State v. Scott
Citation | 861 S.E.2d 892 |
Decision Date | 06 July 2021 |
Docket Number | No. COA19-250-2,COA19-250-2 |
Court | Court of Appeal of North Carolina (US) |
Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. William Lee SCOTT |
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Kathryne E. Hathcock, for the State.
M. Gordon Widenhouse, Jr., for defendant-appellant.
¶ 1 The Supreme Court of North Carolina remanded this case to this Court to determine whether the State has carried its burden to prove and to apply a harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt standard of review to Defendant's claim of constitutional error. Defendant's blood had been unlawfully seized from a hospital where Defendant was treated following an auto collision. This Court previously concluded the admission of blood alcohol concentration ("BAC") search results of Defendant's blood was error. On remand, we determine whether the State has proved the Fourth Amendment seizure violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See U.S. Const. amend. IV.
¶ 2 The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]" U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Supreme Court of the United States observed:
[t]he interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental human interests require law officers to suffer the risk that such evidence may disappear unless there is an immediate search.
Schmerber v. California , 384 U.S. 757, 769-70, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1835, 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 919 (1966). "The [Fourth] Amendment thus prohibits ‘unreasonable searches,’ ... [and] the taking of a blood sample ... is a search." Birchfield v. North Dakota , 579 U.S. ––––, ––––, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 2173, 195 L. Ed. 2d 560, 575 (2016) ; see also State v. Romano , 369 N.C. 678, 685, 800 S.E.2d 644, 649 (2017) ().
¶ 3 The Supreme Court of the United States also concluded: "The reasonableness of a search depends on the totality of the circumstances, including the nature and purpose of the search and the extent to which the search intrudes upon reasonable privacy expectations." Grady v. North Carolina , 575 U.S. 306, 310, 135 S.Ct. 1368, 191 L. Ed. 2d 459 (2015) (per curiam ). Blood tests: (1) "require piercing the skin and extract[tion of] a part of the subject's body"; (2) are "significantly more intrusive than blowing into a tube"; and (3) place in the hands of law enforcement "a sample that can be preserved and from which it is possible to extract information beyond a simple BAC reading." Birchfield , 579 U.S. at ––––, 136 S.Ct. at 2178, 195 L. Ed. 2d at 565-66 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶ 4 Without probable cause, exigent circumstances, or an exception to the warrant requirement, a warrantless search violates the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. This Court unanimously agreed Defendant's constitutional rights were violated. State v. Scott , 269 N.C. App. 457, 465, 838 S.E.2d 676, 681 (2020), rev'd , 377 N.C. 199, 2021-NCSC-41, 856 S.E.2d 507 (2021). See U.S. Const. amend. IV ; State v. Welch, 316 N.C. 578, 587, 342 S.E.2d 789, 794 (1986) ( ).
¶ 5 This Court also unanimously agreed Defendant's motion to suppress should have been allowed. Scott , 269 N.C. App. at 465, 838 S.E.2d at 681. The order resulting in the production of the blood to the State was not based on either probable cause or exigent circumstances. Id. at 464–65, 838 S.E.2d at 681.
¶ 6 We previously concluded Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated by law enforcement officers, compelling the production and seizure of his blood from the hospital without a warrant. We review whether the State has proved the subsequent introduction of evidence obtained from the State Bureau of Investigation laboratory's analysis of Defendant's blood and its admission at trial, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 7 Upon remand, the State must show, and this Court applies a harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt standard of review. The standard of review for federal constitutional errors applies to this case. See State v. Ortiz-Zape , 367 N.C. 1, 13, 743 S.E.2d 156, 164 (2013) () (quoting State v. Lawrence , 365 N.C. 506, 513, 723 S.E.2d 326, 331 (2012) ); State v. Autry , 321 N.C. 392, 399, 364 S.E.2d 341, 346 (1988) (); State v. Peterson , 361 N.C. 587, 594, 652 S.E.2d 216, 222 (2007).
¶ 8 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(b) "reflects the standard of prejudice with regard to violation of the defendant's rights under the Constitution of the United States, as set out in the case of Chapman v. California , 386 U.S. 18 , 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967)." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443 official cmt. (2019). The burden falls "upon the State to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error was harmless." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(b) (2019) ; see also Brecht v. Abrahamson , 507 U.S. 619, 630, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1717, 123 L. Ed. 2d 353, 367 (1993) ; Chapman , 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 827–28, 17 L. Ed. 2d at 710-11 ; Lawrence , 365 N.C. at 513, 723 S.E.2d at 331. "[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that [the error] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Chapman , 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828, 17 L. Ed. 2d at 708 ; see also Davis v. Ayala , 576 U.S. 257, 267, 135 S.Ct. 2187, 2197, 192 L. Ed. 2d 323, 332-33 (2015) ; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(b).
¶ 9 This Court allowed and received supplemental briefing on this issue from both parties. The State argues any error in the introduction and admission of the blood evidence and the results of BAC testing performed on the blood was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. The State argues other overwhelming evidence was properly admitted into evidence to show both: (1) Defendant was passing another vehicle at a high rate of speed in a no passing zone; and, (2) his admission he was driving recklessly and grossly speeding at and near the time of the collision with Veocia Warren's vehicle. The State asserts this evidence independently supports the jury's conclusion to prove the malice required for a conviction of second-degree murder by a motor vehicle to support the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 10 The State also argues Defendant's multiple prior convictions for impaired driving and speeding show knowledge, intent, and absence of mistake independently support the verdict and prove the introduction of the blood evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court also instructed the jury disjunctively that to convict, it must find "the defendant drove while impaired, and or drove in excess of the posted speed limit, and or drove recklessly." (emphasis supplied).
¶ 11 The trial court stated, As the trial court predicted, this Court and the...
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