State v. School Dist. No. 1 of Cascade County

• Citation: 38 P. 462,15 Mont. 133
• Parties: STATE ex rel. STANFORD v. SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1 OF CASCADE COUNTY et al.
• Decision Date: 19 November 1894
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Montana

38 P. 462

15 Mont. 133

STATE ex rel. STANFORD v. SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1 OF CASCADE COUNTY et al.

Supreme Court of Montana

November 19, 1894

Appeal from district court, Cascade county; C. H. Benton, Judge.

Action by James T. Stanford against School District No. 1 of Cascade county and Charles W. Pomeroy and others, trustees, to restrain the issuance of school bonds. From an order sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, relator appeals. Reversed.

M. M Lyter, for appellant.

Thomas E. Brady, for respondents.

A. J Shores, for Susan Cowan, petitioner.

DE WITT, J. (after stating the facts).

Under the statute quoted in the statement above (section 1950, as amended), a majority of the school trustees must first decide to submit the question named in the statute to the electors and the electors must then vote upon the proposition submitted. That which the trustees may decide to submit to the electors, and upon which the electors shall vote, is plainly stated in the statute. It is whether authority shall be given to the trustees to issue coupon bonds in a certain amount (within the limit defined by the statute), and bearing a certain rate of interest (within the limit fixed by the statute), and payable and redeemable at certain times, and for certain purposes. So it seems that, in an election upon the question of issuing bonds of a school district, the matter submitted to the electors contains several propositions, as follows: First, the amount of bonds; second the rate of interest which they shall bear; third, the time when payable; fourth, the time when redeemable; and, fifth the purposes for which the money is to be used. Consulting the notice published by the school trustees, set forth in the statement above, we find that they submitted to the electors only two of the above propositions, namely, the first and fifth; that is, the amount of the bonds, and the purposes of the use of the money. They wholly omitted to submit the second, third, and fourth propositions, namely, the rate of interest of the bonds, the time when payable, and the time when redeemable. Were these propositions so omitted material, or were they simply formalities? The question now arises before the bonds are delivered to any purchaser, and no question of innocent purchaser is involved. 15 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 1272, cases cited in note 4. We are of opinion that the trustees did not submit to the electors questions which the law required to be submitted, and that those questions so omitted should, on consideration of an application to enjoin the issuance of the bonds, be considered vital and material, and not simply needless formalities. An election for the...