State v. Scroggie, 16892

CourtCourt of Appeals of Idaho
Citation755 P.2d 485,114 Idaho 188
Docket NumberNo. 16892,16892
PartiesSTATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jesse Earl SCROGGIE, Defendant-Appellant.
Decision Date25 May 1988

Page 485

755 P.2d 485
114 Idaho 188
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
Jesse Earl SCROGGIE, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 16892.
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
May 25, 1988.
Petition for Review Denied June 30, 1988.

Page 486

[114 Idaho 189] Jonathan W. Cottrell, Sandpoint, for defendant-appellant.

Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.


Idaho Code § 19-3501(2) provides that, absent a showing of good cause to the contrary, a criminal prosecution must be dismissed when the defendant is not brought to trial within six months from the date the indictment or information is filed (unless the trial is postponed upon application of the defendant). The instant case raises the question whether I.C. § 19-3501(2) applies to the retrial of an action following remand upon an appeal. We hold that it does not.

In 1980, Jesse Scroggie was found guilty by a jury of second-degree murder. The judgment of conviction was subsequently reversed on appeal and the case was remanded for a new trial. State v. Scroggie, 110 Idaho 103, 714 P.2d 72 (Ct.App.1986). The appellate remittitur was issued on June 12, 1986. On July 29, 1986, the district court scheduled a new trial to commence on February 3, 1987. In mid-January, 1987, Scroggie moved for dismissal of the charge, under I.C. § 19-3501, because he was not brought to trial within six months after the remittitur was filed.

Scroggie's motion was denied by the court through a two-part analysis. First, the court determined that I.C. § 19-3501 was inapplicable because the trial required by the statute, i.e., within six months after the information was filed, had occurred in 1980. Having concluded the statute did not apply, the court next considered whether Scroggie's right to a speedy trial under the federal and state constitutions had been abridged. In making that determination, the court utilized the four-fold balancing test announced in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). 1 Applying that test to the period between the date of the remittitur and the date of the scheduled trial, the court concluded Scroggie's constitutional protections had not been violated. Consequently, the court denied the motion for dismissal.

Then, reaching a plea bargain agreement with the state, Scroggie pled guilty to an amended charge of voluntary manslaughter. The agreement included a recommendation by the prosecutor to the court that the sentence to be...

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2 cases
  • State v. Avelar
    • United States
    • Idaho Court of Appeals
    • 13 Junio 1996
    ...however, does not refer to any period following a remittitur from an appeal after a trial has once been held. State v. Scroggie, 114 Idaho 188, 190, 755 P.2d 485, 487 (Ct.App.1988), applying Olson v. State, 92 Idaho 873, 875-76, 452 P.2d 764, 766-67 (1969) (new trial necessitated by reversa......
  • State v. Avelar
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • 22 Enero 1997
    ...does not apply to retrial following successful appeal, relying on the plain language of the statute and on State v. Scroggie, 114 Idaho 188, 755 P.2d 485 (Ct.App.1988). The court did not address Avelar's argument that such an interpretation would violate equal protection principles under th......

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