State v. Schnabel

CourtSupreme Court of Hawai'i
Citation127 Hawai'i 432,279 P.3d 1237
Docket NumberNo. SCWC–29390.,SCWC–29390.
Parties STATE of Hawai‘i, Respondent/Plaintiff–Appellee v. Less Allen SCHNABEL, Petitioner/Defendant–Appellant.
Decision Date11 May 2012

Emmanuel V. Tipon, Sparlin & Tipon, for petitioner/defendant-appellant.

Donn Fudo, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, City and County of Honolulu, for respondent/plaintiff-appellee.

ACOBA, DUFFY, and McKENNA, JJ.; and RECKTENWALD, C.J., dissenting, with whom NAKAYAMA, J., joins.

Opinion of the Court by ACOBA, J.

We hold first, that, Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 571–84(h) clearly and unambiguously prohibits the use of evidence from juvenile proceedings in any adult criminal case for any purpose whatsoever. Accordingly, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) gravely erred in affirming the ruling of the circuit court of the first circuit (the court), that Respondent/PlaintiffAppellee State of Hawai‘i (Respondent) would be allowed to introduce evidence from the prior juvenile proceedings of Petitioner/DefendantAppellant Less Allen Schnabel, Jr. (Petitioner), if Petitioner testified on cross-examination in the instant case that he did not know a single punch could cause the death of a person, State v. Schnabel, No. 29390, 2010 WL 4546655, at *2–3 (App. Nov. 12, 2010) (mem.). Secondly, we hold that the statement of the Deputy Prosecuting Attorney (DPA) to the jury during closing arguments not to "get too caught up in the mumbo jumbo of all the words [of the jury instructions,]" among other statements, infringed on Petitioner's right to have the case against him proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the December 15, 2010 judgment of the ICA, filed pursuant to its November 12, 2010 Memorandum Opinion (memo op.),1 affirming the court's September 10, 2008 judgment of conviction and sentence, is vacated. This case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.2 Each of the aforesaid errors, standing alone, provides an ample basis for vacation. However, in order to avoid similar errors from being made on remand, both errors are addressed.

I.

The following essential matters are from the record and the submissions of the parties.

A.

On April 22, 2007, at Zablan Beach Park in Nanakuli, Hawai‘i, Petitioner allegedly caused the death of Christopher Reuther (decedent) by one punch. Id. at *1. Respondent's witnesses testified that they met decedent at the park, began conversing with him, and eventually invited him to camp with them overnight. At some point decedent left the group, against their warning not to do so, and headed toward the restrooms. According to Respondent's witnesses, as decedent was walking to his car, Petitioner approached him from behind and hit him in the face. Immediately thereafter, decedent "spun out" in a "half-circle" or "jump[ed] around" before collapsing to the ground. Respondent's witnesses testified that Petitioner's actions were unprovoked.

The defense's witness, Kristie Reverio (Reverio), testified that decedent was walking towards the parking lot and taking photographs near where she and Petitioner were standing. Petitioner confronted decedent and asked him if he was taking pictures of them. Decedent responded that he had only taken a picture of the stop sign. Reverio and Petitioner thought decedent was being "sarcastic" and asked to see his camera's viewfinder. Decedent held out the camera for them, but then pulled it back and began walking towards his car with a "smirk" on his face. Petitioner told decedent, "[Y]ou cannot be doing things like that over here, you need to leave."

Decedent then approached Petitioner and stated, "[Y]ou cannot tell me what to do," while in a "fighting stance." Reverio thought Petitioner and Decedent "were going to fight." At that moment, Petitioner punched Decedent on his right cheek. Decedent then fell backward, stood back up, staggered forward, and fell down.

B.

On May 8, 2007, Petitioner was charged with (1) Manslaughter, Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707–702(1)(a) (Supp.2007)3 and (2) Unauthorized Entry into a Motor Vehicle in the First Degree, HRS § 708–836.5 (Supp.2007).4 Prior to trial, Respondent filed a Notice of Intention to Use Specified Evidence (Notice) indicating that, at trial, it would seek to introduce the following evidence relating to Petitioner's juvenile proceedings: (1) on September 1, 2002, Petitioner attended a party at Nanakuli Beach Park and as complainant attempted to "shake [Petitioner's] hand, [complainant] was suddenly punched on the left side of his face [,] causing [him] to fall to the ground where he was thereafter kicked in the face several times [,]"5 (2) Petitioner was "present at his entire trial[,]" and (3) Dr. Jorge Camara (Dr. Camara) testified "that an orbital fracture

... can cause not only a rupture of the bone socket[,]" but could also cause a "subdural hematoma in the brain [,]" which "could then create a ‘substantial risk of death.’ " Respondent attached a transcript of Dr. Camara's testimony given at Petitioner's juvenile proceedings as an exhibit to its Memorandum in support of the Notice. According to Respondent, the aforementioned evidence was admissible to show that Petitioner "was on notice that similar acts in the future could cause much more serious injuries[.]"

The defense filed a motion in limine to preclude Respondent from introducing Dr. Camara's testimony pursuant to Hawai‘i Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rules 402 (2010)6 and 403 (1993).7 At the hearing on the motion, Respondent argued that evidence from the juvenile proceedings was relevant to Petitioner's "knowledge" that his conduct, i.e., a single punch, could cause a substantial risk of death. The defense argued that the injuries involved in the juvenile proceedings were "not the same type of injury" as the one in this case because the juvenile case involved "punches and kicks" which were "likely to be much more damaging than a punch." Defense counsel additionally noted that Dr. Camara did not testify that those acts "would cause [,]" but "could cause," bleeding in the brain. Finally, it was argued by the defense that at the time of the juvenile proceedings, Petitioner was seventeen years old and "in a traumatic situation where we hope he was paying attention but well may not have been."

After taking the matter under advisement, the court initially ruled that Respondent could not introduce any evidence relating to Petitioner's juvenile proceedings.8 Subsequently, however, during further pre-trial proceedings, Respondent moved the court to reconsider its ruling. Respondent also asked the court, in the alternative, "to at least allow [Respondent] to—if [Petitioner] ... takes the stand and is cross-examined[,] to make reference to the fact[.]"9 The court answered that reconsideration was "not going to happen," but considered "what [might] happen[ ] if [Petitioner] takes the stand and he says he was completely unaware, totally unaware, hit somebody in the head, that they [sic] might cause them [sic] serious injury or death."

Defense counsel stated that if the court allowed Respondent to ask Petitioner whether he knew a single punch "could," as opposed to "would," cause death, Petitioner's "answer will be ‘no.’ " Defense counsel related that even if he did respond in that manner, evidence of Dr. Camara's testimony would not be "sufficient to prove that [Petitioner] did know differently" since Dr. Camara's testimony was about "a punch and kicks" which, when "combined[,] could cause subdural hematoma

[which] could cause death[.]" Defense counsel further asserted that the evidence would "mislead the jury," "distract [it] from trying this case[,]" and would "be highly prejudicial[.]"

The court then expressed its concern that "most of the men on the jury—...—understand that a large man that punches another man could kill him." Thus, the court responded that, if Respondent laid a foundation regarding Petitioner's height and weight on the date of the incident and argued that the punch "was a sucker punch or a false crack[,] ... and [Petitioner] says no way" a punch can cause the death of a person, its "inclination [would be] to give [Respondent] some latitude over [the defense's] strong objection[.]"

C.

In addition to the testimony described supra, the chief medical examiner for the City and County of Honolulu (medical examiner) also testified. The medical examiner related that based on the information provided by the hospital and from the investigator who read the hospital reports, the cause of death was believed to be an aneurysm

. She recounted, however, that because there was a "small tear" in decedent's "basilar artery" and a bruise behind his ear consistent with a "fist blow," it was her opinion that decedent died as a result of a "traumatic subarachnoid hemorrhage" caused by an "assaultive blunt force injury to the head." The medical examiner observed that while "you see subarachnoid hemorrhage, non-trauma related[,]" trauma-related subarachnoid hemorrhage is "not very common." In her opinion, decedent's injury was "unique."

As to the difference between the medical examiner's conclusion regarding the cause of death and the conclusion of the hospital, she stated, "I think at that point[,] all [the hospital doctors] knew from their scans was that [decedent] had [ ] bleeding in the subarachnoid space, which means covering the brain[.]" She explained that the hospital would not have seen the tear "because there was no time for them to inject dye in the[ ] blood vessels[,] ... [b]ut at the autopsy, [she] injected dye." The medical examiner stated that she "did not see any aneurysms

as the doctors suspected, but instead saw [a] tear[.]" In her view, "you never see an aneurysm right [t]here [where the tear was located; y]ou see aneurysms in different areas, but what I saw was a fresh, tiny torn area."

Petitioner did not testify. After the prosecution rested, the court permitted defense counsel to state on the record that Petitioner had decided not to testify based in part on...

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