State v. Scott

• Decision Date: 07 December 2007
• Docket Number: No. 95,760.,95,760.
• Citation: 171 P.3d 639
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Billy L. SCOTT, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

171 P.3d 639

STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Billy L. SCOTT, Appellant.

No. 95,760.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

December 7, 2007.

Benjamin J. Fisher, senior assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Keith E. Schroeder, county attorney, and Paul J. Morrison, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee.

Jennifer E. Conkling, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant.

The opinion of the court was delivered by BEIER, J.:

Barkeep Billy Scott challenges his jury conviction of involuntary manslaughter for the death of patron Juanita Goodpasture, who expired the night she consumed a red, yellow, and green alcoholic concoction too aptly named "The Stoplight."

Evidence in the record before us is conflicting on exactly how much other alcohol Goodpasture consumed at Scott's establishment, The Point; on the exact contents of the three drinks composing "The Stoplight"; on whether Goodpasture drank "The Stoplight" to win a bet with Scott or a contest of his design; and on whether Scott offered a prize or refund if Goodpasture was able to refrain from using the bathroom and remain upright for 30 minutes after "The Stoplight" slid down her throat.

There is no conflict, however, on what happened to Goodpasture after she was assisted home from The Point. She passed out in the yard of her home, where her mother and a friend left her, alone and unconscious, until bar closing time. Goodpasture's mother and friends then worked together to get the 273-pound Goodpasture into her living room and left her alone again while they watched movies elsewhere.

The next day, Goodpasture was dead, a victim of acute ethanol intoxication. By the time of her autopsy, a blood alcohol content of .37 to .43 was detected. The examining physician opined that Goodpasture's aspiration of her stomach contents also could have contributed to her demise. Neither he nor any other witness testified that "The Stoplight," in particular, had a lethal role.

The State initially charged Scott under alternative theories of involuntary manslaughter—a violation of K.S.A.2004 Supp. 21-3404(c) based on the doing of a lawful act in an unlawful manner, and a violation of K.S.A.2004 Supp. 21-3404(a) based on unintentional and reckless behavior. After his arrest, it amended its complaint to charge Scott only under K.S.A.2004 Supp. 21-3404(c).

At trial, the relevant portion of Jury Instruction No. 6, taken from PIK Crim.3d 56.06, provided:

"In Count I, the defendant is charged with the crime of involuntary manslaughter. The defendant pleads not guilty.

"To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved:

1. That the defendant unintentionally killed Juanita Goodpasture;

2. That it was done during the commission of a lawful act in an unlawful manner. . . ."

Jury Instruction No. 7 stated:

"The laws of Kansas provide: No club, drinking establishment, caterer or holder of a temporary permit, nor any person acting as an employee or agent thereof, shall offer or serve any free cereal malt beverage or alcoholic liquor in any form to any person; or encourage or permit, on licensed premises, any game or contest which involves drinking alcoholic liquor or cereal malt beverage or the awarding of drinks as prizes."

Although Scott argues several sometimes interrelated issues on appeal, we conclude that two are dispositive and the rest, moot.

Necessity of Proof of Causation

We first address whether involuntary manslaughter, as defined in Kansas, requires the State to prove that a defendant's conduct caused the victim's death. Our standard of review on this question of statutory interpretation is de novo. State v. Bryan, 281 Kan. 157, 159, 130 P.3d 85 (2006); see also State v. Robinson, 281 Kan. 538, 539-40, 132 P.3d 934 (2006) (in interpreting statute, court must give effect to plain, unambiguous language, expressed intent of legislature). Although criminal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the accused, our interpretation must be reasonable and sensible in light of the legislature's word choice. See State v. Vega-Fuentes, 264 Kan. 10, 14, 955 P.2d 1235 (1998).

As mentioned, Scott ultimately was charged and convicted under K.S.A.2004 Supp. 21-3404(c), which defines involuntary manslaughter as "the unintentional killing of a human being committed ... during the commission of a lawful act in an unlawful manner." Nothing in this statute explicitly exempts bar owners or bartenders from criminal liability for the death of a patron if the elements of the criminal offense are proved. That being said, it does not appear that our involuntary manslaughter statute has ever been employed on similar facts, i.e., to prosecute a bar owner or bartender on the theory that violation of a statute regulating the dispensing of liquor resulted in fatal alcohol poisoning of a patron. See, e.g., State v. Bell, 273 Kan. 49, 51-52, 41 P.3d 783 (2002) (demonstrating typical invocation of K.S.A. 21-3404(c) as lesser included offense in murder case in which defendant claims lawful self-defense but may have exerted unlawful excess force, leading to unintentional death of victim); see also State v. Bell, 266 Kan. 896, 916, 975 P.2d 239, cert. denied 528 U.S. 905, 120 S.Ct. 247, 145 L.Ed.2d 207 (1999) (instruction on involuntary manslaughter not warranted where no evidence other than defendant's own statement that he fired first shot in self-defense); State v. Meyers, 245 Kan. 471, 474, 781 P.2d 700 (1989) (involuntary manslaughter instruction not available despite assertion of self-defense where evidence established that, after altercation, defendant went to his home, got a gun, went looking for the victims, fired warning shots, then closed his eyes and fired two shots, one of which struck and killed the victim); State v. Seelke, 221 Kan. 672, 673, 681, 561 P.2d 869 (1977) (wife's voluntary manslaughter conviction for shotgun slaying of her drunken husband who had just savagely beaten her and threatened both her and her twin babies reversed where evidence supported instruction on lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter based on lawful act, unlawful manner self-defense); State v. Gregory, 218 Kan. 180, 185-86, 542 P.2d 1051 (1975) (evaluating district court's instruction on manslaughter, holding jury could conclude self-defense with excessive force, justifying lawful act, unlawful manner involuntary manslaughter instruction).

Several Kansas cases arising under distinct factual circumstances demonstrate that convictions of involuntary manslaughter require proof that the defendant's conduct caused the victim's death. State v. Chastain, 265 Kan. 16, 25, 960 P.2d 756 (1998); State v. Collins, 36 Kan.App.2d 367, 371, 138 P.3d 793 (2006). Moreover, the victim's contributory negligence, while not a defense, is

"a circumstance to be considered by the jury along with all other evidence to determine whether the defendant's conduct was or was not the proximate cause of the decedent's death. In some instances, a decedent's contributory negligence may have been a substantial factor in his or her death and a superseding cause thereof; it may have intervened between a defendant's conduct and the fatal result so as to be itself the proximate cause." Chastain, 265 Kan. 16, Syl. ¶ 7, 960 P.2d 756.

See Collins, 36 Kan.App.2d at 371, 138 P.3d 793.

In Chastain, 265 Kan. 16, 960 P.2d 756, the defendant was charged with involuntary manslaughter after a fatality resulted from a collision at an intersection. The State contended the defendant was under the influence of alcohol and driving at a high speed; the defendant contended the victim's negligence in running a stop sign caused the accident. When, during deliberations, the jury asked if the fault of both parties could be considered, the district judge responded in the affirmative. On appeal, this court upheld the defendant's conviction of the lesser included offense of driving under the influence, holding that the district judge's response to the jury was correct and that causation was an essential element of the crime. 265 Kan. at 24-25, 960 P.2d 756.

In Collins, 36 Kan.App.2d 367, 138 P.3d 793, our Court of Appeals examined another involuntary manslaughter case involving an allegation that the defendant driver was under the influence of alcohol and his ultimate conviction on the lesser included offense of driving under the influence. At trial, the defense had relied on the victim's negligence in sitting on a stationary motorcycle in the middle of the road at night, arguing that the fatality accident would have occurred even if the defendant had been sober and reasonably prudent. On appeal, the State argued that the district judge had erred in instructing the jury on proximate cause. The appellate panel affirmed the conviction, holding that proof of involuntary manslaughter while driving under the influence required evidence that defendant's conduct proximately caused the victim's death. 36 Kan.App.2d at 371, 138 P.3d 793.

Other Kansas cases have consistently held likewise. See State v. Anderson, 270 Kan. 68, 72, 12 P.3d 883 (2000) (proof of proximate cause required); State v. Yowell, 184 Kan. 352, 336 P.2d 841 (1959) (more required for proof of involuntary manslaughter than mere unlawful act as attendant circumstance in series ultimately resulting in fatality; unlawful act must be proximate cause of victim's death); see also State v. Scott, 201 Kan. 134, Syl. ¶ 3, 439 P.2d 78 (1968) (evidence sufficient to sustain manslaughter conviction where death would not have resulted except for unlawful conduct); State v. McNichols, 188 Kan. 582, 586-87, 363 P.2d 467 (1961) (same; unlawful conduct must be proximate cause of death to support manslaughter); State v. Maxfield, 30 Kan.App.2d 873, 878-79, 54 P.3d 500 (2001), rev. denied 273 Kan. 1038 (2002) (holding evidence sufficient to support finding that defendant's conduct caused victim's death, thus supporting...