State v. Schrader

• Decision Date: 18 January 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-K-1059,87-K-1059
• Citation: 518 So.2d 1024
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. William F. SCHRADER. 518 So.2d 1024
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 1024

518 So.2d 1024

STATE of Louisiana v. William F. SCHRADER.

No. 87-K-1059.

518 So.2d 1024

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 18, 1988.

Anthony P. Champagne, Office of the Indigent Defender, Houma, for applicant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Douglas H. Greenburg, Dist. Atty., Allen Helm, III, Asst. Dist. Atty., for respondent.

COLE, Justice.

ISSUES

The numerous issues in this case are raised by the errors assigned and briefed by the defendant; and, in addition, the defendant's application to this court suggested an error patent on the face of the record, i.e., the non-sequestration of the jury in a capital case. The latter matter, plus concerns about the sufficiency of the evidence, prompted us to grant certiorari. Having reviewed the errors assigned and having examined the lack of sequestration of the jury, we conclude defendant's conviction and sentence must be affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

About 10 p.m. on the evening of October 31, 1970, a fire destroyed the house defendant and his family were renting in Houma, Louisiana. Inside at the time of the fire were defendant's wife (Audrey), her daughter by a previous marriage (Elizabeth) and her daughter's friend (Catherine Smith). Catherine, aged 9, died as a result of injuries sustained in the blaze. Elizabeth suffered permanent brain damage. Audrey was hospitalized but survived without major injury. The blaze was investigated by both state and city fire officials, and, while no firm conclusions were reached as to its origins, arson was not ruled out. There the matter stayed until June of 1985 when city detectives received information that the fire had been deliberately started by defendant. Experts reexamined the burned-out remains, and after at least one concluded the fire was intentionally set. Defendant was indicted for the murder of Catherine Smith.

The indictment charged defendant with "first degree" murder in violation of La.R.S. 14:30. However, the alleged murder occurred in 1970, and prior to 1973 La.R.S. 14:30 did not distinguish between first and second degree murder. Thus, prior to trial on the merits, the state amended the indictment to charge defendant with murder. Defendant pled not guilty.

At trial the following year, the state presented evidence that defendant, at some point prior to the fire, threatened to burn down the house. There was also evidence that defendant purchased a small amount of gasoline about two hours before the fire started. Jurors returned with a responsive verdict of guilty of manslaughter. The appellate court affirmed. State v. Schrader, 506 So.2d 866 (La.App. 1st Cir.1987).

Defendant now seeks review of the appellate court decision, reurging thirteen of the fifteen assignments of error made at the Court of Appeal.

The assignments of error, as numbered by the defendant, are as follows:

1. The trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress.

2. The trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to quash.

3. The trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for bail in a capital case.

4. The trial court erred in overruling the defendant's objection to the state amending it's answers to the bill of particulars on the morning of the trial.

5. The trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for a continuance based on the absence of a material witness.

8. The trial court erred in overuling the defendant's objection to the state's questioning of Judy Smith Griffith dealing with threats made by defendant.

9. The trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial.

10. The trial court erred in sustaining the state's objection to defense counsel's question of Howard Oubre dealing with whether or not he had discovered any witnesses who saw the defendant at the scene of the fire.

11. The trial court erred in overuling the defendant's objection to the state's reading of materials from a book and then asking witness Howard Oubre if he agreed with those statements.

12. The trial court erred in overruling the defense counsel's objections to the state's question of William F. Schrader regarding a civil lawsuit filed in connection with the fire.

13. The verdict of the jury was contrary to the law and to the evidence.

14. The trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial.

15. The sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive and improper under the circumstances and amounted to cruel and unusual punishment.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

By this assignment of error, defendant argues that certain testimony should have been suppressed. Harold Foret, a neighbor, testified that while visiting the Schrader home in 1970 he witnessed a domestic dispute between defendant and his wife in which defendant threatened to burn down the Schrader house. Harold Foret testified that the statement was made a "day before or week before" the house burned down.

Defendant argues, in brief, that this testimony was unreliable and irrelevant, in particular because defendant was intoxicated at the time and because the statements were made sixteen years before the trial. We disagree with defendant. The threats were admissible to show the defendant's state of mind shortly before the fire, and relevant on the question of whether he then made good on his word. State v. Martin, 458 So.2d 454 (La.1984); State v. Weedon, 342 So.2d 642 (La.1977).

In the motion to suppress, defendant forwarded an additional argument. He suggested the statement was not freely given and for that reason should have been suppressed. We agree with the Court of Appeal on this issue.

The record clearly indicates that defendant's threats were unsolicited, voluntary statements made in a non-custodial situation in the presence of individuals not associated with any law enforcement agency. Louisiana procedure does not authorize the use of a motion to suppress to test the admissibility of evidence constitutionally obtained, as in this instance. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 703; State v. Garnier, 261 La. 802, 261 So.2d 221 (1972).

Schrader, 506 So.2d at 870.

Motions to suppress filed under La.C.Cr.P. art. 703 address only constitutional violations, State v. Matthieu, 506 So.2d 1209, 1212 (La.1987), and an essential prerequisite for suppressing a statement on voluntariness grounds is misconduct or overreaching by the police. Colorado v. Connelly, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986).

For the foregoing reasons, this assignment of error is without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO

By this assignment of error, defendant says his indictment should have been quashed because he was denied his right to a speedy trial. The offense occurred on October 31, 1970, but defendant was not arrested or formally charged until September of 1985. The defendant argues the delay made it virtually impossible for him to defend himself properly.

Both the trial court and the appellate court correctly interpreted this assignment of error as going to preindictment delays and, as such, not involving the speedy trial clause of the Sixth Amendment. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 445, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971); United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977). The First Circuit then looked to the jurisprudence of this Court, particularly to State v. Malvo, 357 So.2d 1084 (La.1978), to deny relief where the delays impacted "equally" on both sides and where the state's experts "based their opinions on evaluation of the site undertaken a short time prior to defendant's arrest." Schrader, 506 So.2d at 870.

Malvo contains a full discussion of the federal jurisprudence, with this Court reiterating the principle that constitutional guarantees to a speedy trial are not invoked until a citizen becomes an accused, either by arrest or indictment. Malvo went on to articulate the standard to evaluate complaints over untoward delays in initiating prosecutions:

The proper approach in determining whether an accused has been denied due process of law through a preindictment or pre-arrest delay is to measure the government's justifications for the delay against the degree of prejudice suffered by the accused.

Malvo, 357 So.2d at 1087.

Malvo thus employed a "balancing of the interests" between the government's reasons for the delay against prejudice demonstrated by the defendant. While declining to enunciate an inflexible rule (noting the state's interest in protecting its investigation "will not be sufficient to justify a delay which causes significant prejudice"), this Court nevertheless found the contended for prejudice lacking. Id.

Similar analysis, focusing on the requirement that the defendant show actual serious prejudice, has been used in State v. Manuel, 426 So.2d 140, 147-148 (La.1983) (4 month delay in drug prosecution); State v. Jenkins, 419 So.2d 463, 464-465 (La.1982) (13 month delay in drug prosecution); State v. Crain, 379 So.2d 1094, 1096-1097 (La.1980) (6 month delay in drug prosecution); State v. Cole, 384 So.2d 374, 376 (La.1980) (2 1/2 year delay in prosecution for aggravated battery); State v. Coleman, 380 So.2d 613 (La.1980) (5 month delay in drug prosecution).

In the present case the defense claims specific prejudice in having been unable to examine the site with its own experts, so as to establish that no accelerants were present immediately after the fire. More broadly, the defense argues the state could have prosecuted fifteen years earlier and the state had a duty to investigate more carefully then and to prosecute timely if it had a case. The prosecutor denied inferences that the state had been negligent or that it had not used due diligence in solving the crime. At the hearing on the motion to quash, the state offered no other evidence regarding the fifteen year pre-indictment delay.

The only basis for specific prejudice articulated by the defendant was an inability to examine the site as it existed in 1970. Yet, at trial, he was able to adduce evidence from both...