State v. Schouweiler

• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: CHUTICH, Justice.
• Citation: State v. Schouweiler, 887 N.W.2d 22 (Minn. 2016)
• Decision Date: 16 November 2016
• Docket Number: No. A15–1461.,A15–1461.
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Kristyn Nicole SCHOUWEILER, Appellant.

887 N.W.2d 22

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,

v.Kristyn Nicole SCHOUWEILER, Appellant.

No. A15–1461.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Nov. 16, 2016.

Lori Swanson, Minnesota Attorney General, Saint Paul, MN; and Karen S. Kelly, Wabasha County Attorney, Jacob J. Barnes, Assistant County Attorney, Wabasha, MN, for respondent.

Drake D. Metzger, Metzger Law Firm, LLC, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.

OPINION

CHUTICH, Justice.

Appellant Kristyn Nicole Schouweiler was charged with felony issuance of a dishonored check, Minn.Stat. § 609.535, subd. 2 (2014), when her check for past-due property taxes was returned for insufficient funds. The district court dismissed the criminal complaint, concluding that Schouweiler's check met the statutory exception for “a check given for a past consideration,” id., subd. 5 (2014). The court of appeals reversed, and Schouweiler petitioned for review. We conclude that “a check given for a past consideration” means a check given for a good or service that was received in the past. Because Schouweiler's check for past-due property taxes was given, in part, for government services provided in the previous year, her check was “given for a past consideration.” Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.

I.

In February 2015, Schouweiler issued a check in the amount of $1,969.07 to the Wabasha County Auditor/Treasurer for past-due property taxes payable in 2014. The check was not honored by Schouweiler's bank, which returned it for insufficient funds. The County Auditor/Treasurer mailed a notice to Schouweiler, informing her that she had 5 days to make a valid payment, but she failed to do so.

Schouweiler was charged with issuance of a dishonored check, Minn.Stat. § 609.535, subd. 2. Schouweiler challenged the probable cause underlying the complaint and moved to dismiss it, arguing that her check fit within the statutory exception for “a check given for a past consideration,” id., subd. 5. After a hearing, the district court dismissed the criminal complaint, holding that Schouweiler's check for past-due property taxes was “a check given for a past consideration,” id., because there was no contemporaneous exchange of goods or services for the check.

It reasoned that the purpose of the dishonored-check statute was “to protect the person who would not have given the goods to the defendant but for the contemporaneous delivery of the check.”

The court of appeals reversed. Observing that the phrase “past consideration” has a special meaning in contract law, the court of appeals held that the past-consideration exception “refers to a promise to pay that is unenforceable for lack of adequate consideration.” State v. Schouweiler, No. A15–1461, 2016 WL 102578, at *2–3 (Minn.App. Jan. 11, 2016). Because Schouweiler wrote the check to fulfill a statutory obligation to pay taxes, and not to honor an unenforceable contractual obligation, the court of appeals concluded that the check was not “given for a past consideration.” Id. at *3. Schouweiler sought review by this court, once again contending that her issuance of a check for past-due property taxes was “a check given for a past consideration.” We granted review.

II.

We begin with an overview of the statute. The dishonored-check statute provides: “Whoever issues a check which, at the time of issuance, the issuer intends¹ shall not be paid, is guilty of issuing a dishonored check.” Minn.Stat. § 609.535, subd. 2. But the Legislature created exceptions to the dishonored-check statute: “This section does not apply to a postdated check or to a check given for a past consideration, except a payroll check or a check issued to a fund for employee benefits.” Id., subd. 5.

Schouweiler's sole contention is that her check was “given for a past consideration” and is therefore subject to the exception in the dishonored-check statute. To resolve this issue, first we must decide whether the phrase “past consideration” has a plain or technical meaning. Then we must decide whether a check given to pay a property tax obligation is “given for a past consideration.”

A.

We begin with the phrase “past consideration.” Schouweiler argues that “past consideration” plainly refers to a valuable good or service that the check issuer received in the past. Quoting a Wisconsin Court of Appeals decision that interprets a dishonored-check statute nearly identical to Minnesota's statute, Schouweiler argues that the past-consideration exception includes “checks given either for services already performed or for goods already received.” See State v. Archambeau, 187 Wis.2d 502, 523 N.W.2d 150, 151–52 (Wis.Ct.App.1994) (quoting 66 Op. Wis. Att'y Gen. 168, 174 (1977)).

The State contends that the phrase “past consideration” is a contractual term of art. Because Schouweiler's tax payment arises from a statutory obligation, not a contractual one, the State argues, her check could not have been “given for a past consideration.”

The meaning of the past-consideration exception is a question of law, which we review de novo.

Ekdahl v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 213, 851 N.W.2d 874, 876 (Minn.2014). The purpose of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature. Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 536 (Minn.2013). We generally interpret words and phrases according to their common and ordinary meaning, but we interpret technical words and phrases according to their special, technical meaning. Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud, 813 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn.2012) ; accord Minn.Stat. § 645.08(1) (2014). To decide whether words in a statute have a technical meaning or an ordinary meaning, we consider the context in which the phrase appears. State v. Rick, 835 N.W.2d 478, 484 (Minn.2013). We interpret a statute “as a whole so as to harmonize and give effect to all its parts, and where possible, no word, phrase, or sentence will be held superfluous, void, or insignificant.” Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 496 (Minn.2009) (quoting In re UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 754 N.W.2d 544, 563 (Minn.2008) ); see also Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2014).

In ordinary, nonlegal speech, the word “consideration” means a payment given as compensation for a good or service. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 484 (2002) (defining “consideration,” in part, as “something given as recompense: as ... payment, reward”); see also The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 392 (5th ed.2011) (defining “consideration,” in part, as “[p]ayment given in exchange for a service rendered; recompense”). “Past,” of course, refers to something that has “existed or occurred in an earlier time.” The American Heritage Dictionary 1290. “A check given for a past consideration” would then refer, according to its common and ordinary meaning, to a check given as payment for something of value received in the past.

As a contractual term of art, however, the phrase “past consideration” has a different meaning. “Consideration” is an act or forbearance that induces a contractually binding promise. See Consideration, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed.2014). But when the act or forbearance was given before the return promise was made, the act or forbearance is called “past consideration.” See id. Because a “past consideration” does not actually induce a return promise, a promise given for “past consideration” is not legally binding. See 4 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 8:11 (4th ed.2008) ; see also Lamprey v. Lamprey, 29 Minn. 151, 155, 12 N.W. 514, 515 (1882).

The surrounding text of subdivision 5 shows that the Legislature intended for the phrase “past consideration” to be given its ordinary meaning, not its technical meaning. Stated in full, subdivision 5 provides: “This section does not apply to a postdated check or to a check given for a past consideration, except a payroll check or a check issued to a fund for employee benefits. ” Minn.Stat. § 609.535, subd. 5 (emphasis added).

Subdivision 5 has two layers. The first clause—“[t]his section does not apply to a postdated check or to a check given for a past consideration”—creates an exception to the dishonored-check statute. Id. The second clause—“except a payroll check or a check issued to a fund for employee benefits”—creates an exception to the exception. Id. Consequently, a check issued for payroll or benefits first must qualify as a “check given for past consideration” to avoid rendering the payroll-check and employee-benefit-check exceptions mere surplusage.

If we interpreted the phrase “past consideration” according to its technical meaning, the exceptions for “a payroll check” and “a check issued to a fund for employee benefits” would make little sense. An employee's pay and benefits are typically bargained for when an employment agreement is made and, therefore, are not “past consideration” under contract law.² We cannot give effect to each word of the statute unless the phrase “past consideration” is interpreted according to its common and ordinary meaning. Accordingly, we hold that the exception for “a check given for a past consideration” in subdivision 5 refers to any check given in payment for a good or service that was received in the past. Such a check does not give rise to criminal liability under the dishonored-check statute.

This interpretation of the phrase “a past consideration” is supported by a decision of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals that discusses several Wisconsin Attorney General opinions that interpret an almost identical statutory exception. Archambeau, 523 N.W.2d at 151 ; see Wis. Stat. Ann. § 943.24(4) (West 2015) (“This section does not apply to a postdated check or to a check given for a past consideration, except a payroll check.”).³ Noting that a payroll check “usually follows an agreement as to the terms of employment, form of compensation, and the actual performance of the work,” 66 Op. Wis. Att'y Gen. 168, 175 (1977), the Wisconsin Attorney General concluded...