State v. Schwind Quarry Co.

• Decision Date: 30 June 1903
• Citation: 55 A. 366,97 Md. 696
• Parties: STATE, to Use of JETER et al., v. SCHWIND QUARRY CO OF BALTIMORE CITY.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

55 A. 366

97 Md. 696

STATE, to Use of JETER et al., v. SCHWIND QUARRY CO OF BALTIMORE CITY.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

June 30, 1903

Appeal from Superior Court of Baltimore City.

Action by the state of Maryland, to the use of Mary Jeter and others, against the Schwind Quarry Company of Baltimore City. From a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the declaration plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before McSHERRY, C.J., and FOWLER, BRISCOE, BOYD, PEARCE, and SCHMUCKER, JJ.

Ward P Littig, for appellant.

Wm. L Marbury, for appellee.

PEARCE J.

This appeal is taken from a ruling of the superior court of Baltimore City sustaining a demurrer to a declaration, the substance of which is as follows: "For that the defendant corporation at the time of the commission of the wrong and injury hereinafter mentioned was operating a stone quarry in the city of Baltimore, and Edward Jeter, the husband and father of the equitable plaintiffs, was employed by it as a stone-cutter. And it was the duty of the defendant corporation to provide the said Jeter with a reasonably safe and proper place in which to work, and with reasonably safe and proper tools with which to work, and to employ reasonably competent co-employés, and to promulgate rules for their government, and to refrain from exposing the said Jeter to unnecessary risk and danger while at work. And the plaintiff in fact says that on the day and date mentioned the said Jeter was directed by one of the employés of said corporation, then and there in command of said quarry, and having authority over him, to extract a charge of blasting powder theretofore placed in a hole drilled in a rock in said quarry, for which work the said Jeter was not skilled fitted, or employed, and of the danger of which he was ignorant and unwarned, and in the execution of which he was killed. And the plaintiff further says that the death of the said Jeter was directly due to the negligence of the defendant corporation in discharge of its aforesaid duties towards him, to wit, the duties to provide him with a reasonably safe and proper place in which to work, and with reasonably safe and proper tools with which to work, and to employ competent co-employés, and to promulgate rules for their government, and to refrain from exposing him to unnecessary risk and danger whilst at work; and that the said Jeter used due care, but the defendant corporation did not use due care. And by reason of the killing of said Jeter, the equitable plaintiffs were deprived of his support, and the plaintiff claims $5,000 damages." The plaintiff declining to amend the declaration after the ruling on the demurrer, judgment for costs was entered for defendant.

Mr Poe, in section 562 of his work on Pleading, speaking of the degree of precision required in pleading, says: "The declaration should always describe the contract for the breach of which the suit is instituted, or the tort for which redress is sought, with such reasonable degree of certainty as will give fair notice to the defendant of the character of the claim or demand made against him, so as to enable him to prepare for his defense." And in Gent v. Cole, 38 Md. 110, this court said: "It is one of the first principles of pleading that facts should be stated for the purpose of informing the court, whose duty it is to declare the law arising upon those facts, and to apprise the opposite party of what is meant to be proved, in order to give him an opportunity to answer or traverse it." Tested by these principles, we think, as was said by Judge Alvey in the case just cited, that "the statement of the tortious acts complained of, and the manner in which they effected the injury to the equitable plaintiffs, are altogether too general and indefinite to be good on demurrer." After stating the employment of the deceased by the defendant, and his relation to the equitable plaintiffs, the declaration sets out in the first part the several alleged duties of the defendant to the deceased, and in the latter part charges that the death was directly due to the negligence of the defendant in the discharge of these duties, reciting them again in the most vague and general terms, and charging the death to be due, not to the neglect of any one of these duties, but to the neglect of all combined. The intervening part of the declaration will be referred to later, but, passing that for the present, we think it is plain that without that intervening part the declaration is not sufficient in law. The defendant is not told what specific duty is claimed to have been neglected, but is required to meet a charge of general misconduct in the alleged neglect of every duty imposed upon it by the law. Not only so, but there is no averment of the manner in which any one of these duties has been violated. It does not specify in what respect the place provided for work was unsafe, or how the want of safety caused the death. It does not specify what tools provided for...