State v. Schmidt

• Decision Date: 12 July 1905
• Citation: 104 N.W. 259,19 S.D. 585
• Parties: STATE v. SCHMIDT.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

104 N.W. 259

19 S.D. 585

STATE v. SCHMIDT.

Supreme Court of South Dakota

July 12, 1905

Error to Circuit Court, Roberts County.

Ben Schmidt was convicted of assault and battery, and brings error. Reversed.

Howard Babcock and J. J. Batterton, for plaintiff in error.

Philo Hall, Atty. Gen., Frank McNulty, State's Atty., and E. M Bennett, for the State.

CORSON P. J.

Upon an information filed in the justice's court in Roberts county, the defendant was tried and convicted of the crime of assault and battery. An appeal having been taken to the circuit court, he was again convicted, and the case is now before us on writ of error.

The principal error relied upon for reversal of the judgment of the court below is the giving of the following instruction "The jury is further instructed that in this case the burden of proof is on the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the blows struck by him were struck in the necessary self-defense of himself or his brother Ed Schmidt, and that by a 'preponderance of the evidence' is meant that the evidence on the part of the defendant on this question of self-defense must be of some greater force or effect than the evidence of the prosecution." It is contended by the plaintiff in error that the court erred in this instruction in stating to the jury that "the burden of proof is on the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the blows struck by him were struck in the necessary self-defense of himself or his brother Ed Schmidt," that the burden of proof never changes in a criminal case, and that it is sufficient if the evidence of the defense raises in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. It is contended on the part of the state that upon the question as to whether the accused actually committed the assault and battery the burden of proof rested upon the state, but that as to whether or not the accused was justified in the commission of the assault and battery, under any of the exceptions contained in the law relating to assault and battery, the burden of proof was upon the accused, and that unless that defense was sustained by a preponderance of the evidence, it was the duty of the jury to convict the defendant of the crime charged.

We are inclined to adhere to the view taken by this court in the case of State v. Weckert, 95 N.W. 924--that "the burden of proof is upon the state from the beginning to the end of the trial. It is never changed." And we are of the opinion that if the jury are not satisfied upon a comparison of all the evidence, that the accused is guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, it is their duty to acquit, but if, from such consideration of all the evidence they have no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, it is their duty to convict, and that the court therefore erred in its charge to the jury, for which the accused is entitled to a new trial. There seems to be a conflict in the authorities upon this subject, but, in our opinion, the greater weight of authority and the better reasoning of the courts sustain the view that the burden of proof is upon the state throughout a criminal trial, and that, where the evidence introduced on the part of the state or by the accused is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury as to the guilt of the accused, he should be acquitted. The Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 16 S.Ct. 353, 40 L.Ed. 499, in a well-considered opinion, uses the following language: "Strictly speaking, the burden of proof, as those words are understood in criminal law, is never upon the accused to establish his innocence, or to disprove the facts necessary to establish the crime for which he is indicted. It is on the prosecution from the beginning to the end of the trial, and applies to every element necessary to constitute the crime." In People v. Downs, 123 N.Y. 558, 25 N.E. 988, the Court of Appeals of New York held: "The rule that in criminal cases the defendant is entitled to the benefit of a reasonable doubt applies not only to the case as made by the prosecution, but to any defense interposed." That learned court in its opinion says: "We have decided so recently as to make further citation needless that the rule that in criminal cases the defendant is entitled to the benefit of a reasonable doubt applies not only to the case as made by the prosecution, but to any defense interposed." In People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 22, 97 Am. Dec. 162, the Supreme Court of Michigan, speaking by Mr. Justice Cooley, says: "There is no such thing in the law as a separation of the ingredients of the offense, so as to leave a part to be established by the prosecution, while as to the rest the defendant takes upon himself the burden of proving a negative. The idea that the burden of proof shifts in these cases is unphilosophical and at war with fundamental principles of criminal law. The presumption of innocence is a shield to the defendant...