July and August 1971 was not barred by his prior acquittal in a prosecution for bribery based on acts done by him in April 1970, allegedly in violation of N.J.S.A. 2A:93--8, which reads as follows:

Any person who gives, offers or promises any money, real estate, service or thing of value to any foreman or person having other workmen or employees under his control or authority, for the purpose of influencing him to employ or retain any workman or employee in any position, or for the purpose of procuring employment or avoiding discharge therefrom, and any such foreman, or person in control or authority, who accepts or agrees or offers to accept any money, real estate, service or thing of value for any of such purposes, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

Contrary to what defendant argues, he has not been tried twice for the same offense. There is no warrant for sustaining defendant's plea of double jeopardy--this whether we apply the 'same transaction' test, State v. Roller, 29 N.J. 339, 345, 149 A.2d 238 (1959), the 'same evidence' test, State v. Labato, 7 N.J. 137, 144--147, 80 A.2d 617 (1951), or the 'lesser included offense' test, State v. Dixon, 40 N.J. 180, 191 A.2d 39 (1963).

The two alleged offenses for which defendant was tried were separate criminal transactions occurring more than a year apart. The elements of each crime are distinct and different. The elements of the crime of obstructing justice are the doing of an act which obstructs, impedes or hinders the due course of public justice--here, seeking to induce another to give false information to the police authorities engaged in an investigation.

None of these is a constituent element of the bribery offense for which defendant was theretofore tried. The elements of that offense and the ultimate issues of facts which were to be decided at the first trial were:

(1) Whether defendant was a 'foreman or person having other workmen or employees under his control or authority,' and

(2) Whether defendant accepted or agreed or offered to accept money or other thing of value 'for the purpose of influencing him to employ or retain any workman or employee in any position, or for the purpose of procuring employment or avoiding discharge therefrom * * *.'

Nor is there any merit to the argument that the prosecution for obstruction of justice should have been barred on the grounds of collateral estoppel. Cf. State v. Redinger, 64 N.J. 41, 312 A.2d 129 (1973); State v. McCue, 122 N.J.Super. 171, 299 A.2d 744 ...

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9 cases
  • State v. Paradis
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • December 19, 1983
    ...State v. Darling, 197 Kan. 471, 419 P.2d 836 (1966); People v. Bolden, 98 Mich.App. 452, 296 N.W.2d 613 (1980); State v. Schlue, 129 N.J.Super. 351, 323 A.2d 549 (1974); State v. Yormark, 117 N.J.Super. 315, 284 A.2d 549 (1971); State v. Smith, 271 Or. 294, 532 P.2d 9 (1975); State v. Tarma......
  • State v. Gibson
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • December 15, 1983
    ...State v. Darling, 197 Kan. 471, 419 P.2d 836 (1966); People v. Bolden, 98 Mich.App. 452, 296 N.W.2d 613 (1980); State v. Schlue, 129 N.J.Super. 351, 323 A.2d 549 (1974); State v. Yormark, 117 N.J.Super. 315, 284 A.2d 549 (1971); State v. Smith, 271 Or. 294, 532 P.2d 9 (1975); State v. Tarma......
  • State v. Tarman
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • November 14, 1980
    ...v. State, 3 Ind. 353, 354, 56 Am.Dec. 510 (1852) (dictum); State v. Norman, 135 Iowa 483, 487, 113 N.W. 340 (1907); State v. Schlue, 129 N.J.Super. 351, 323 A.2d 549 (1974); State v. Heaton, 56 N.D. 357, 217 N.W. 531 (1927); Patterson v. State, 96 Ohio St. 90, 117 N.E. 169 (1917). See gener......
  • Kinney v. People, No. 06SC521.
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • June 30, 2008
    ...to give an acquittal instruction); People v. Bolden, 98 Mich.App. 452, 296 N.W.2d 613, 617 (1980) (same); State v. Schlue, 129 N.J.Super. 351, 323 A.2d 549, 552 (App.Div.1972) These state courts have ruled that fairness requires that an acquittal instruction be given when the jury is likely......
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