State v. Scroggins

• Citation: 716 P.2d 1152,110 Idaho 380
• Decision Date: 19 December 1985
• Docket Number: No. 15457,15457
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Michael Shawn SCROGGINS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Idaho

Page 1152

716 P.2d 1152

110 Idaho 380

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Michael Shawn SCROGGINS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15457.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Dec. 19, 1985.

On Denial of Petition for Rehearing

April 29, 1986.

Kenneth F. White, and Van G. Bishop, Nampa, for defendant-appellant.

Jim Jones, Atty. Gen. and Lynn E. Thomas, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for the plaintiff-respondent.

HUNTLEY, Justice.

Michael Shawn Scroggins appeals from a conviction of first-degree murder and attempted rape of thirteen-year-old Mondi Lenten. Scroggins was sentenced to death for first degree murder and received a fixed sentence of ten years for the attempted rape to run concurrent with the death sentence. Scroggins' co-defendant, Albert Beam, was convicted of first-degree murder and rape and was sentenced to death for the murder and to a fixed 30 year term for the rape. In State v. Beam, 109 Idaho 616, 710 P.2d 526 (1985), this Court affirmed Beam's conviction and sentence.

Scroggins appeals his conviction arguing that the district court erred in using two separate juries, one for Scroggins and one for Beam, in a simultaneous trial. He also claims that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence certain state exhibits, erroneously refused to grant a new trial based upon new evidence and failed to properly instruct the jury.

Scroggins also appeals his death sentence challenging the constitutionality of Idaho's death sentencing procedure and contending that the trial court's findings in support of the death penalty were erroneous. He further maintains that the trial court imposed the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner and that the sentence imposed was excessive and disproportionate.

I. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Michael Scroggins stood charged by Information of the following crimes:

COUNT III

That MICHAEL SHAWN SCROGGINS on or about the 8th day of July, 1983 in the County of Canyon and State of Idaho, then and there being, did then and there wilfully, knowingly, intentionally, unlawfully, feloniously and with malice aforethought and premeditation, kill a human being, to wit: Mondi Jeanine Lenten, by then and there causing the said Mondi Jeanine Lenten to be drowned, thereby mortally wounding said Mondi Jeanine Lenten, from which wounds said Mondi Jeanine Lenten died on or about the 8th day of July, 1983, in the County of Canyon and State of Idaho.

All of which is contrary to Idaho Code Sections 18-4001, 18-4003(a), and 18-4004 and against the power, peace and dignity of the State of Idaho.

COUNT IV

That MICHAEL SHAWN SCROGGINS on or about the 8th day of July, 1983 in the County of Canyon and State of Idaho, then and there being, did then and there wilfully, knowingly, intentionally, unlawfully, feloniously, forcibly and against the consent of Mondi Jeanine Lenten, not the wife of said defendant accomplish an act of sexual intercourse with said female and she was prevented from resistance by threats of immediate and great bodily harm, accompanied by The Information also alleged that Scroggins, "did wilfully, knowingly, intentionally, unlawfully and feloniously commit those acts charged" in Counts III and IV "of the Information on file herein through the carrying, displaying, using, threatening or attempting to use a firearm or other deadly weapon, to wit: a knife."

[110 Idaho 382] an apparent power of execution on the part of the said defendant.

Scroggins' co-defendant Beam took the stand as a state witness and testified that Scroggins had raped the victim and that after Scroggins had raped the victim, he, Beam, had raped her. Beam also testified that Scroggins took the victim to a creek and there began pushing her head under water. According to Beam, Scroggins then slit the victim's throat. Beam claimed that because he, Beam, could not stand the sight of blood, he alone pushed her head under water until she was drowned.

Scroggins also testified at his own trial. He acknowledged that he had accompanied Beam and the victim to the creek and that at one point, he had handcuffed her. He conceded that the knife used to cut her throat belonged to him but said that he did not cut her. He admitted that he was present in the vicinity when Beam raped the victim, but said that he did not observe the act. He testified that he, Scroggins, had begun to mount the victim but had not proceeded to have intercourse with her. The morning after the crimes were committed Scroggins went to the police station and reported them. Although the officers did not at first believe Scroggins' story, he convinced them to believe him and took them to the scene of the crime.

As the judge noted at the time of sentencing, the Scroggins' jury, by its verdict, did not believe Beam's testimony. Scroggins' jury found that Scroggins did not use a knife, that he did not commit rape but was guilty of attempted rape, and that he did not directly commit the crime of murder but rather aided and abetted the commission of a felony-murder, a killing committed during the perpetration of an inherently dangerous felony, which in this case, was attempted rape.

II. DID THE TRIAL COURT DEPRIVE SCROGGINS OF DUE PROCESS BY JOINTLY TRYING HIM WITH HIS CO-DEFENDANT AND BY USING SEPARATE JURIES SITTING IN THE SAME COURTROOM?

Beam testified before his own jury and also testified before Scroggins' jury. Scroggins testified before his own jury only and did not testify before Beam's jury. Scroggins argues that the joint trial procedure employed here effectively denied him due process of law particularly in light of the testimony of one Sandra Wahlen. Wahlen, Beam's fiance, took the stand and began to testify as to statements made to her by Beam. Scroggins' attorney requested that Scroggins' jury be excused from the courtroom during Wahlen's testimony because the prosecutor's questions might elicit answers which would violate the Bruton rule. Beam's counsel similarly objected. The objection was sustained as to Scroggins but was overruled as to Beam. The trial court then removed the Scroggins' jury and the State pursued direct examination of Wahlen before the Beam jury only. Wahlen testified that on the evening of the murder, Beam told her, "I think I killed somebody." (Emphasis added). Scroggins' attorney considered that testimony to be inculpatory as to Beam but exculpatory as to Scroggins. Therefore, Scroggins' attorney requested that that portion of Wahlen's testimony be read back to the Scroggins' jury. The trial court did not grant that request but instead permitted the state to again call Wahlen to the stand and testify before the Scroggin's jury. When she resumed testimony, Wahlen stated that Beam had told her, "I think we killed somebody." This testimony was, of course, inculpatory as to both Beam and Scroggins. Scroggins insists that Wahlen's testimony violated the rule announced in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). In Bruton, in a joint trial of the petitioner and his accomplice, the prosecutor introduced the accomplice's While we conclude that the use of the dual jury system in the present case does not pose grounds for reversal, the potential for serious error in a complicated case may caution against its use.

[110 Idaho 383] confession into evidence through the testimony of a postal inspector. The accomplice, however, did not testify. The confession explicitly incriminated the petitioner. He objected, claiming a denial of confrontation. The district court cautioned the jury that the confession was admissible only against the accomplice. The Court of Appeals affirmed. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed. It found a denial of the right of confrontation notwithstanding the trial court's cautionary jury instruction. In the present case, since the accomplice, Albert Beam, in fact testified at Scroggins' trial, the Bruton situation was not present. In Bruton, the petitioner was unable to confront his accomplice because the accomplice did not testify. In the present case, Beam testified before Scroggins' jury and Scroggins had the opportunity to cross-examine him as to any statements presented through the testimony of other witnesses, such as Ms. Wahlen. Had Beam not testified in Scroggins' trial, our determination would be different, the result being that Ms. Wahlen's testimony would not have been admissible in Scroggins' trial. However, since Beam testified at Scroggins' trial, Scroggins was not denied the right of confrontation.

III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE DECEASED'S BODY?

As part of the state's case-in-chief, Dr. Thomas Donndelinger, a pathologist, was called to testify as to the cause of death, alleged in the Information to be drowning. During the course of the examination, the state presented several photographs of the decedent's body, which photographs depicted bruises and abrasions. The prosecutor asked Dr. Donndelinger whether the photographs would assist him in describing his observations and in articulating medical conclusions. When the state moved to admit the photographs, Scroggins' counsel objected, claiming that the photographs were highly prejudicial and designed to inflame the jury. With regard to the photographs, Dr. Donndelinger's testimony established the following: (1) Exhibit 64 depicted a photograph of the wound beneath the victim's chin; (2) Exhibit 65 was a close-up of the left side of the wound; (3) Exhibit 66 was a close-up of the wound under the upper part of the neck; (4) Exhibit 67 was another close-up of the right side of the wound. The prosecutor's questions for Dr. Donndelinger were not based on his observations of the photographs but of his observations of the actual throat wound. Scroggins contends therefore that the photographs were not introduced to assist Dr. Donndelinger in describing the wounds but rather to inflame the jury's passion.

Where allegedly inflammatory evidence is relevant and material as...