State v. Schulz, 80-1110-CR

Decision Date13 January 1981
Docket NumberNo. 80-1110-CR,80-1110-CR
Citation302 N.W.2d 59,100 Wis.2d 329
PartiesSTATE of Wisconsin, Respondent, v. Gary A. SCHULZ, Appellant. *
CourtWisconsin Court of Appeals

Review Denied.

John W. Kelley and Kelley & Weber, S. C., Wausau, for appellant.

Bronson C. La Follette, Atty. Gen., and David J. Becker, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

Before DONLIN, P. J., and FOLEY and DEAN, JJ.

FOLEY, Judge.

Gary Schulz was granted leave to appeal an order denying his motion to dismiss two homicide by intoxicated user of vehicle charges. Section 940.09, Stats. He claims that a trial on these charges would subject him to double jeopardy since as a result of the same conduct, he has already had a forfeiture imposed as a first offender for violating a county ordinance adopting sec. 346.63(1), Stats., operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. We conclude that the finding of guilt on the county ordinance charge does not bar the state from trying Schulz on the present homicide by intoxicated user of vehicle charges.

Because of similarity between the double jeopardy provisions of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions, we accept, where applicable, decisions of the United States Supreme Court as governing both Constitutions. State v. Rabe, 96 Wis.2d 48, 291 N.W.2d 809 (1980). The United States Supreme Court has held that there is no double jeopardy bar to a second prosecution if the first prosecution was not criminal and if it did not result in a criminal punishment. The double jeopardy clause merely prohibits two attempted criminal punishments. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 93 S.Ct. 489, 34 L.Ed.2d 438 (1972). This court has previously held that a person's first violation of sec. 346.63(1) is not a criminal offense. State v. Albright, 98 Wis.2d 663, 298 N.W.2d 196 (Ct.App.1980). In this case, therefore, there has not been a prior criminal trial. The question remaining is whether the penalties for a first violation of sec. 346.63(1) are criminal penalties.

As stated in United States v. Ward, --- U.S. ----, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980), the question of whether a particular statutorily defined penalty is civil or criminal is a matter of statutory construction. Under the methodology employed in Ward, in construing the statute, the court first considers the express legislative intent. If the legislative intent was to establish a civil penalty, the court then must consider whether the penalty is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intent.

Applying this methodology in a construction of the penalties for violating the county ordinance adopting sec. 346.63(1), we conclude that the legislature intended a civil penalty and that the penalty does not negate that intent. The former sec. 346.65, the penalty section for violating sec. 346.63(1), provided for a fine and possible imprisonment. By ch. 278 § 55, 1971 Wis.Laws, the legislature removed the provision for a fine, eliminated the right to impose a prison term, and substituted the forfeiture provision. This change indicates a legislative intent to establish a civil penalty. Section 778.01, Stats.

This intent is not negated by the incidental penalties that result or may result from a violation of sec. 346.63(1). In addition to the forfeiture, Schulz could also lose his license, sec. 343.30(1q)(b) and (c), Stats.; be required to attend a driver safety school, sec. 345.60, Stats.; and be imprisoned if he failed to pay his forfeiture. These penalties are not so punitive in purpose or effect to negate the intent of the legislature. The potential forfeiture of $500 is not sufficient to trigger the protection of the...

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29 cases
  • State v. Lawton
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Court of Appeals
    • February 27, 1992
    ...128 (1991). 4 With this analysis in mind, we reexamine our decision in State v. Schulz. 5 B. State v. Schulz In State v. Schulz, 100 Wis.2d 329, 302 N.W.2d 59 (Ct.App.1981), the defendant moved for dismissal of two charges of homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle, contending that h......
  • State v. Kramsvogel
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • May 29, 1985
    ...N.W. 746 (1916); Kuder v. State, 172 Wis. 141, 145-46, 178 N.W. 249 (1920) (and the cases cited therein); and State v. Schulz, 100 Wis.2d 329, 330, 302 N.W.2d 59 (Ct.App.1981). In applying this principle to the case at hand, the double jeopardy clause does not bar this prosecution if the mu......
  • State v. McMaster
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • December 13, 1996
    ...the defendant and might act as a deterrent is inconsequential to the overall purpose of public safety. In State v. Schulz, 100 Wis.2d 329, 302 N.W.2d 59 (Ct.App.1981), the court held that a finding of guilt for violating a county ordinance does not bar criminal prosecution on the homicide b......
  • State v. Thierfelder, 91-0942-CR
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • January 7, 1993
    ...Wis.2d at 109, 369 N.W.2d 145, quoting Milwaukee v. Johnson, 192 Wis. 585, 590, 213 N.W. 335 (1927). See also State v. Schulz, 100 Wis.2d 329, 330, 302 N.W.2d 59 (Ct.App.1981). Our cases are consistent with the United States Supreme Court's position that the double jeopardy clause of the fi......
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