State v. Schultz

• Decision Date: 13 January 2011
• Docket Number: No. 82238–7.,82238–7.
• Citation: 170 Wash.2d 746,248 P.3d 484
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent,v.Patricia Sue SCHULTZ, a/k/a Patricia Sue Peterson, Petitioner.

170 Wash.2d 746

248 P.3d 484

STATE of Washington, Respondent,

v.Patricia Sue SCHULTZ, a/k/a Patricia Sue Peterson, Petitioner.

No. 82238–7.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued Jan. 14, 2010.Decided Jan. 13, 2011.

Jodi R. Backlund, Manek R. Mistry, Backlund & Mistry, Olympia, WA, for Petitioner.Brian Patrick Wendt, Clallam County Prosecutor's Office, Port Angeles, WA, for Respondent.CHAMBERS, J.

[170 Wash.2d 750] ¶ 1 Patricia Sue Schultz was convicted of possession of illegal drugs after police entered her home without a warrant and discovered evidence of drug possession. Schultz contends that the search was unlawful and the evidence obtained must be suppressed. The State contends the warrantless search was justified under the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement. The Court of Appeals upheld the search, concluding the potential for domestic violence justified the entry into the home and, alternatively, that Schultz consented to the search because she acquiesced to the entry. We recognize that domestic violence presents unique challenges to law enforcement and courts. We hold that the likelihood of domestic violence may be considered by courts when evaluating whether the requirements of the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement have been satisfied. We further hold that mere acquiescence to an officer's entry is not consent and is not an exception to our state's constitutional protection of the privacy of the home. Finally, we hold the State has not shown that its entry into Schultz's home was justified by the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement. Schultz's motion to suppress should have been granted. We reverse.

Facts

¶ 2 On April 4, 2004, Sequim police received a phone call from a resident of an apartment complex about a yelling male and female. Officers Kori Malone and Michael Hill responded to the call. Upon arriving at the apartment, Officers Malone and Hill stood outside and overheard a man and woman talking with raised voices.¹ They specifically overheard the man say that he wanted to be left alone and needed his space.

¶ 3 According to the officers, Officer Malone knocked on the apartment door and Schultz answered. Schultz appeared agitated and flustered. Officer Malone asked Schultz where the male occupant of the apartment was. Schultz denied that anyone else was there. Officer Malone told Schultz that she had heard a male voice in the apartment. Schultz called for Sam Robertson, who emerged from a nearby bedroom. Schultz then stepped back, opened the door wider, and Officer Malone followed Schultz inside.

¶ 4 Schultz testified to a slightly different version of events. According to Schultz, after she said no one else was in the apartment, the officers told her they had heard a male voice and were coming in. Schultz said that she stepped to the side because the officers were entering. Under either version, it appears that neither officer requested permission to enter the apartment, nor did the officers inform Schultz or Robertson that they could refuse a search. Neither Schultz nor Robertson asked the officers to leave nor attempted to prevent their entry. The trial judge found “the defendant acquiesced to their entry,” Clerk's Papers (CP) at 23–24, and the Court of Appeals reported that “Schultz did not object.” State v. Schultz, noted at 146 Wash.App. 1057, 2008 WL 4216255, *1 (2008).

¶ 5 After entering the apartment, the officers separated Schultz and Robertson. Officer Malone spoke to Schultz inside the apartment while Officer Hill spoke to Robertson outside. About that time, Officer Malone noticed Schultz's neck was red and blotchy. Officer Malone asked Schultz whether anything physical had happened during the argument. Schultz denied anything had and told the officer her neck reddens when she becomes upset. Schultz also explained the argument started because she wanted Robertson to change the locks on the door, but Robertson was instead sitting on the couch. During this time, Schultz was acting “fidgety” and picking things up around the house. Officer Malone asked Schultz to sit in a chair. Schultz complied but continued to fidget and grab at things. Officer Malone warned Schultz she would be handcuffed for officer safety if she did not sit still.

¶ 6 Outside, Robertson told Officer Hill there had been no physical violence and the argument had been about Robertson's failure to change the locks on the apartment door. The discussion outside took between 5 and 10 minutes before Robertson and Officer Hill returned inside to confer with Officer Malone.

¶ 7 Meanwhile, Schultz continued to pick up things off a nearby table, including a makeup bag. At that point, Officer Hill noticed a handgun and a marijuana pipe on the table. Officer Hill secured the weapon and unloaded it. He asked Schultz who the pipe belonged to, and Schultz said it belonged to her son who lived in Vermont. Officer Hill asked Schultz if he could search for more narcotics, and Schultz consented.

¶ 8 At that point, Schultz stood up and began picking things up off the table again. Officer Malone handcuffed Schultz to prevent her from grabbing anything but told Schultz that she was not under arrest. Schultz asked for her antianxiety medication. Officer Hill went with Robertson to go find the antianxiety medication. Robertson and Officer Hill talked while searching for the medication. Their talk led to Robertson's arrest for use of drug paraphernalia. Schultz then revoked her consent for a search. Officer Hill sought and received a search warrant by telephone. The officers searched the apartment and discovered methamphetamine. Schultz was charged.

¶ 9 Schultz sought to suppress the methamphetamine, arguing that the officers were not authorized to be in the apartment when they saw the evidence used to justify the search warrant. The trial court concluded that the officers were properly in the apartment on the ground that they needed to talk to the occupants to ensure their safety. The trial court also concluded that “neither [Robertson nor Schultz] told [the officers] to leave and that [Schultz] initially acquiesced to their entry, stepping back and opening the door further, and at no time told or asked them to leave.” CP at 23–24. The trial court denied Schultz's motion to suppress, and Schultz was convicted after a trial on stipulated facts. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Schultz, noted at 146 Wash.App. 1057, 2008 WL 4216255. We granted Schultz's petition for review. State v. Schultz, 165 Wash.2d 1036, 205 P.3d 131 (2008).

Analysis

¶ 10 We generally review a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress for substantial evidence. State v. Hill, 123 Wash.2d 641, 644, 647, 870 P.2d 313 (1994). “Substantial evidence exists where there is a sufficient quantity of evidence in the record to persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the truth of the finding.” Id. (citing State v. Halstien, 122 Wash.2d 109, 129, 857 P.2d 270 (1993)). We review the legal conclusions of the trial court de novo. State v. Smith, 165 Wash.2d 511, 516, 199 P.3d 386 (2009) (citing State v. Carneh, 153 Wash.2d 274, 281, 103 P.3d 743 (2004)).

¶ 11 Schultz contends the officers' entry into her apartment violated article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, which provides, “No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.” Under our constitution, the home enjoys a special protection. “ ‘[T]he closer officers come to intrusion into a dwelling, the greater the constitutional protection.’ ” State v. Ferrier, 136 Wash.2d 103, 112, 960 P.2d 927 (1998) (internal quotations marks omitted) (quoting State v. Young, 123 Wash.2d 173, 185, 867 P.2d 593 (1994)).

¶ 12 The best source of “authority of law” is a warrant. See State v. Day, 161 Wash.2d 889, 893, 168 P.3d 1265 (2007); Ferrier, 136 Wash.2d at 115–19, 960 P.2d 927. “However, there are a few ‘jealously and carefully drawn exceptions' to the warrant requirement.” State v. Reichenbach, 153 Wash.2d 126, 131, 101 P.3d 80 (2004) (internal quotations marks omitted) (quoting State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash.2d 61, 70–71, 917 P.2d 563 (1996)). Protection from searches without authority of law may be waived by meaningful, informed consent. When the State asserts an exception authorizes its intrusion into private affairs, it bears the heavy burden of establishing that the exception applies. State v. Johnston, 107 Wash.App. 280, 284 n. 11, 28 P.3d 775 (2001) (citing State v. Parker, 139 Wash.2d 486, 496, 987 P.2d 73 (1999)); State v. Johnson, 128 Wash.2d 431, 446–47, 909 P.2d 293 (1996).

Emergency Aid Exception

¶ 13 The State contends that entry was authorized under the emergency aid exception. This exception emerges from the police's “community caretaking function” and “allows for the limited invasion of constitutionally protected privacy rights when it is necessary for police officers to render aid or assistance.” State v. Thompson, 151 Wash.2d 793, 802, 92 P.3d 228 (2004) (citing State v. Kinzy, 141 Wash.2d 373, 386, 5 P.3d 668 (2000)). Under this court's cases, to justify intrusion under the emergency aid exception, the government must show that “(1) the police officer subjectively believed that someone likely needed assistance for health or safety concerns; (2) a reasonable person in the same situation would similarly believe that there was need for assistance; and (3) there was a reasonable basis to associate the need for assistance with the place being searched.” Id. (citing Kinzy, 141 Wash.2d at 386–87, 5 P.3d 668). The Court of Appeals has suggested three more factors: (4) there is an imminent threat of substantial injury to persons or property; (5) state agents must believe a specific person or persons or property are in need of immediate help for health or safety reasons; and (6) the claimed emergency is not a mere pretext for an evidentiary search. State v. Leffler, 142 Wash.App. 175, 181, 183, ...