State v. Scoggin

• Citation: 236 N.C. 19,72 S.E.2d 54
• Decision Date: 22 August 1952
• Docket Number: No. 434,434
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Parties: STATE, v. SCOGGIN.

Page 54

72 S.E.2d 54

236 N.C. 19

STATE, v. SCOGGIN.

No. 434

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Aug. 22, 1952

Joseph B. Cheshire, Jr., Raleigh, Atty, for defendant, appellant.

Harry McMullan, Atty. Gen., and Robert B. Broughton, Member of Staff, Raleigh, for the State.

DENNY, Justice.

The defendant does not challenge the validity of any provision contained in the traffic ordinance of the City of Raleigh, but appeals from the refusal of the court below to sustain his motion for nonsuit at the close of the State's evidence and renewed at the close of all the evidence.

It is provided in Section 19, Chapter 5, of the 1950 Code of the City of Raleigh, '* * * at any time between the hours of 8:00 A.M. and 6:00 P.M. of any day, except Sundays * * *. No person shall park any vehicle for longer than One Hour at any one time along the following streets within the areas and limits defined as follows: * * * (b) Along Fayetteville Street between Morgan Street and Cabarrus Street.' Section 58 of this chapter provides, 'No person shall allow, permit or suffer any vehicle registered in his name to stand or park in any street in this city in violation of any of the ordinances of the city regulating the standing or parking of vehicles.' And section 68 of the same chapter reads as follows: 'It shall be unlawful for any person to cause, allow, permit, or suffer any vehicle registered in his name, or under his control, to be parked overtime or beyond the lawful periods of time as above set forth.'

It was admitted by the defendant and his counsel that on 11 September, 1951, that day not being a Sunday, and between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m., the defendant's motor vehicle was parked in a parking meter space in a one-hour parking zone on Fayetteville Street, in the City of Raleigh, between Morgan Street and Cabarrus Street, and that at such time the defendant was the owner of such motor vehicle and was duly registered as such owner with the Motor Vehicle Department of the State of North Carolina and the Licensing Department of the City of Raleigh, and at such time and place the parking meter displayed a sign plainly indicating illegal parking and that the lawful parking period had expired. However, no evidence was offered or admission made tending to show who parked the defendant's car at the time and place set out in the warrant.

It is apparent this is a test case and we are called upon to pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conclusion that the defendant parked, or allowed his automobile to be parked, in violation of the law as charged in the warrant. The decisive question, therefore, is whether in the absence of any authorized legislative rule of evidence, the mere proof or admission of ownership of the automobile, and that it was parked contrary to the provisions of the traffic ordinance of the City of Raleigh, is sufficient to support an inference that the defendant parked, or allowed the automobile to be so parked, and to sustain a conviction if such inference is not explained or refuted by other evidence. We are not dealing with an inference that may be drawn from circumstantial evidence, but whether an inference of guilt may be drawn from certain admitted or proven facts.

The traffic ordinance of the City of Raleigh contains no rule of evidence to the effect that proof or admission of ownership of a motor vehicle which has been parked in violation of the law, shall be prima facie evidence that the owner thereof committed or authorized such violation. In fact, we know of no law in this State which has delegated to municipalities the right to legislate upon the question of evidence, and of its weight and effect upon the courts.

Some of the authorities in other jurisdictions hold that no prima facie rule of evidence, based on ownership, is necessary to support a conviction for the violation of a traffic ordinance. They follow what might be termed the rule of expediency; the inconvenience of keeping watch over parked vehicles to ascertain who in fact operates them, if not the impossibility of such task. Commonwealth v. Ober, 286 Mass. 25, 189 N.E. 601; City of Chicago v. Crane, 319 Ill.App.623,49 N.E.2d 802. The following authorities also hold that where a parking ordinance has been violated, proof or admission of ownership of the vehicle involved is sufficient to carry the case to the jury and to sustain a conviction in the absence of an explanation or denial on the part of the defendant. State v. Morgan (by an equally divided Court), 72 R.I. 101, 48 A.2d 248; People v. Marchetti, 154 Misc. 147, 276 N.Y.S.708; People v. Rubin, 284 N.Y. 392, 31 N.E.2d 501. Other Courts have upheld such convictions under the prima facie rule of evidence with respect to ownership. People v. Kayne, 286 Mich. 571, 282 N.W. 248; Commonwealth v. Kroger, 276 Ky. 20, 122 S.W.2d 1006; City of St. Louis v. Cook, 359 Mo. 270, 221 S.W.2d 468.

The State cites the following decisions of this Court in support of its contention that the verdict below should be upheld. State v. Kittelle, 110 N.C. 560, 15 S.E. 103, 15 L.R.A. 694; State v. Smith, 117 N.C. 809, 23 S.E. 449; State v. Morrison, 126 N.C. 1123, 36 S.E. 329; State v. Garner, 158 N.C. 630, 74 S.E. 458; State v. Carter, 205 N.C. 761, 172 S.E. 415; State v. Holbrook, 223 N.C. 622, 27 S.E.2d 725; State v. Brannon, 234 N.C. 474, 67 S.E.2d 633.

In the case of State v. Kittelle, supra, this Court upheld the conviction of the defendant, a licensed liquor dealer, where one of his employees sold beer to a minor in violation of the law. The conviction, however, was obtained under a statute which provided that such sale should be prima facie evidence of the violation thereof.

We do not consider the cases of State v. Smith, supra, and State v. Morrison, supra, to be in point on the question under consideration. Each of these cases involved an act which was illegal unless the defendant prior thereto had obtained a privilege license from the State authorizing the respective transactions complained of. In all such cases, when the State proves the commission of the act by the defendant, it makes out a prima facie case and the burden shifts to the defendant to show he was duly licensed to engage in the business or trade involved. In the instant case, the State seeks to prove by an inference or presumption that the defendant committed the offense complained of simply because he is the owner of the car and not by proof of any act committed by him, or by any one under his control or by his permission.

In State v. Garner, supra, the defendant was indicted under a statute which provided, 'No cattle shall be moved or allowed to move from any quarantined area of this or any other state, * * *.' The defendant lived in a quarantined area in Moore County near the Hoke County line. There was no fence between Hoke and Moore Counties. Hoke County was not in the quarantined area. The defendant owned a cow which was infected with cattle fever tick, and permitted her to run at large. As a result she strayed across the line into forbidden territory. The Court held that the act of turning the cow out, 'whereby she was permitted to stray, was done purposely, and therefore willfully.' Likewise, we do not think this case in point. An automobile does not move upon our streets and highways except when operated by some individual. But the owner of the diseased cow knew when he turned her out and permitted her to run at large near the Hoke County line, that in all probability she would do exactly what he was forbidden by law to allow her to do.

In the case of State v. Carter, supra [205 N.C. 761, 172 S.E. 416], the defendant was convicted of violating an ordinance of the City of High Point which provided that, "it shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to park any automobile, truck or any motor driven vehicle on the north side of English Street between College Street and Phillips Street' * * *. ' The question presented on the appeal to this Court did not involve the question now before us. The defendant in that case challenged the authority of the City of High Point to adopt and pass such an ordinance. This Court, in upholding the ordinance, said: 'All the evidence at the trial of this action shows that the defendant parked his automobile on English street, between College street and Phillips street, in violation of a valid ordinance of the city of High Point.'

The case of State v. Holbrook, supra, in keeping with prior decisions of this Court, held that upon an indictment for larceny, possession of the fruits of crime recently after its commission justifies an inference of guilt, and, though only prima facie evidence of guilt, may be controlling unless explained or accounted for in some way consistent with innocence. Even so, in such case, the burden is on the State to prove that the goods have been stolen and that the defendant is in possession of them. Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 16 S.Ct. 895, 40 L.Ed. 1090. However, the recent possession of stolen goods, without more, will not raise an inference or presumption that will support the charge, G.S. § 14-71, of receiving stolen goods knowing them to have been feloniously stolen or taken. State v. Best, 202 N.C. 9, 161 S.E. 535; State v. Lowe, 204 N.C. 572, 169 S.E. 180; State v. Oxendine, 223 N.C. 659, 27 S.E.2d 814; State v. Larkin, 229 N.C. 126, 47 S.E.2d 697.

The State also, in citing State v. Brannon, supra, points out that where, in a murder trial, it is proved or admitted that the defendant intentionally killed the deceased with a deadly weapon, the law implies malice, and the defendant is presumed to be guilty of murder in the second degree unless he shows mitigating circumstances to reduce the homicide to manslaughter or excuse it altogether. It will be noted, however, in such a case, the presumption of malice does not arise until it is proved or admitted that the defendant intentionally killed the deceased...