State v. Schrader

• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: [135 Wash. 661] MAIN, J.
• Citation: State v. Schrader, 135 Wash. 650, 243 P. 10 (Wash. 1926)
• Decision Date: 29 January 1926
• Docket Number: 19293.
• Parties: STATE v. SCHRADER.

243 P. 10

135 Wash. 650

STATE v. SCHRADER.

No. 19293.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

January 29, 1926

Appeal from Superior Court, Snohomish County; Alston, Judge.

On rehearing. Former opinion affirmed. For former opinion, see 238 P. 617.

Wm. A. Johnson, of Everett, for appellant.

C. T Roscoe, Charles R. Denney, and Joseph H. Smith, all of Everett, for the State.

MAIN, J.

The facts in this case are fully set out in the opinion of the department of the court which first heard it. 238 P. 617. After the opinion was filed a petition for rehearing was presented and granted, and the case was reheard en banc.

The controlling question, as we now view it, is whether the defendant, not having pleaded insanity at the time of the trial, but having expressly pleaded sanity at that time, can now have his then sanity determined.

Section 2174, Rem. Comp. Stat. provides:

'When it is desired to interpose the defense of insanity or mental irresponsibility on behalf of one charged with a crime, the defendant, his counsel or other person authorized by law to appear and act for him, shall at the time of pleading to the information or indictment file a plea in writing in addition to the plea or pleas required or permitted by other laws than this, setting up (1) his insanity or mental irresponsibility at the time of the commission of the crime charged, and (2) whether the insanity or mental irresponsibility still exists, or (3) whether the defendant has become sane or mentally responsible between the time of the commission of the crime and the time of the trial. The plea may be interposed at any time thereafter before the submission of the cause to the jury, if it be proven that the insanity or mental irresponsibility of the defendant at the time of the crime was not before known to any person authorized to interpose a plea.'

It will be observed that by this statute, when it is desired to interpose the defense of insanity, the defendant, his counsel, or other person authorized by law to appear and act for him, shall at the time of pleading to the information or indictment file a plea in writing in addition to the plea or pleas required or permitted by other laws than this, setting up: '(1) His insanity or mental irresponsibility at the time of the commission of the crime charged, and (2) whether the insanity or mental irresponsibility still exists. * * *'

By the statute the counsel for the defendant is expressly authorized to enter the plea. In the present case the plea was in writing that the defendant was insane at the time of the commission of the offense, but that at the time of the trial was mentally responsible and sane. Some time subsequent to the time, when the jury by its verdict had found the defendant guilty of the offense with which he was charged which was in effect holding that he was sane at the time it was committed, he sought by this application to have the question of his sanity at the time of the trial and the rendition of the verdict inquired into, and that is the question now presented for review. It must be kept in mind that the plea was expressly made under authority given by the statute that the defendant was sane at the time of the trial. Having pleaded his sanity at the time of the trial and taken the verdict of the jury...