State v. Schwanda

• Decision Date: 09 August 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-002,84-002
• Citation: 499 A.2d 779,146 Vt. 230
• Parties: STATE of Vermont v. Lawrence T. SCHWANDA.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Page 779

499 A.2d 779

146 Vt. 230

STATE of Vermont v. Lawrence T. SCHWANDA.

No. 84-002.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

Aug. 9, 1985.

Raymond G. Bolton, Bennington County State's Atty., and Ralph H. Sheppard, Deputy State's Atty., Bennington, for plaintiff-appellee.

Frederick J. Glover, Ludlow, for defendant-appellant.

Before ALLEN, C.J., and HILL, UNDERWOOD, PECK and GIBSON, JJ.

ALLEN, Chief Justice.

Defendant Lawrence Schwanda appeals his conviction for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, 23 V.S.A. § 1201(a)(2), on the ground that the trial court erroneously denied his motions for mistrial based on two instances of alleged juror misconduct. We affirm.

The first incident occurred just prior to defendant's trial when one of the jurors approached the state's attorney and initiated a brief conversation with him in full view of the other jurors and defendant and his attorney concerning a voir dire which had taken place on the previous day in an unrelated matter. The juror informed the state's attorney that she had been mistaken when she indicated that she believed that she was related to a witness.

Thereafter, before the start of the trial the court asked the jurors whether they had learned anything about the case, the defendant or the lawyers, and whether anyone had become aware of any information that might tend to prejudice or influence them regarding the case since their selection three weeks earlier. The court further asked:

"I take it no one has been influenced in any way in connection with the matter nor has anyone approached you about the case?"

There was no affirmative response to the court's questioning. After the jury was sworn, counsel for defendant approached the bench and requested a mistrial because the juror had approached the prosecutor in a "friendly manner" in front of other members of the jury. He argued that the jury was "tainted" and thus rendered unable to reach a fair or impartial verdict. Without conducting any further examination of the jury, the court ruled that the conduct was not prejudicial, but it gave defendant permission to renew the motion should there be an adverse verdict.

After the luncheon recess, while entering the jury box with the other jurors, the same juror approached and initiated a brief conversation with the court reporter. Defendant again moved for mistrial. The court reporter explained to the court, in chambers, that the juror worked as a nurse for a local doctor and knew that the court reporter's wife had recently given birth. The juror had asked to see pictures of the new baby, and the court reporter had promised to show them to her later. Defendant complained that the effect of this contact was "cumulative" and prejudicial. The court, without examining the jury, concluded that defendant had not been prejudiced by the second incident and denied the motion.

After suffering an adverse verdict, defendant renewed his motions, citing State v. Woodard, 134 Vt. 154, 353 A.2d 321 (1976), for the proposition that defendant had a right to trial by a jury free from any suspicion of taint by extraneous influences, and State v. Ovitt, 126 Vt. 320, 229 A.2d 237 (1967), for the proposition that mere capability of jury prejudice requires reversal.

In State v. Woodard, supra, a juror overheard the defendant discuss on the telephone, during a recess, his urgent need to present an alibi defense. The juror rejoined the jury before informing the judge some hours later of what he had heard. The juror eventually was excused from the jury and called as a prosecution witness. Asserting that a jury must be free and untainted by suspicion "like Caesar's wife," Id. 134 Vt. at 157, 353 A.2d at 323, this Court concluded that the incident had the capacity to influence deliberations and therefore ordered a new trial.

In State v. Ovitt, supra, the court officers had purchased liquor for the jurors to have with their meals during the trial. This Court felt such acts were "capable of influencing the jurors favorable to the State, and thereby capable of prejudicing the deliberative function of the jury." Id. 126 Vt. at 325, 229 A.2d at 241. Considering the combined effect of that irregularity and other errors committed by the trial court, this Court concluded the verdict was "tainted with suspicion," and reversed and remanded for a new trial. Id.

Motions for mistrial are addressed to the trial court's sound discretion and should not be granted absent a showing of prejudice. State v. Chambers, 144 Vt. 377, 381, 477 A.2d 974, 977 (1984). To justify reversal, an abuse of discretion must be shown. Sunday v. Stratton Corp., 136 Vt. 293, 306, 390 A.2d 398, 405 (1978).

As this Court stated in State v. Woodard, supra, 134 Vt. at 157, 353 A.2d at 323, the proponent of a motion for mistrial must show that an irregularity--i.e., anything creating "any suspicion of extraneous influences"--had the capacity to influence jury deliberations. Id. at 158, 353 A.2d at 323-24. If an irregularity is shown, then, in order to avoid a mistrial the opposing party must show that the irregularity in fact had no effect on the jury. See id. at 157, 353 A.2d at 323 ("In the absence of proof to the effect that the jury was not influenced by the circumstances here, the danger remained that the capacity to do so did exist.").

In this case, the juror's brief conversation with the state's attorney concerned a totally unrelated matter. Even assuming that further inquiry was required, an examination was made and the negative response clearly indicated that the jury had not been "influenced."

The subject matter of the conversation with the court reporter was even more innocuous and could not have created "any suspicion of extraneous influences" as required by State v. Woodard, supra, 134 Vt. at 158, 353 A.2d at 323-24.

While such conversations are inadvisable and are to be guarded against, they did not in this instance meet the threshold test of capacity to influence.

The irregularity to be guarded against is taint by external causes tending to disturb the exercise of deliberate and unbiased judgment. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149, 13 S.Ct. 50, 53, 36 L.Ed. 917 (1892). The contact or tampering which is deemed presumptively prejudicial must concern a matter pending before the jury. Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229, 74 S.Ct. 450, 451, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954). The conduct here complained of was totally unrelated to the case at hand. The potential for prejudice falls well below the likelihood of harm contained in the remark...